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“As almost all fires arise from inattention in one shape or another, it
is of the utmost importance that every master of a house or other es-
tablishment should persevere in rigidly enjoining and enforcing on those
under him, the necessity of observing the utmost possible care in pre-
venting such calamities, which, in nineteen cases out of twenty, are the
result of remissness or inattention. Indeed, if any one will for a moment
consider the fearful risk of life and property, which is often incurred from
a very slight inattention, the necessity of vigilance and care will at once
be apparent. Immense hazard is frequently incurred for the most trifling
indulgences, and much property is annually destroyed, and valuable lives
often lost, because a few thoughtless individuals cannot deny themselves
the gratification of reading in bed with a candle beside them.”
‘Fire Prevention including Fire-proof Structures’ (1866), written by James
Braidwood (1800-1861) (James Braidwood was founder of Edinburgh
Fire Brigade in 1824, the world’s first municipal fire service and, in 1833,
went on to become Superintendent of the London Fire Engine Establsh-
ment. He is referred to as the ‘Father of the British Fire Service’.)
“To myself I am only a child playing on the beach, while vast oceans of
truth lie undiscovered before me.”
Isaac Newton (1642-1727)
“If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old”
Peter F. Drucker (1909-2005) (referred to as the Father of modern man-
agement)
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Abstract
The problem at the heart of this research is the lack of objective information about
what actually causes the property fires commonly seen on the television and experi-
enced vicariously. Most people are unlikely to suffer a fire and are unable to imagine
the consequences of a fire in their home, in their village hall or at their place of work.
This means that an average manager in a company or organisation is ill-equipped to
formulate and manage a fire safety plan tailored to that company or organisation.
Those that do are hampered because there are no obvious ways of measuring the
standard of management needed to manage the plan successfully. Most people are
left to their own devices to decide how an ignition occurs, how quickly a fire can con-
sume a property, what contingencies should have been considered and so on. This
study investigates the relationship between fire damage and fire safety management
and hypothesises that most fire damage is the result of inadequate or unsuccessful
fire safety management.
A triangulation approach has been taken to the methodology utilised in this research
using two qualitative methods and one quantitative method. It offers three sets of
results:
• The first set is an authoritative categorisation of the components of fire safety
management consisting of a brief and concise description of each component
rated in order of importance. The categorisation fills a gap for a comprehensive
definition and aspires to become the accepted definition validated by objective
evidence.
• The second set of results are the opinions and priorities of those with most
influence on the practice and enforcement of fire safety on a university campus.
Diverse opinions and viewpoints between the practice and enforcement of fire
safety are highlighted and indicate a need for a greater understanding of each
other’s roles.
• The third set is the analysis of two sets of fire incident data comparing fire
v
damage occurring on a university campus against the fire damage occurring
throughout the area administered by one fire and rescue service. Frequen-
cies of fire damage occurring at different times of day, month and year are
emphasised and compared. The cost of fire damage on a university campus
is postulated. The model of analysis is one that could be developed into a
predictive management planning tool.
This research signals that the management of fire safety is important and its impor-
tance lies in reducing the amount of damage and impact which is the consequence
of fire. It contributes to that aim and opens the way to further research that could
turn the subjective subject of fire safety management into an objective science.
vi
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Preface
Warehouse fire
When fire broke out in a large 45,000m2 warehouse unit belonging to an international
clothing retailer, the outcome was the destruction and demolition of a building built
five years previously at a cost of £8 million. Half of the company’s entire stock of
clothing, said to be worth tens of millions of pounds in financial terms alone, was
destroyed in one night.
It is difficult for any business to continue after suffering such a large loss but, because
of risk protection, a strategic plan of action and a nearby vacant warehouse, the
company managed to not only survive this setback but is now, seven years later,
one of the leading UK High Street clothing retailers.
The author’s part in this fire incident, was to lead the investigation into the cir-
cumstances surrounding the fire to ascertain its cause. This question remained
unanswered at the completion of the investigation and the cause is still unknown.
However, in reviewing the substance of the investigation, some significant conclu-
sions were drawn from the evidence and the course of events leading up to the
ignition that caused the fire. These conclusions convinced the author of the crucial
role that fire safety management should play in the everyday life of a business. The
ability to measure the standard of fire safety management being performed would
also offer some confidence in the continuity of any business organisation.
The circumstances preceding the fire
The fire occurred some ten hours after a pipe had burst in the system of pipes
that supplied the whole site of twenty-eight warehouse units on a large distribution
estate, with water for their fire sprinkler protection systems. Each warehouse was
viii
fitted with sprinkler protection and the estate-wide system was designed to cope
with three fires occurring, simultaneously, in different warehouse units. When the
heat from a fire was detected, sprinklers in the affected unit operated and caused
a pressure drop in the system of water pipes, triggering the operation of one of
three water pumps situated in a pump-house on the edge of the estate. The pump
operated to re-pressurise the system with water from an adjacent lagoon. The burst
water pipe, positioned about two metres under the car park in front of the pump-
house, occurred spectacularly whilst the three pumps were being put through their
weekly tests.
The system of water pipes formed a ring main around the estate which was fed by
the spur from the three water pumps. The burst pipe in the pump spur meant that,
in effect, the ring main could not be re-pressurised with water from the lagoon, until
the burst had been repaired. This meant that the sprinkler protection in all twenty-
eight warehouse units was compromised should a fire occur whilst the condition
remained; a circumstance that had not been the subject of detailed planning.
The hastily formed action plan to repair the burst water pipe consisted of employing
a mechanical digger to expose the pipework underneath the car park so that it could
be repaired. However, during this operation, a gas main lying near to the water pipe
was ruptured causing a gas escape. This made further work to expose the pipework
impossible. The area around the the hole in the car park was evacuated and cordoned
off and the gas company were informed. No further work on the repair of the burst
water pipe could take place until the ruptured gas main had been stabilised or
repaired.
The original plan had estimated several hours for the repair of the water pipe but
the complication of the ruptured gas main now included a dynamic that was difficult
to evaluate. The gas company had to attend, assess and repair the gas main making
it difficult to estimate the amount of time it would take. It could now take, perhaps,
several days before the sprinkler system was re-commissioned.
It was during this period of uncertainty, approximately ten hours after the burst
water pipe had occurred, that a fire started in the midst of the racking of the
warehouse unit occupied by the international clothing retailer. The sprinklers above
the fire operated as soon as their operating temperature was reached and initially
controlled the fire for several minutes. The initial control provided by the stored
pressure in the system of pipes was lost over the next two or three minutes because
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the pumps were unable to supply replacement water from the lagoons. The fire,
having resisted the efforts of the sprinkler system to control it, now traveled away
from the point of ignition at an estimated speed of five metres per minute and,
having started near to the rear of the building, broke through the front face of the
building some thirty-five minutes later.
The exact cause of the fire has never been determined. That is to say, the source
of the ignition was not determined, the material that was ignited first was not
determined and, if the fire had been set by a human, the motive for setting the fire
was never determined. This was despite much sifting through evidence, particularly
in the form of CCTV images. However, this was of little consequence as, publicly,
all fault and certainly the focus of the insurance companies, was being placed firmly
on the shoulders of the management of the site claiming ineptitude in their repair
of the damaged pipe and incompetence for their being no method of bypassing the
faulty pipework.
Lack of management foresight
The author’s reflections on the investigation and, perhaps, the lack of a vested
interest in the fire incident, forced conclusions to be drawn which were different
from those being held publicly. If blame was to be placed, the author was inclined
to place it on the management of the warehouse unit and the present activity in
writing this thesis has its roots in this alternative conclusion.
Earlier on the day of the fire, only a short time after the burst pipe had occurred,
a verbal message had been circulated by the site management, to all twenty-eight
occupancies on the estate. The message informed each management team that its
sprinkler protection system would not operate if a fire should occur. The same mes-
sage was sent to inform the Control Centre of the fire and rescue service prompting
a decision by them to augment their pre-determined emergency response should a
fire call be received while the situation remained1.
The nature and character of the message was hardly appropriate for the crucial
information it contained; it was a short verbal telephone message that simply told
whoever received the message, the fact that there was a problem with the sprinkler
1This decision would prove to be quite inadequate but it may have been proved to be adequate
if there had been some action on the part of the occupiers.
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ring main and that their building’s sprinkler system would not operate successfully if
it was needed to. The message did nothing to spell out the danger to the continuity of
each business, the potential consequences of a fire to them or the environment and it
did not suggest any counter-measures that might be put into effect to compensate for
the deficiency. It was simply a hastily thought out attempt to alert the management
of each occupancy to a potential threat.
The message was received in the offices of the international clothing retailer by a
telephonist and immediately passed on to a manager. However, there is no evidence
that the manager took more than a passing glance at the information and also, there
was no evidence that any action was taken as a result. Much of the damage that
occurred in terms of finance, environmental damage, employment etc. could have
been avoided had there been a recognition of the threat that had been posed by the
situation.
For instance; initially, the information could have been confirmed by returning the
call from the site management asking for clarification of the message; was the in-
formation correct, how long would the system be out of commission, what contin-
gencies, if any, were in place and had they any suggestions regarding what to do?
Following confirmation, an assessment of the situation could have been carried out
which would have posed urgent questions about what the sprinklers were designed
to do and what would happen if they failed. A telephone call to the insurance com-
pany would have been in order and would have produced some immediate advice
from people experienced at mitigating against fire loss. The insurers would have
known the chance of a fire occurring and what the consequences would be if one did
occur. They would have assessed the risk and advised on the best course of action
to take to protect the building and its stock.
Once the management team were aware of the danger and provided with advice, it
would have been a simple matter for them to formulate an action plan. The effect of
the plan would have been to compensate for the lack of the sprinkler system. It could
have taken the form of a team of look-outs with ready access to fire extinguishers,
briefed of the circumstances and led by a manager. The chances are that the fire
would have occurred, it would have been quickly spotted and dealt with manually,
calling the fire and rescue service (five to seven minutes attendance time) to make
sure that the fire was extinguished.
The fact that this did not occur and, probably, did not happen in the other twenty-
xi
seven occupancies on that day, provides the volition behind this thesis. Adequate
fire safety management is integral to any management system because the threat
of fire presents a clear and present danger to any company or business or, for that
matter, any domestic household. Some way of measuring fire safety management
could offer a strategy to fire safety managers of assessing the standard enacted in
an individual property allowing them to concentrate on the elements that would
have most effect on reducing the probability of an ignition getting out of control.
Having reference to an index of the most likely types of property to suffer from poor
fire safety management based on the amount of damage resulting from a fire would
offer a strategy to fire officers to target and advise those properties on how to better
protect themselves.
Jim Baker
Hinckley, Leicestershire 2013
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1. Introduction
1.1. The problem
When a fire incident is reported on the television news, a dramatic incident unfolds.
A reporter is seen talking to camera, firefighters can be seen hurrying about at their
task and a column of smoke pouring out of the roof of a building. The reporter
presents the facts of when the firefighters were called, what factory is involved, how
many jobs are at risk and so on. Sometimes, dependent on the strength of evidence
presented to them at the scene, they will speculate about the cause of the incident;
an electrical fault, deliberate ignition, contractors working on the roof are some of
the causes often speculated.
Realistically, not much more can be expected from the reporter and, for most people,
it concludes their interest in the incident, but the report may be misleading because
it does not give the actual root cause of what led up to the fire. That sort of
information will, very often, be denied to all but the most assiduous researcher.
Information about the root cause, however, is critical.
Consider the following case; when the space shuttle Challenger exploded during take-
off in 1986, killing all seven crew members, there was much speculation by NASA
and the US Government regarding the continuation of the programme of launches.
The cause of the accident was identified and published by the Rogers Commission
in US Government (1986) but the shuttle programme was effectively frozen and
decisions had to be made about existing contracts that supplied the shuttle project.
One contract involved the supply of ammonium perchlorate, an oxidiser used in the
manufacture of solid rocket fuel, by a company situated in Las Vegas.
PEPCON was one of only two producers of ammonium perchlorate who continued to
manufacture the oxidiser even though NASA had cancelled the contract because they
believed the shuttle programme would re-commence once the investigation into the
1
1.1 The problem
Challenger accident was over. However, as can be seen in National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) (2012), PEPCON were not shipping the product and
the problem they faced was one of storage. Their solution was to store the product
on site in the car park surrounding the manufacturing plant. Storage was usually in
aluminium drums but when their supply of these ran out, PEPCON started to use
plastic drums to store the product.
There are conflicting reports on what caused the ignition of one of the plastic drums
containing the product but Routley (1988) attributes the ignition to either a dis-
carded cigarette or the sparks from a welding torch whilst employees were repairing
a steel structure that had been damaged in the wind. About twenty minutes after
the ignition of the plastic drum a series of explosions took place involving about
4500 tons of product. The explosions also ruptured a high pressure natural gas
pipeline buried underneath the plant. The incident claimed two lives, injured 372
people and caused damage estimated at over $100 million.
If the events and circumstances that contributed to this incident are analysed, the
root cause is not obvious. There are several possible causes that could have contrib-
uted. It may have been:
• the lack of supervision and risk assessment among the stored drums of product;
• the use of plastic drums because of the shortage of aluminium drums;
• the decision to stockpile the product in the car park and not a more secure
location;
• the decision to carry on producing the ammonium perchlorate because of in-
decision on the part of NASA and the US Government;
• the decision to build the plant producing and storing potentially explosive
substance over a high-pressure natural gas pipeline.
An overview of the incident could be taken which suggests that the cause of the acci-
dent was down to a lack of foresight for what might happen and a lack of awareness
for what was happening. With hindsight, it seems obvious that the complacency
shown in the decisions and lack of supervision by the managers when dealing with
something so potentially explosive, would lead to the outcome. But it was appar-
ently not obvious at the time.
Ammonium perchlorate along with many other flammable substances is stored safely
under certain conditions every day and in all parts of the world. It is the instiga-
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tion and maintenance of the conditions of storage that is the essence of fire safety
management.
The problem is the lack of objective information gleaned from the investigations
into fire incidents and the misperceptions about what actually causes the property
fires seen on the television. Most people are unlikely to suffer a fire and are unable
to imagine the consequences of a fire in their home, in their village hall or at their
place of work. Still less, to consider the loss of employment, the loss of a community
facility, the increase in insurance premiums etc. There are no means of measuring
the standard of management needed to manage fire safety successfully. Most people
are forced to rely on their own knowledge and experiences when concluding under
what circumstances an ignition is more likely to take place.
1.2. How would research impact on the problem
The problem has three strands:
1. There is a misperception about the root cause of a fire because there is a lack
of objective information about the cause of fires associated with certain types
of property or with certain categories of business.
2. The long-term consequences of a fire are difficult to imagine because, for the
majority of people, their only experience of a fire incident is experienced vi-
cariously.
3. There is no means of measuring whether the standard of fire safety manage-
ment associated with a certain type of property or certain category of business
is adequate.
The aim of this thesis is to add to the current level of information about the con-
nections between fire damage and fire safety management. If there is a correlation
such that the level of fire damage decreases when the level of fire safety manage-
ment increases, then this will be a mechanism for the use of fire safety managers
and regulators alike. It can also confirm the assertion:
The majority of fire damage resulting from property fires in the UK,
occurs as a result of a failure to manage fire safety successfully
If this assertion is accurate and a capability of measuring fire safety management
could be developed from it, fire safety managers would be able to improve their
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management strategies to not only counter the threat of prosecution but also to
build in a safety margin. In addition to this, regulators would be able to improve
the targeting of businesses and organisations and concentrate their inspection regime
on those where objective evidence suggests they are at a higher risk than others.
If there is a correlation between the standard of fire safety management and the
amount of fire damage, an improved standard would equal a reduction in damage.
This may also lead to a reduction in the number of emergency responses from the
fire and rescue service and the opportunity for them to turn reactive resources into
proactive resources.
1.2.1. Is there a financial aspect to the research
The rising financial cost of fire gives rise to another need for research. Particularly
when the rising cost of fire in England and Wales is compared against the falling
number of fire deaths. The fire and rescue service in England and Wales has, for a
number of years, pursued the aim of reducing the number of fire deaths caused in
accidental fires in dwellings. They have been successful in this endeavour and, as
can be seen in Figure 1.1, the number of fire deaths has reduced quite significantly
over the period from 2000 to 2008. In contrast, as can also be seen in Figure 1.1,
the cost of fire has been increasing over the same period.
The outcome of this research will not in itself, reduce the cost of fire but its results
offer opportunities that could assist in achieving that outcome. For instance:
• The categorisation of fire safety management given in Chapter 4 on page 60 is a
foundation on which could be built a rudimentary system of measurement. The
measurement would be aimed at measuring the ability of each management
category to reduce the amount of fire damage that occurs and could be based on
objective evidence acquired from the fire incident database. This would allow
both the fire safety managers and the fire and rescue service to concentrate on
those categories associated with the most damage;
• The interviews reported on in Chapter 5 on page 82 give an idea of the opin-
ions and motivations of those with influence on the fire safety management of
Loughborough University campus. They reveal some differences that currently
impede progress in reducing fire damage. Understanding the differences could
help to overcome the impediments;
4
1.2 How would research impact on the problem
• The quantitative results of the case study found in Chapter 6 on page 103
indicate the potential for a model used for forecasting the likely amount of
fire damage at certain times of day, month or year and so on. The ability to
forecast this allows more informed management decisions to take place.
Figure 1.1.: Comparing the decrease in fire deaths with the increase in the eco-
nomic cost of fire
Figures from 2000 to 2004 are for England and Wales; figures from 2005 onwards are for England
only (Source: UK Government)
The research investigates the relationship between fire damage and fire safety man-
agement using the Loughborough University Campus as an example. The research
postulates the hypothesis:
If it is the case that an acceptable standard of fire safety management is
practiced in Loughborough University then there is likely to be less fire
damage when a fire occurs.
The hypothesis makes certain assumptions:
Firstly: that there is a correlation between the standard of fire safety management
and the amount of fire damage.
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Secondly: that there is no measure of the standard of fire safety management.
Thirdly: that there is no measure of fire damage that takes into account all of its
impact.
Confirming the hypothesis would be addressing all three strands of the problem. Es-
tablishing a correlation between the level of fire safety management and the amount
of fire damage could yield objective evidence suggesting that certain types of prop-
erty are susceptible to more, or less, fire damage. Objective evidence could take the
place of experience and knowledge to reduce misperceptions and to inform interested
parties. Associating fire damage with types of property and/or types of business
could introduce and promote a system of measuring the level of management needed
to reduce the amount of fire damage.
The performance of fire safety management could be measured by the following
logic:
1. Fire damage assessed to an agreed model is recorded and linked to the type of
property in which the fire occurred. This will produce a hierarchy of property
types associated with the most damage to those with the least damage.
2. A continuum of property types is developed from the hierarchy if those with
the most recorded fire damage are situated at one end of the continuum and
those with the least recorded fire damage are situated at the other end. This,
in itself, would be a simple visual measurement indicating which types of
property are more prone to fire damage.
Inferences could made from this simple visual measurement because those properties
associated with the most recorded fire damage are likely to be those that:
• generate the most reactive activity by the fire and rescue service in terms of
an immediate response with extinguishing and rescue equipment;
• create most damage to the local economy in terms of local disruption, loss of
employment and business interruption;
• constitute most damage to the environment in terms of air and ground pollu-
tion.
It becomes obvious that identifying and tackling those property types associated
with the most recorded fire damage could have a beneficial effect overall.
3. A much more detailed focus on the types of property associated with the most
fire damage would be achieved by accurate investigation of the circumstances
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of the fire. National fire incident reporting in England, Northern Ireland,
Scotland and Wales collects such variables as:
a) the cause of the fire,
b) the source of the ignition of the fire;
c) the item that was ignited first;
d) the material mainly responsible for the development of the fire.
These variables are all elements in the process of combustion and they can all be
controlled. For instance, the item first ignited could have been kept separated from
the ignition source so that it did not ignite. Or the material responsible for the
development of the fire could have been separated from the item that was ignited
first so that it did not assist with the combustion. Because they are capable of
being controlled, the variables could be the subject of a system of management
to maintain their separation. As such, they have a direct relationship with the
management of fire safety. Associating these variables with certain types of property
and/or categories of business begins to generate property and/or business profiles.
This would improve and add to the understanding of the relationships between the
recorded fire damage and the controllable components of fire safety management.
4. Analysis of the variables that have a direct relationship with the management
of fire safety provides a deeper understanding of their influence on each other.
Studying the frequencies of data collected in the variables would indicate which
variables have a bigger probability of occurring.
5. Monitoring the fire incident and fire investigation data allows refinement of
the analysis to improve the quality of the data.
1.3. The solution to the problem
The management of fire safety is the control and supervision of combustion countered
with adequate contingencies for when that control or supervision breaks down. There
are three things that come together to create combustion; some kind of fuel, heat
from a variety of sources and oxygen from the atmosphere, all mixed together in
their correct proportions. Good fire safety management can be defined as the control
and supervision of these three elements, whilst effective fire safety management can
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be defined as the control and supervision of those three elements having regard for
the circumstances in which they are to be found.
However, this is not very helpful to someone who has been appointed as a fire safety
manager in a company or an organisation and is looking for advice regarding how
best to control and supervise combustion. There are definitions; and there is also a
plethora of guidance and helpful assistance available from many creditable sources1.
Yet, it appears, from research into fire incidents, that, to some extent, it is ignored.
Take, for example, these incidents:
• a textile factory in Karachi, Pakistan in September 2012 when 289 factory
workers died when fire broke out. The evacuation was obstructed by a lack of
satisfactory fire exits, storage of finished and unfinished garments and secur-
ity measures (source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19566851: ac-
cessed 6 August 2013);
• the Lame Horse Nightclub in Perm, Russia on 5 December 2009 when 150
people died and 160 people were injured when a firework used as part of the
performance ignited the plastic ceiling above the stage. Smoke quickly filled
the nightclub but the evacuation was obstructed by one leaf of a double fire
exit door being sealed shut and alternative exits not illuminated to indicate
they were there (source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8396587.stm: accessed 6
August 2013);
• the Station Nightclub in Rhode Island, USA in February 2003 when 100 people
died when a firework on stage ignited the walls and ceiling of the stage. The
evacuation was obstructed by a table placed in the hallway leading to the main
entrance, security guards preventing use of the exit by the stage and a lack of
direction by staff (source: Grosshandler et al, 2005).
This last example, that of the Station Nightclub in Rhode Island, was widely re-
ported and thoroughly investigated by NIST following the incident. The report of
the incident by Grosshandler et al (2005), is extensive and comprehensive and freely
available over the internet. The investigation was assisted by the existence of a video
recording taken by one of the surviving occupants at the time the fire occurred. The
video dramatically shows the inception of the fire and its dynamics as it begins to
1Examples of guidance for the management of fire safety, in the UK alone, are the British Stand-
ards Institute (BSI) and the UK Government (guidance is freely available to download from
the UK Government).
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evolve the smoke that caused the high death toll2.
If this illustrates the problem, then the solution to the problem is an adequate stand-
ard of fire safety management. That means firstly; adequate control and supervision
of ignition sources and combustible materials. Secondly, satisfactory contingencies
for when that control and supervision falters.
1.4. Life safety and property protection
The protection of life from fire is treated very seriously in the UK. Community fire
safety is described by London Fire Brigade as the effort made by them to help people
stay safe from fire and other emergencies in the home, at work and in London’s other
buildings. Their community fire safety efforts include; offering fire safety visits to
people in their own homes and fitting free smoke alarms where necessary. Visiting
schools to talk to schoolchildren about fire safety. Working with other agencies to
target those identified as the most vulnerable from fire. Reducing the frequency
of deliberately started fires. Advising on safety in the workplace and working with
developers and building inspectors to improve safety in buildings. Enforcing their
responsibilities under fire safety legislation3.
This emphasis on life safety is characteristic of the way fire safety is addressed
in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. All individual fire and rescue
services emulate London Fire Brigade to some degree. The emphasis is present in
building codes relating to the construction of buildings and in fire safety legislation
relating to the occupation and use of buildings. For example, the legislation covering
construction of buildings in England and Wales (the Building Act, 1984) allows
the Government to make regulations in respect of the design and construction of
buildings with regard to the health, safety, welfare and convenience of persons who
are in, affected by or connected with the buildings. While the fire safety legislation
relating to the provision of fire safety in non-domestic occupied buildings in England
and Wales (the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order, 2005), identifies a duty to
ensure that the premises are safe for occupants.
2A copy of the video recording can be found on YouTube at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOzfq9Egxeo (accessed on 26 March 2013)
3Information taken from London Fire Brigade’s website : http://www.london-
fire.gov.uk/CommunitySafety.asp (accessed on 29 March 2013).
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The duty is for preservation of life rather than the preservation of such matters as
the building, the continuity of the business, the investment in jobs and resources
etc. and the roots of this in Britain, probably lie in a report from the Departmental
Committee on the Fire Service chaired by Holroyd (1970) and known as ‘The Holroyd
Report’. One of the recommendations in this report was that fire safety should be
organised to reflect a natural division in the subject; one aspect should have regard
to new and altered buildings and the other to occupied buildings.
The report proposed a new Fire Safety Act but concluded that it was not practical
to combine the two aspects into one law. So it advocated that the maintenance of
safety in occupied buildings should be the subject of a new law giving the statutory
responsibility for enforcement to the fire and rescue service. The result was the Fire
Precautions Act (1971), enacted in England, Scotland and Wales, which gave the fire
and rescue service the implementation and enforcement of the “protection of persons
from fire risks; and for purposes connected therewith” to premises designated by the
British Government Secretary of State.
The Fire Precautions Act (1971) was exceptional because it was the first piece of fire
safety legislation in the UK under which the fire and rescue service had been given
responsibility for enforcement. The requirements of the legislation were principally
to do with life safety:
• the provisions for means of escape in case of fire;
• the provisions for securing the means of escape in case of fire;
• the provisions for fighting a fire;
• the means for giving people warning in case of fire.
This division between the focus on life safety and the focus on protection of property
was reflected in the House of Lords by Lord Windlesham in 1971 when outlining
the passage of the Fire Precautions Act (1971). He emphasised that the legislation
was concerned with the preservation of life rather than the preservation of buildings
when he said that the parliamentary committee had come to the conclusion that
"it would be neither appropriate nor practicable to try to compel owners,
by legislation, to protect their property against damage by fire, but that
this should continue to be left to voluntary arrangements between owners
and their insurance companies." HL Hansard (1971)
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The Fire Precautions Act (1971) was regarded as a milestone in fire safety legislation
because the Home Office had involved the Fire Inspectorate in its drafting and its
implementation and enforcement had been entrusted to the fire and rescue service.
Fire safety had become politicised due to a number of fires with loss of life associated
with poor fire safety (HC Hansard, 1960, 1961, 1970; HL Hansard, 1971). Those
fires that became the subject of politics include:
Eastwood Mills in Keighley UK in 1956 where eight people died because of a lack
of a fire warning system and inadequate means of escape from fire. The con-
sequences of this fire led to an amendment of the Factories Act (1959) (Grice,
2009).
Henderson’s Store in Liverpool UK in 1960 where eleven people died because of
the rapid spread of fire in the ceiling voids and through fire doors wedged
open because it was a hot day. The consequences of this fire gave an impetus
to review the fire provisions in the Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act
(1963) (Grice, 2009).
The Top Storey Club in Bolton UK in 1961 where nineteen people died because of
the lack of fire warning and their inability to use the single access stairway from
the ground floor. Some of the nineteen died by attempting to jump into the
canal that ran alongside the building. It was felt that many more would have
died but for the fact that there were only twenty-five people in the premises
at the time of the fire. The nineteen who died represented about 75% of the
people in the premises. The consequences of this fire led to an amendment of
the Licensing Act (1964) (Grice, 2009).
The Rose and Crown Hotel in Saffron Walden UK in 1969 where eleven people
died in a hotel built in the 16th Century. The fire started in a TV set even
though the set had been switched off. Heat and smoke was allowed to spread
through the building because fire-resisting doors were left open or did not fit
properly. The fire warning system was operated but it only lasted a short
time before fire destroyed its control panel. The consequences of this fire gave
impetus to the enactment of the Fire Precautions Act (1971) (Grice, 2009).
The Club Cinq-sept at Laurent du Pont near Grenoble in France in 1970 where 146
people died when a fire rapidly developed because of the combustible décor and
furnishings. People were trapped because the emergency exits were padlocked
and barred with planks of wood to deter gatecrashers. The consequences of
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this fire focused attention in the British Parliament during the passage of the
Fire Precautions Bill and assisted its passage into law (Grice, 2009).
Woolworths in Manchester in 1979 when 31 people died and 53 people were injured
when fire broke out in the furniture department on the second floor. Thick
smoke from burning polyurethane furniture obscured fire exit signs and con-
fused many faced with finding their way out. The consequences of this fire led
to the enactment of the Furniture and Furnishings (Fire) (Safety) Regulations
(1988).
Bradford City Football Stadium in Bradford UK in 1985 when 58 people died.
This fire occurred during a televised football match in full view of the TV
cameras. A lighted cigarette ignited litter and debris underneath a timber
stand. The majority of deaths occurred at the rear of the stand where people
tried to exit through the entry turnstiles which had been locked when the
match started. The consequences of this fire led to the enactment of The Fire
Safety and Safety at Places of Sport Act (1987) (Popplewell, 1985).
King’s Cross Underground Station in London UK in 1987 when 31 people died.
A lighted cigarette or match ignited the debris, grease and fluff underneath the
timber escalator in the machinery room and then ignited the wooden escalator
steps. The spread of fire into the Ticket Hall at the top of the escalator
was assisted by the flow of air coming from arriving and departing trains in
the tunnels below. The incident led to the enactment, following the inquiry
by Desmond Fennell, of the Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations)
Regulations 1989 (Fennell, 1988).
These fires were all notable in that they gave impetus to a change in UK legislation.
The public outcry following the incidents caused the UK Parliament to react with
new legislation. This occurrence gave rise to the term, ‘stable-door legislation’.
There is no such emphasis on property protection in the UK. All of the above fires
caused extensive damage to the properties from heat, smoke, water and so on and
some damage to the capability of the occupiers to carry on with business the next
day. Property protection and business continuity have little meaning when compared
with the protection of life. The resultant legislation from these fire incidents was
focused on preventing more damage to life rather than more damage to property.
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1.4.1. Incidents in nightclubs
A nightclub fire has occurred during the writing of this thesis causing the death of
some 230 patrons out of an estimated 1000 to 2000 people in the building at the time.
The fire occurred in the Kiss nightclub in Santa Maria, Brazil on 27 January 2013
and was reportedly the result of a firework being let off on stage. Allegations from
eyewitnesses appearing in the press itemise the use of an outdoor firework on stage,
the quick ignition of the ceiling material above the stage, the fast evolution of dense
choking smoke, the prevention of people evacuating until they had paid their bills, a
single point of entry and exit and so on. All items that would have been addressed,
controlled and minimised by a competent system of fire safety management. One
that had fully considered the risks involved around the suitability and use of the
building as a nightclub permitting an occupancy of more than 1000 people. Not
addressing these issues could easily be argued as failings in the management system.
This is not the first nightclub fire associated with a high death toll. The Lame
Horse Nightclub in Perm Russia and the Station Nightclub in Rhode Island have
already been mentioned above. In the case of the latest one, the Kiss nightclub in
Santa Maria, Brazil, it seems unlikely that anyone would have considered that over
1000 people relaxing, drinking and enjoying themselves late at night, could have
successfully evacuated through one exit in an emergency. It is worth hypothesising
that if the fire had been situated so that it involved and effectively blocked off the
one available exit, then conceivably the death toll would have been far higher than
it actually was!
Nevertheless, a competent system of fire safety management would have been mind-
ful of the inadequacies of the building and would have either run an enterprise
suitable to those conditions or made such changes to the building that would have
eradicated or minimised the risk that became so apparent.
The list of nightclub fire tragedies is, unfortunately, still growing and it is becoming
increasingly difficult to believe that nightclub managers are so naive and unaware
of their responsibilities that they do not realise the potential for disaster.
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1.5. The cost of fire in the UK
In a UK Government publication, Roy (1997) reported on an attempt to measure
the cost of fires to society. He determined two major categories:
• direct and indirect costs such as the loss of and damage to property, fatalities
and injuries and disruption to business;
• the costs of preventing, containing and fighting fires such as the provision of
a fire and rescue service and the cost of reducing the risk of a fire occurring.
This seems inadequate when attempting to place a true value on a property. Perhaps
the question should be re-phrased:
If the cost of a property fire were the total of the costs of:
• fatality, injury and rehabilitation (the costs of a death and the hospitalisation
and rehabilitation of injured people);
• the emergency response (the actions of fire, police, ambulance, local authority
and so on);
• interruption to business including:
– the inability to produce goods;
– the loss of business potential because the business was exclusive, or it
was a skilled trade or it was a unique supplier or other;
– the interruption to adjacent businesses because of their inability to pro-
duce because of pollution, flooding, or until the area has been made safe
and so on;
• damage to the environment because of air and ground pollution, loss of habitat
and flora and fauna, pollution of watercourses and so on;
• re-building (i.e. design, planning and building permissions, building materials,
contractors, employees and so on);
• damage to the climate because of the production of energy used in producing
new building materials for reconstruction and energy used in the reconstruction
itself;
• damage to the community because of loss of employment, loss of convenience,
loss of independence and so on;
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• damage to heritage because it was irreplaceable, it was unique, it had emo-
tional value and so on.
Then, conversely, a more realistic value of a property must be its potential:
• to protect the health and lives of those who use it;
• to survive a fire without the assistance of the emergency services;
• to carry on its business or purpose during and following a fire incident;
• to refrain from disrupting its adjacent buildings;
• to cause no damage to the environment;
• to fully serve the community that depends on it;
• to preserve its heritage.
1.5.1. Fire damage
Compare two scenarios: the first scenario is a fire incident that destroys the com-
munity facility in a small village in a rural district. The second scenario is a fire
incident that destroys the community facility in the centre of a large city. It is
worth looking at the differences when estimating the loss of the two properties or
the damage caused to each community.
For the sake of argument, we will assume that the economic loss or the cost of
re-building, is roughly the same; the damage to the environment through smoke,
pollution from fire-fighting water and so on, is roughly the same; but is the loss to
the community different?
It is likely that the community facility in the small rural village is used for meetings of
the council, meetings of local groups such as Scouts and Guides, wedding receptions,
birthdays and celebrations and it is likely to be in use every day. To lose this would
be quite significant to the life of the village because the nearest alternative might
be in the next village some distance away. Its replacement would be imperative and
the focus of the ruling authority.
With regard to the community facility in the centre of a large city, the facility might
be used for much the same reasons and also in use for much the same periods of
time. However, the need for its replacement would not be so urgent because there
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would be alternatives within easy reach and it is doubtful that the ruling authority
would focus on its replacement with such zeal as it would in the rural village.
So, it could be argued that the loss of the community facility in the rural village
would result in more damage to the village community than the loss of the com-
munity facility in the centre of a large city would to the city community.
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2.1. Overview
The capitals of many countries are characterised by shanty towns where impover-
ished people seek employment and and build unauthorised dwellings. In its 2008
report A Big Devil in the Jondolas, Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement SA (2008);
a shack dwellers movement in South Africa1 state that on average in South Africa,
there are ten shack fires a day, with someone dying in a shack fire every other day.
Abahlali baseMjondolo complain that lack of tenure stops shack dwellers from up-
grading their homes with less flammable building materials and the refusal to allow
shack settlements access to electricity leads to the use of dangerous sources of light
and heat, such as paraffin stoves and candles. Most fire safety practitioners would
agree that given these conditions, it is little wonder that fires occur, that they spread
quickly from dwelling to dwelling and that they cause injuries and fatalities amongst
the population. Historians would agree that similar conditions existed in the major
cities of the UK during the Industrial Revolution2 in the 18th and 19th Centuries
when people in rural areas moved into the cities for employment.
Efforts to control fire in the UK came in the form of control over the construction
of buildings. Acts of Parliament, such as an Act for rebuilding the City of London
(1666), enacted by Monarch Charles II and an Act for rebuilding the town of War-
wick and for determining differences touching houses burnt or demolished by reason
of the late dreadful fire there (1694) enacted by Monarchs William III and Mary II,
were the result of major fires. They were designed to prevent a fire in one building
1Abahlali baseMjondolo is a shack-dwellers’ movement in South Africa well known for its cam-
paigning for public housing. "Jondolo" is a South African term for a shack. "Abahlali" are the
residents who have no option except to live in one.
2The Industrial Revolution describes the process of mechanisation of agriculture, the manufacture
of textiles and the process of industrialisation and forced sweeping social effects on the lives of
rural workers.
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easily transferring to an adjacent building either through the connecting/party wall3
or via the roof. It was recognised that combustible roofing materials encouraged the
fire to travel from one building to the next and so the legislation insisted that roofs
should be constructed in non-combustible materials such as lead, tiles or slate.
This approach to the problem of fire spreading quickly and travelling from building to
building, was effective and is the reason that so many pre-war buildings still survive
in the UKs major towns and cities following the large fires and conflagrations caused
by bombing in the Second World War. This is not to be disingenuous to the efforts
of the firefighters during that conflict as the part they played in the protection of
the UK capital is well documented. A quote from the book ‘Firemen at War by
Wallington (2005), gives a flavour of their organisation, determination and fortitude:
"During Blitz raids, firefighters were often the only human signs of life
in the streets. Their tasks involved facing the enemy perils of bomb blast,
flying shrapnel and collapsing buildings, to tackle fires that quickly grew
into conflagration proportions, bigger than anything seen in peacetime.
Choked by thick smoke, scorched by swarms of burning embers, often
dehydrated and suffering severe water shortages, the firefighting teams
somehow gained the upper hand before the first bombers of the Luftwaffe
arrived on the following day, heralding the beginning of the struggle all
over again. And, in September 1940, this was only the beginning..."
Extract from the book ‘Firemen at War’ by Neil Wallington.
The fires of the Second World war highlighted another issue in the UK to do with
protection of buildings regarding the provision of a fire-fighting force. It was obvious
that the biggest protection of buildings stemmed from the methods of construction
and the type of materials used in construction. This would prevent the passage of fire
from building to building but, as buildings became more complex and more valuable
as business premises, there was an increasing need for a firefighting force capable of
extinguishing a fire in the building where the fire originated. However, the method
of providing a firefighting force in the UK before the Second World War was not
nationally organised. Many pre-war fire brigades were organised by the municipal
authorities or by large manufacturing businesses; some were publicly funded, some
were privately funded, some employed paid firefighters and others were staffed by
3A party wall refers to the wall (or walls) that usually separate buildings. For example, in a
semi-detached or terraced house the party wall is the wall shared with the adjoining house
(source: Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors).
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volunteers. There were few standards to regulate the training of firefighters or the
type of equipment they used. The issue that became critical during the defence
of the major cities in the UK during the Second World War was that there were
differences in the make and type of equipment that each fire brigade was provided
with. This lack of standardisation of equipment meant that, in many cases, the
equipment used by one fire brigade could not be supported by or used with the
equipment from another fire brigade simply because there were different makes of
equipment and it was not designed to fit together. Recorded in HC Hansard (1945),
the solution was to form the National Fire Service out of the existing fire brigades
and the Auxiliary Fire Service4 in which common standards could be regulated.
Following the ending of hostilities consideration was given to re-organising the fire
service in the UK and led to the enactment of the Fire Services Act (1947).
2.2. Fire Safety
Andrews (1891), in his book Old Church Lore relates that when the monarch, Alfred
the Great5, founded the University at Oxford in 872, he directed that a bell should
be rung every night at eight when all the inhabitants of Oxford should cover up
their fires and go to bed. Why this rule was imposed is not recorded but it may be
speculated that it was because of the inconvenience and disruption caused by the
structure fires resulting from open hearth cooking and heating fires.
Andrews (1891) also writes that William the Conqueror, following the Norman’s
colonisation of Britain after their invasion and victory over the English at Hastings
in 1066, reinforced Alfred’s rule by passing his own legislation that the population
should extinguish all cooking fires and candles at the sounding of a church bell
at eight o’clock each evening6. There is debate about William’s intentions for re-
inforcing the rule; Andrews (1891) writes that some scholars attribute it with no
intention, insisting that it was a common rule in Normandy where it was usually
accompanied by a religious service. Other scholars say that it was a method of
4The Auxiliary Fire Service was formed to assist the existing fire brigades which had become
overwhelmed by the amount of work caused by bombing during the Second World War.
5Alfred the Great reigned as King of England from 871 to 899.
6The sounding of a church bell at eight o’clock each evening is a custom still practised in
some European villages and towns. Two examples are Castleton in Derbyshire (see webpage:
http://www.peaklandheritage.org.uk/index.asp?peakkey=31002121: accessed 7 August 2012)
and Strasbourg in France.
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preventing seditious associations and conspiracies. It is pure speculation to suggest
that it was a form of fire safety but it is tempting to suppose that lives and property
were saved as a result of this order.
Extinguishing the cooking fire was assisted with the use of a couvre feu,7 which
was a clay bowl-shaped device that fitted over the fire. This excluded the oxygen
and hindered the combustion whilst, at the same time, preserving the heat of the
fire and enabling the fire to be easily re-kindled next morning. Andrews (1891) also
writes that the phrase, couvre feu became anglicised by usage to curfew, a word that
is still in use associating the control of a population by force during periods when
authorities believe treacherous acts will be carried out under cover of darkness.
Fire continued to be commonplace throughout the Middle Ages. Two major fires
were recorded in London before the one reported by Samuel Pepys as the Great Fire
of London in 1666. Bucholz and Ward (2012) write that fires that devastated the
city were recorded as early as 125. As an illustration, they relate that the first St.
Paul’s Cathedral burnt down in 675, the second in 961 and the third in 1087.
The fire in 1666, commonly known as The Great Fire of London, started in the shop
of the baker to Charles II in Pudding Lane. According to Samuel Pepys’ account
of the fire8, the baker’s maid failed to extinguish the ovens and the heat ignited
the timber-framed building. The fire quickly spread to other neighbouring timber-
framed buildings and then spread throughout the city, transferring from house to
house, assisted by the congested streets and the wooden buildings with thatched
roofs. Fewer than ten people lost their lives in this fire because the fire was spotted
early, it progressed slowly from building to building and sufficient warning was given
to the people affected by it. St Paul’s Cathedral was again devastated by fire but, as
Lang (1956) records, this was rebuilt in the years following the fire by Sir Christopher
Wren and is the building that is recognisable as St Paul’s Cathedral today.
It is arguable that modern fire safety started with the 1666 Great Fire of London
and that this was the spur necessary for those in authority in London to take a hard
look at measures that might prevent the same thing happening again. This meant
deciding whether or not it was wise to construct timber-framed buildings so closely
together that flames could easily jump from one building to another.
7‘Couvre feu’ was literally ‘fire cover’ in French.
8Samuel Pepys (1633 to 1703) became famous for chronicling the turbulent years of the 17th
Century in his diaries.
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It was recorded that very few people lost their life or were injured in the Great
Fire of London yet a great many people lost their property and belongings to the
fire. This was probably because although the fire occurred around midnight and
most of the population had retired to bed (supposedly the most unsafe time for the
occupant of a dwelling), the fire was discovered very quickly and gave time for the
occupants of neighbouring buildings to evacuate their buildings and get to a place
of safety. However, very many more of London’s population were affected by the fire
and many people who escaped with their lives from the fire, nevertheless became
homeless over the ensuing days as the fire spread from house to house.
The reaction to the destruction of a large part of London by the Monarch, Charles
II, was speedy and effective but it was because of the property loss and not because
of the loss of life. The Act for rebuilding the City of London (1666), enacted by
Charles II, specified four types of house that could be built in the regeneration of
London. The Act stated that only four types of house would be permitted to be built
and the choice of which house type could be built was dependent on its location.
The property had to be the first type of house if it fronted onto a lane, the second
type if it fronted onto a street, the third type if it fronted onto a principal street and
the fourth type if it was a large mansion house built for a ‘person of quality’. The
Act went on to dictate certain principles that had to be embodied into the design
of each property to guard against the 1666 fire re-occurring.
The Party Wall etc. Act (1996), enacted in England and Wales, has its root in
Charles IIs legislation. Hannaford and Stephens (2004) report that a series of stat-
utory codes in respect of the concept of the party wall, commencing with the Act for
rebuilding the City of London (1666), culminated with the London Building Acts
(Amendment) Act (1939). In effect, the 1996 Act extended the provisions in the
1939 Act to the whole of England and Wales while repealing any local legislation
relating to party walls9.
Bird and Dockling (1949) make reference to an earlier regulation in 1189 enacted
by Richard I of England, prescribing the design of stone party walls to be three
feet thick and sixteen feet high. In this earlier legislation, the monarch Richard,
obviously understanding what the problem was and probably with the intention of
9The Pyramus and Thisbe Club, an association of party wall surveyors, claim credit for the
1996 legislation after lobbying Parliament following the case of Gyle-Thompson v Wall Street
(Properties) Ltd 1 WLR 123 [1974] 1 ALL ER 295 (1974), a notorious tort involving a party
wall.
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preventing the spread of fire over the top of a party wall, added:
“whosoever wishes to build, let him take care, as he loveth himself and
his goods, that he roof with reed nor rush, nor with any manner of litter,
but with tile only or shingle or board or, if it may be, with lead.” Bird
and Dockling (1949)
It is tempting to claim the adoption of the notion of a party wall as success for the
original concept of completely separating one property from another but the lack
of objective evidence of the successful performance of party walls in fire since 1189,
makes this a conjecture rather than a fact. Possibly, the only arguable position is
to state that although there is more than one recorded Great Fire of London (1135,
1212 and 1666), each of which threatened the existence of London as a capital and
as a city, there has been no instance of a single property fire threatening the whole
city of London with destruction since 166610.
2.3. Post-war Building Studies
Regulations for construction of buildings in the UK have, generally, extended from
those introduced in London. This is presumably because of London’s importance
as the home of the Monarchy and the centre for Government and the lead taken
by Charles II after the destructive fire that occurred in 1666. The legislation fol-
lowing that fire11 was meant to prevent the power of fire reeking the same amount
of destruction again in London and the legislation governing party walls applied in
London for many years before being enforced throughout the country. It is disin-
genuous to say that initiatives to control the construction of buildings were not
proposed and enacted in the rest of the country but the measures that were put in
place were subjective and dependent on the experiences of the influential people in
the villages, towns and cities concerned. Naturally, those locations that had suffered
devastating fires causing the destruction of many buildings gave more than a passing
thought to how the power of fire could be averted than those that had not. In 1693,
for an example recorded in the book ‘Provincial Towns in Early Modern England
10Although much of London was destroyed by fire as a result of the air raids in 1940 and 1941,
the continued bombing over 57 days/nights, in September and October 1941 can hardly be
compared to the occurrence of a single property fire threatening the whole city similar to that
which occurred in 1666.
11The Act for rebuilding the city of London 1666.
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and Ireland’ ; edited by Borsay et al (2002), the City of Warwick suffered a fire on
a hot day in June when the weather conditions were particularly supportive in fan-
ning the flames from a thatched roof that had caught alight from a kindling torch.
The fire became so large and out-of-control that the city centre was abandoned and
houses in the path of the fire were demolished in vain attempts to stop the fire’s
inevitable progress from dwelling to dwelling. Even St Mary’s Church, built in the
14th Century, was almost totally destroyed by the fire. However, the performance
of one house; Archer Mansion in Jury Street, stood out from the rest. This is be-
cause Archer Mansion was a brick-built building with a tiled roof that managed to
withstand the progress of the fire forcing it to burn itself out.
Lessons were learnt and the performance of Archer Mansion did not go unnoticed
because the devastation of Warwick resulted in an Act of Parliament enacted by
William III and Mary II in 169412 modelled on the earlier legislation enacted by
Charles II following London’s fire in 1666. Further local Building Acts were enacted
in other towns and cities following serious fires throughout the 18th century and
were mostly aimed at substituting the use of timber and thatch as roofing materials
in favour of lead, slate or tile. However, it was always the threat of fire, rather than
other causes, that prompted the need for controlling the construction of buildings
in England before the 19th Century.
In his book, ‘A History of Building Control in England and Wales; 1840 to 1990’,
Ley (2000) records that threats, other than the threat of fire, were taken into ac-
count during the 19th Century following a series of Government Inquiries into the
living conditions in Victorian London brought about the Metropolitan Building Act
(1844). This Act and the Local Government Act (1858) extended control of building
regulation, already present in London, to other local authorities in the UK.
In the 20th Century, during the Second World War, bombs were dropped on towns
and cities creating fire storms which threatened to destroy and lay waste to the
buildings not destroyed by the power of the bombs. What is surprising is the number
of buildings that were still standing at the end of hostilities; a good example is St
Paul’s Cathedral in London.
Compare the attempt at mass destruction in London brought about by the Second
World War against the attempt brought about by the slow inexorable march of the
12An Act for rebuilding the towne of Warwick, and for determining differences touching houses
burnt and demolished by reason of the late dreadful fire there 1694.
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fire that started in Pudding Lane in 1666. The Pudding Lane fire starting in the
baker’s building, ignited the adjacent buildings by burning away the party wall or
igniting the adjacent thatched roof then jumped the gaps between houses by the
mechanics of radiated heat. Efforts to extinguish the fire becoming more and more
unsuccessful as the fire grew because of the increased availability of material to burn.
This same slow, inexorable process did not occur in London during the Blitz even
though there were many seats of fire caused by the bombings than just the one in
1666. Firefighters were assisted in their efforts because of the design and construction
of the walls and roofs of the buildings. It is difficult to believe that the difference
in the consequences of the fire in Pudding Lane and the Blitz in the Second World
War was not due, in some way, to the inclusion of adequate barriers to prevent fires
easily spreading from building to building.
In the years following the Second World War, the number of unoccupied buildings
in London and elsewhere gave an opportunity to experiment with and progress
the science of fire using the resource of bombed and vacated buildings awaiting
demolition and development. Experiments and tests were carried out on suitable
buildings awaiting demolition, to observe and test the natural phenomena of fire in
search of general laws governing the effects and consequences of fire in various types
of property.
This opportunity led to the Post-war Building Studies: No.20 (1946) and the Post-
war Building Studies: No.29 (1952) published by the Joint Committee of the Build-
ing Research Board of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and
of the Fire Office’s Committee. These studies were an attempt to grade the fire
precautions necessary in different types of buildings by investigating and assigning
suitable fire precautions to attain an adequate standard of safety, dependent on the
fire hazard of the building under consideration.
In Post-war Building Studies: No.20 (1946), the Joint Committee defined the three
objectives of fire precautions to safeguard life and property. These were:
1. to prevent or reduce the number of outbreaks of fire;
2. to provide adequate facilities for the escape of the occupants, should an out-
break occur; and
3. to minimize spread of fire both within the building and to near-by buildings.
The first objective, that of preventing outbreaks of fire, was most important and
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one of primary concern, according to the Joint Committee. They considered that
there was sufficient objective data available to conclude that most outbreaks were
attributable to acts of carelessness by people. These, they determined, could be
tackled by educating the public but they doubted that this was practicable, so the
only course of action was to place reliance on protection of the structure of the
building and of fire-fighting measures. This led the Joint Committee to concentrate
on the second and third objectives.
The second and third third objectives, those of providing means of escape facilities
and of minimising the spread of fire both within a building and to nearby buildings,
the Joint Committee divided into two different concepts; passive defence of fire and
active defence of fire13.
Passive fire defence, the Joint Committee described as the provision for limiting
the development and spread of fires that have started along with adequate
means of escape and other safeguards for the occupants. The provisions in-
cluded:
• proper subdivision of large buildings by walls and floors of adequate fire res-
istance;
• fire-resisting protection to load-bearing members of structure;
• measures to facilitate the access of firefighters and;
• steps to minimise the spread of fire from one building, or part of a building to
another building.
Active fire defence, the Joint Committee described as the provision for the ex-
tinction of fires or the availability of fire extinguishing equipment such as
a sprinkler installation, the provision of hand extinguishers or a dry rising
main14.
It was the opinion of the Joint Committee that the correct approach to the design
of a building would be to incorporate these two concepts of fire defence in an ideal
13The two terms; passive and active fire protection, are much used in current building construction
but these references in the Post-war Building Studies are possibly the first attempt to publish
a definition.
14A dry rising main, or ‘dry riser’, is a vertical pipe located in a multi-level building to deliver
water for fire-fighting to outlets on each level of the building. The pipe is usually supplied with
water pumped from the tank of a fire appliance. If the pipe is kept fully charged with water
supplied by a tank or a water main, it is known as a wet riser. If the pipe is supplied from a
tank on the roof of the building, it is known as a ‘downcomer’.
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balance for the type of building and occupancy. They were convinced that there were
trade-offs possible between passive and active fire defence and that if sufficiently
good active fire defence measures could be guaranteed, then onerous passive fire
defence would be uneconomical. The concept of a trade-off between passive and
active fire defence measures surfaces in the discussion between acceptability and
equivalency and has much to do with a fire engineering approach to design.
Stollard and Abrahams (1999) state that it would be unreasonable and costly to
ask designers to design for absolute safety. They refer to the acceptable level of fire
safety traditionally defined through legislation. An acceptable level of fire safety
is one where the risks to people and property have been reduced to a level which
society regards as acceptable. Legislation for fire safety has tended to be produced
in response to a major incident, so it does not always offer a balanced solution to
every building design.
The concept of equivalency is engaged once the architects have achieved an accept-
able level of safety. Stollard and Abrahams (1999) explain that an acceptable level
of fire safety can be achieved by different fire safety designs if one fire safety measure
is traded-off against another. For example, perhaps, fire safety measures introduced
to decrease the likelihood of ignition might be balanced against a decrease in the
amount of fire safety measures introduced to contain a fire. Or, perhaps, an in-
crease in fire safety measures to protect the means of escape from a building might
be balanced against a decrease in methods of fire extinguishment.
The definition of a fire-engineered solution given by the Chief Fire Officer’s Associ-
ation (CFOA) better explains the concept15:
“A fire engineered solution is a scientific based approach to provide an
alternative way of providing adequate fire protection measures within a
building, the measures taken can often deviate from established procedure
and normally recognised guidelines. This could be by using sprinklers
and smoke control as a compensatory feature.”
15A definition of fire engineering taken from CFOA webpage http://www.cfoa.org.uk/11822 on 31
July 2012.
26
2.4 Fire safety engineering
2.3.1. Research into the science of fire
Research carried out by the Fire Office’s Committee16 after the Second World War
informed the designers of dwellings during the post-war period which saw many
houses and factories built. The work of the Fire Office’s Committee and latterly, the
Fire Research Station, began to offer objective data about how materials, specifically
building materials, behave in fire and how fire behaves in buildings. Immediately
after the war, experiments were carried out in the many half-demolished buildings
that were waiting to be cleared. The principles of compartmentation and building
separation were the focus of these experiments and informed the standard also used
in the current Building Regulations.
2.4. Fire safety engineering
Fire safety engineering, according to the Building Research Establishment, is the
application of scientific and engineering principles based on the understanding of
the effects of fire, the reaction and behaviour of people to fire and consideration of
the ways to protect people, property and the environment from the consequences of
fire17 .
The Institution of Fire Engineers offers a similar description of fire safety engineering
and lists six objectives that should be the focus of a fire engineered design. These
include assessment of fire hazards, mitigation of damage by fire, detection of fire,
suppression of fire, investigation and analysis of fire incidents etc.18 .
The Society of Fire Protection Engineers holds an annual examination of fire protec-
tion engineering. The list of topics that they include in the curriculum for students
to study gives some indication of the diversity surrounding their interpretation of
fire protection engineering. Topics include; Explosion protection; Fire alarm sys-
tems; Fire dynamics; Fire protection analysis and management; Human behaviour;
Passive building systems; Smoke management; and so on19.
16The Fire Office’s Committee was established in 1880 by the insurance industry both to advise
the industry and provide technical support. Their testing facility at Borehamwood was taken
over by Government at the outbreak of World War II and became the Fire Research Station.
17 Source: http://www.bre.co.uk/page.jsp?id=1855 (accessed on 21 July 2013)
18 Source: http://www.ife.org.uk/about/about/fireengineering (accessed on 21 July 2013)
19Source: http://www.sfpe.org/SharpenYourExpertise/Education/2013FireProtectionEngineeringPEExam.aspx
(accessed on 21 July 2013)
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Christian (2003) offers a more effective description in his book A Guide to Fire
Safety Engineering. He describes fire safety engineering as the provision of adequate
fire safety precautions in a building or structure that departs from those prescribed
by some form of building control. He explains that the performance criteria usually
required by the prescribed method is achieved or surpassed by a different means
involving trade-offs between passive and active fire protection measures. This allows
the designer the freedom to use new and different materials and to make optimum
use of the available space. He comments that fire safety engineering may be the
only viable means of achieving a satisfactory level of safety in some large or complex
buildings. Christian (2003) associates the application of fire safety engineering with
separate ideas, such as:
• the process of fire safety engineering with regard to the application of engin-
eering methods, scientific study and experience and judgement;
• the context in which the design of a building or structure accommodates the
identified fire hazard and risk and sets the required performance criteria;
• the methods of measurement and calculation that describe the relationships
between materials that incorporate the results of study and research;
• the necessary framework surrounding the discipline which permits an engin-
eering approach to be taken towards fire safety departing from traditional,
prescribed methods.
British Standard 7974 (2001) is a code of practice to enable the principles of fire
safety engineering to be applied to the design of buildings. It is intended to constitute
a framework in which a fire engineering approach to building design can be taken.
Following the code of practice will result in a building design that itemises the fire
safety objectives, the likely fire safety hazards and fire scenarios and the criteria
that has been applied for acceptance. Alongside these will be documented the
assumptions, judgements, calculations and analyses carried out to arrive at the
final design and how these compare against the acceptance criteria. These concepts
are particularly important for the future occupiers of the building and the code of
practice states that they should be included in a fire safety manual to be handed
over. The fire safety manual contains the management and operational procedures
for the fire safety systems necessary for the occupier to maintain the safety margin
engineered into the building design.
British Standard 7974 (2001) benefits from one of the main criticisms arising from
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Cullen (1990). The criticism arises from the inquiry into the fire and explosion that
occurred on the Piper Alpha oil platform in the North Sea in 1988 and concerns
the prescriptive regime of safety that Piper Alpha was subjected to. The criticism
is an important one with regard to fire safety engineering because it supports the
argument in favour of replacing the prescriptive measures used in building codes with
a different system. In his report, Cullen (1990) recommended that the prescriptive
regime of regulation should cease and be replaced by a system of goal-setting. He
thought this would create a regime where the potential major hazards on each
individual installation were identified and provided with appropriate controls to
manage them to help prevent a recurrence of the disaster. It would also solve what
he saw as a major problem revealed by the inquiry; that prescriptive regulations
encouraged a mentality where compliance with the regulations was the focus of the
regulators rather than a full consideration of the actual risk. This new approach
was embodied in the The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations (1992)
requiring a consideration of the case for the safety of every offshore installation to
be acceptable to the Health and Safety Executive. The principle used in British
Standard 7974 (2001) and fire safety engineering is similar to this in that it provides
for the case of fire safety in the buildings to which it is applied.
Salter et al (2011) looked at the way fire safety engineering is currently practiced
in the UK. Interestingly, he found that fire engineers commonly used traditional
resources such as building codes and design guides to validate their fire engineering
designs. He also determined that the provision of life safety was not the only consid-
eration for a fire engineer when designing a system specification; property protection
was also a consideration
Wilkinson (2013) investigated fire engineering design to identify best practice and
to discover the gaps in skills and knowledge. He thought that the development of a
successful engineering strategy depended on three factors:
1. The first, and most fundamental, was that the end-user should be encouraged
to state accurately what the completed building should achieve so that the
process of design and construction could be agreed and as focused as possible.
2. The second factor was that the commercial property insurers should be con-
sulted and involved in the process of design as much as possible. Recruiting
them onto the design team would be a successful way of achieving this.
3. The third factor related to the role of the fire engineer acting as advisers to
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the design team.
Fire safety engineering has already provided many benefits for society. It has en-
couraged the design of many buildings that, before its inception, would have proved
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to design and build. This new way of design-
ing buildings, permitted by the relaxation of adhering to the prescriptive regulations
present in many building codes, has given the opportunity of designing eye-catching
and intriguing buildings. With this method, the building designer has more flexibil-
ity to create the type of building in which occupants can pursue their business in the
way that they wish to pursue it. Fire safety engineering allows the building designer
to design a limitless number of imaginative, functional buildings, each tailored to
the needs of the future occupier and each one considered to be as safe from fire as
could be achieved under the prescription of building codes.
One such functional building, for example, is the shopping mall, a large enclosed
shopping area from which traffic is excluded20. Some shopping malls in English
town centres were formed just by covering entire streets21, while others have been
constructed into purpose-built properties on brown or green-field sites allowing good
access for car owners. Their attraction was the grouping together of shops from
which shoppers could easily walk from one shop to another, in a comfortable indoor
environment. The problem for fire engineers was, how could travel distances (the
actual distance to be travelled by a person from any point within the floor area to
the nearest storey exit, having regard to the layout of walls, partitions, and fittings)
be extended safely. The answer was to control the products of combustion in a
way that gave sufficient time for people to evacuate safely. New concepts such as
this one created opportunities for much research releasing new knowledge for fire
engineers to improve their models of, for example, controlling heat and smoke in
shopping malls as documented in Butcher and Parnell (1994); Building Research
Establishment (1999); Hansell (1992); Sanderson (2007).
The concept of an alternative to the prescription of building codes was dealt with
20Definition of a shopping mall from http://oxforddictionaries.con/definition/english/mall (ac-
cessed on 8 April 2013)
21One example was Walsall in the West Midlands where the Old Square was covered in 1969 and
became Old Square Shopping Centre.
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comprehensively by Malhotra (1986), a researcher at the FR22 and who wrote a
report on behalf of the Department of the Environment on fire safety in buildings
in which the concept was expanded upon. Malhotra (1986) held the opinion that
fire safety engineering could meet the need for alternative building design whilst
providing an equally valid option to the prescribed building codes. He stated that
the reasoning for fire safety engineering was to enable the fire safety provisions of
a building to be based on a quantitative assessment following the simple logic that
the fire safety measures, whatever they were, should be equivalent to the assessed
hazard posed by the products of the fire.
One of the major stumbling blocks to quantitative assessment of fire hazards, an
essential concept in fire safety engineering, was that fire safety guidance was based
on qualitative assessments. The Post-war Building Studies: No.20 (1946): Part I:
General Principles and Structural Precautions and also Post-war Building Studies:
No.29 (1952): Part II: Fire-fighting Equipment Part III: Personal Safety and Part
IV: Chimneys and Flues, key components in Marathon’s tool kit, were largely sub-
jective judgements based on the knowledge and experience of the Members of the
Committee. Research and testing to gain numerical data that allowed quantifiable
assessments to be made and to use the methods of the engineer and scientist, were
new concepts in the field of fire safety and were in need of development.
Fire safety engineering as a way of achieving safe and satisfactory conditions in a
building is different from the traditional methods of achieving safe and satisfactory
conditions. The difference lies in the way that the fire safety measures are determ-
ined. Traditionally, they were determined subjectively and are merely a reflection of
how the building designer assesses the situation. Logically, a building designer who
has experienced the ferocity of a fire in a building such that it has left a deep mental
impression is likely to be far more rigorous in an assessment of the hazards than
a building designer who has not. However, Malhotra (1986) pointed out that this
method, the subjective method, is not suitable for the level of detail and precision
necessary for an engineer, a more objective method is needed, one that exploits the
science of probability and one that can offer insights into the relationships between
the different elements of fire. An example to illustrate this point is the question of
22The Fire Research Station (FR), founded in 1949, replaced the testing facility of the Fire Office’s
Committee. It quickly established a reputation and became a leading centre of research into
fire prevention and fire protection and was involved in the investigation of major fires such as
the fire involving the stand at Bradford City Football Club in 1985 and the fire involving the
Brunswick Tower and staterooms at Windsor Castle in 1992.
31
2.4 Fire safety engineering
how long a fire with an unlimited supply of fuel can be contained in an average-sized
room if, on the one hand, there is a sprinkler system fitted which operates when
a certain temperature is reached and if, on the other hand, there is no sprinkler
fitted. The determination of this question can be obtained by estimation, based on
the estimator’s experience and knowledge; by experimentation, based on lighting a
fire in a model of the room; or by calculation, based on many experiments and much
research into the nature and characteristics on how fire performs in the presence, or
absence, of a sprinkler system.
This aspect of analysis, looking at the performance of the fire and how the perform-
ance is affected by different materials, different configurations, different processes,
different maintenance regimes etc. is a critical part of fire safety engineering. Mal-
hotra (1986) recognised that if you took away the prescription of a set of regulations
that, if followed precisely, would produce a building with similar conditions, then
you had to replace it with something equally as good or else it was worthless. At the
time he wrote his report in 1986, objective data about the performance of building
materials, the products of combustion and the behaviour of people was not avail-
able because it had not been generated. This severely limited the effect of the new
method.
In his paper The Role of the Fire Safety Engineer, Malhotra (1991) lists some of
the components of a fire-engineered solution for which data were available when
the paper was written in 1991 and some items which were under consideration as
components for research and analysis. Components for which data were available
included; production and movement of smoke, occupant behaviour in fires, the sever-
ity of a fully developed fire, the extinction capabilities of sprinklers etc. Some of
the components under consideration included; techniques for assessing hazards, the
effect of sprinklers on the severity of a fire, the performance of different fire safety
measures, the performance of integrated fire safety systems and so forth.
2.4.1. Summerland
A stark example of the consequences of constructing a building to standards other
than those in the prescriptive codes is presented by the fire at the Summerland
holiday complex in Douglas, Isle of Man in 1973. Stollard and Abrahams (1999)
use it as an example in their book Fire from First Principles. The project was
born of an attempt to compete with the growing number of holiday-makers who
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were rejecting British seaside resorts. It was conceived to emulate a Cornish village
with a Mediterranean climate but, by the time it opened, housed a large amount
of entertainment and leisure facilities on different mezzanine and basement floors.
The building was conspicuous because of its roof and walls which were made from
transparent plastic covering a large open space where the entertainments could take
place in sunlight.
The fire that destroyed the Summerland complex was ignited at about 7.40pm one
August evening in 1973 by a boy who was playing with matches whilst smoking
in an unused kiosk on an outside terrace next to the mini-golf course. The floor
of the kiosk caught light and resisted the boy’s efforts to extinguish the fire. Staff
were alerted to the fire at around 7.55pm and joined other holiday-makers in trying
to extinguish the kiosk fire with hose-reels and extinguishers. They were confident
that, although the kiosk had collapsed against the wall of the main building and
the flames were playing on the sheet steel from which this part of the wall was
constructed, the flames would be resisted. However, unknown to them, the heat
from the flames had already ignited the combustible coating on the inside surface of
the sheet steel and was burning in the cavity formed by the Galbestos sheet and the
inner wall which was constructed from Decalin fibreboard also with a combustible
coating. The fire burned and travelled through the cavity for some minutes before
finally breaking through into the interior of the building.
Once the fire was inside the building, the combustible furnishings and fittings soon
ignited, including the transparent plastic promenade wall which also proved to be
combustible. Survivors of the fire in the building at the time verify how quickly
the fire spread to involve the whole of the building and how the transparent plastic
wall and ceiling melted and burnt, dropping molten plastic onto escaping occupants.
They also confirm the lack of fire warning they were given save that of the message
of a show compere who used his microphone and speaker system to urge people to
evacuate.
The account of the fire, which killed fifty people and injured many more, is contained
in the Report of the Summerland Fire Commission and is also the subject of an
unpublished book by Phillips (circa 2010)23. There were many lessons to be learnt
from the tragedy and there were many recommendations enclosed in the report,
23The unpublished book by Ian Phillips was downloaded from his webpage at
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/gees/people/profile.aspx?ReferenceId=9695&Name=dr-
ian-phillips#staffdetails (accessed 19 September 2012).
33
2.4 Fire safety engineering
some of which were used to change the regulations used in building construction.
The report highlighted a number of unfortunate circumstances which combined and
contributed to the high loss of life caused by the fire including:
• the lack of communication between the authorities, architects and developers
during the planning stage of the project;
• the waiving of Manx Building Bye-Law 39 without sufficient justification. This
byelaw required all external walls of a building to be non-combustible and fire
resistant;
• the fast evolution of smoke made sure that escapees quickly became lost and
disorientated;
• parents of children separated from them because they were in other parts of the
complex and went off in search of them instead of making good their escape;
• the parts of the building reliant on lighting were denied this when the man-
ager shut the power off in the misguided belief that this would prevent further
electrical fires. The secondary (emergency) lighting, designed to replace the
primary lighting on failure of power, did not operate because either the gen-
erator was faulty or because it had been isolated;
• the fire alarm system was never sounded because the member of staff, whose
responsibility it was to respond to the indication in the Control Room that
a break-glass call-point had been triggered, had had insufficient training to
be sure of her expected actions. She also reported to the Summerland Fire
Commission that sounding the alarm was not necessary because everyone knew
the building was on fire;
• the call for assistance from the fire service, designed to be automatic when the
fire alarm sounded, was never made because it was dependent on the operation
of the fire alarm and the fire alarm was never operated. The first call received
by the fire service was made from the control room of a local taxi company
relaying a message from one of their drivers who could see the fire. This
was some twenty minutes after the fire had started. The second call to the
fire service was made by the Coastguard relaying a message received from a
passing ship!
This list of circumstances not only points to the failures in the construction of
Summerland which is the usual reason that this fire disaster is used as an example
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but it also highlights the crucial part played by the management of fire safety and the
provision of contingency plans to ameliorate deficiencies in the design of buildings.
2.5. Protection of property and life safety
One big advantage offered by following the prescriptive method detailed in many
building codes, is that it revolves around the concept of compartmentation. At the
core of this concept is the idea that the spread of fire in a building can be restricted
by sub-dividing the building into fire-resistant smaller units. This method inhibits
the ability of the fire, which is burning but confined with limited fuel and, perhaps,
limited oxygen, in one of the smaller units, to spread quickly through the building.
It also provides time for the building’s occupants to evacuate and for fire-fighting
strategies to have an effect before the fire becomes too large
The most serious criticism of the approach offered by a prescriptive building code,
stated by Stollard and Abrahams (1999), was that aspects of fire safety such as the
prevention of fire and the control of smoke evolving from a fire were ignored. The
approach, they said, was to regard components of fire safety such as, travel distances
and escape routes, fire protection of loadbearing elements, roof construction, com-
partment walls and floors etc. as being disconnected from each other. A building
code required a reasonable standard of provision in each separate component but
the components of fire safety were looked at in isolation and not as connected parts.
Stollard and Abrahams (1999) regarded this approach as the traditional approach
and claimed that its inflexibility caused architects to resent prescription and start
to seek loopholes or ways to get round its requirements. They also thought that
it created an artificial distinction between the requirements of legislation that con-
centrated on the ability of the occupants of a building to evacuate safely (usually
referred to as ‘provision of life safety’) and the requirements of the insurers of a
building who were more concerned with the protection of the property as an asset
(usually referred to as ‘provision of property protection’). They reasoned that this
artificial separation could only lead to conflict in the two areas which would be most
beneficial if they operated synergistically.
The view that the building code applicable in England and Wales (Approved Docu-
ment B, 2010), did not cater sufficiently for the provision of property protection was
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underlined by the Fire Protection Association (2008)24 when they published their
copy of Approved Document B; Incorporating Insurers’ Requirements for Property
Protection. This was a copy of the original document supplemented with extra re-
quirements considered by the FPA to be necessary to provide sufficient protection
to property and to acceptably reduce business interruption. In the document, the
insurers’ requirements are printed in italics, in green font, next to the text, tables
and diagrams that they are meant to replace or amend. The FPA claim their extra
requirements give guidance in the provision of property protection and business in-
terruption that are increasingly viewed as requirements for a resilient and healthy
community.
Also included in the document was a new Appendix; Appendix J: Insurer require-
ments for the implementation of fire safety engineering solutions. Appendix J follows
the format of British Standard 7974 (2001) and stresses the importance of contact
and consultation with the insurer in respect of buildings being designed and con-
structed by an alternative method to that offered by the adherence to Approved
Document B (2010). The objective of Appendix J is to set out eight requirements
agreed by the insurers as being critical which will, if followed, meet the twelve prin-
ciples listed in Design Guide for the Fire Protection of Buildings (2003) essential, in
the opinion of the insurers, to give the best protection to property and business in
a building subject to the fire safety engineering approach.
In contrast to the traditional approach, the fire safety engineering approach considers
a building as a complex system and, as one aspect of that complexity, tries to achieve
a satisfactory level of safety by assessing the equivalence of alternative fire safety
strategies. This, according to Stollard and Abrahams (1999), calls for a greater
depth of understanding by the building designer, of the principles of fire safety and
the science of fire as well as the ability to demonstrate to the approving authorities
that the strategies achieve the same level of fire safety as the traditional approach.
Analysis of fire legislation through the centuries from Alfred the Great and William
the Conqueror requiring the populace to cover their fires; to the Monarch’s of Charles
II and William and Mary’s attempts to protect the cities of London and Warwick
by legislation, the focus on protecting property can clearly be seen. The method
24The Fire Protection Association (FPA) was established in 1946 as a national fire safety or-
ganisation working to identify and draw attention to the dangers of fire and to minimise the
potential loss from fire. Their work includes consultancy, publishing, research, risk auditing,
risk surveying, training etc.
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adopted by the Monarchs was to analyse what was wrong and to learn from the
mistakes that caused the damage to property, livelihoods and economies. However,
contemporary legislation reveals that current lawmaking has a different focus and is
more concerned with life safety rather than property protection.
2.6. Fire safety management
Malhotra (1986), in his report, Fire Safety in Buildings had noticed something
else that was a necessary component of adequate fire safety in a building which
was also a critical support for the new concept of fire safety engineering. It was
something that could be argued as being common sense but something that was not
normally recognised in its own right; this was the concept of fire safety management.
Generally, Malhotra (1986) saw the notion of fire safety in a building in levels of
fire protection. The first level included the basics of fire safety; how an ignition was
to be prevented, how the occupants of the building were to avoid the products of a
fire, how the fire would grow and be contained and how far the fire could travel if
it was not controlled. The second level included how the products of fire were to be
identified, controlled and extinguished. The third level was the management level
or the level that assessed, provided, maintained and monitored the first and second
levels. This was the level that most people regarded as common sense.
Malhotra (1986) states that the main objective of fire safety management is to
ensure that all the provided fire safety measures will be available so that people
can use them to assist their escape. He goes on to give examples of major fire
incidents where this objective has not been achieved and where this contributed
greatly to the loss of life and property, namely, the Stardust Disco, Dublin in 1982.
This was also reported and published by the Irish Government in Coffey (2008);
Woolworth’s Store, Manchester in 1980 and Bradford City Football Club Stadium
in 1985 researched by Firth (2005) in his book, Four Minutes of Hell: The Story of
the Bradford City Fire. Malhotra (1986) draws attention to the lack of preparedness
on the part of those responsible for management at the time of the incidents when
something out of the ordinary occurred.
Marathon’s report was written in 1986 yet, travelling forward in time, this lack
of preparedness is still evident. In June 2009, in respect of an offence that was
discovered in January 2007, Shell International Ltd was prosecuted by the London
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Fire Brigade for its management failings with regard to its Shell Centre Headquarters
in London. The inspecting officers, being called to the building because of the
concerns of operational officers following two fire incidents within a week of each
other, found blocked escape routes and fire exits, defective fire doors and excessive
fire loading caused by a refurbishment of the upper floors of the building. London
Fire Brigade responded by preventing access to parts of the 27-storey building to all
employees and members of the public until remedial work had been carried out on
the affected areas and they were considered to be safe25. The failure of management,
in this instance, to consider the responsibilities of maintaining a safe workplace for its
employees and visitors during planned refurbishment of the building, was manifestly
an example of poor management that Malhotra would recognise.
There is much research into the science of fire brought about by the demand for
objective data to fuel the new concept of fire safety engineering but there is, by no
means, the same amount of research into the concept of fire safety management or,
more specifically, the role of managing fire safety. The reason may lie in the notion
that there is a difference between the two ideas in that, fire safety engineering is a
‘hard’ science coming under the scope of engineering while fire safety management is
a ‘soft’ science coming under the science of management. This is reminiscent of the
efforts of eminent physicist, Jim Al-Khalili, in the task he has set himself in trying
to bridge the gap between quantum physics and biology. This is because he can
see that biology is powered by quantum physics and he wants to progress science26.
In a similar manner the science of fire safety management can be progressed by
bridging the gap between the science of fire safety engineering and the science of
management.
There is much advice about fire safety management in the public domain, particu-
larly in England and Wales, to assist with the introduction of the Regulatory Reform
(Fire Safety) Order 2005. The advice gives guidance on the responsibilities, duties
and regulations encountered under the legislation and practical advice about how it
affects different property types. In addition, there is guidance that deals with the
principles of means of escape for disabled people from different property types27.
25Information accessed from London Fire Brigade’s website: http://www.london-
fire.gov.uk/news/NewsReleases09_PR1119.asp (accessed on 21 August 2012).
26See http://www.ias.surrey.ac.uk/workshops/quantumbiology/report.php to access Jim Al-
Khalili’s series of lectures (accessed on 1 April 2013).
27There are twelve Guides and one Supplementary Guide available for free download at
http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/firesafety/firesafetylaw/ (accessed on 23 August 2012).
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The thrust of the advice considers the need for the Responsible Person28 in a prop-
erty, to carry out a suitable and sufficient fire risk assessment. This is the mechanism
required by the legislation to make sure that fires are avoided and that people are
safe if an ignition does lead to a fire.
Guidance about the management of fire safety abounds but there is little advice
about how to assess its performance or the probable consequences of a fire in this
type of business or that type of property.
Howarth and Kara-Zaitri (1999) looked at passenger terminals throughout Europe
and asked how safe they were for people using them and how they compared against
each other. They devised a model for fire safety management and, using a simple
method of assessment, used the model to give points for each component allowing the
safety of each terminal to be assessed whilst building up a continuum of terminals
from the most safe terminal to the least safe terminal. The endeavour was novel and
positive but the results can be criticised in that they were arrived at by a subjective
method reliant on Howarth’s own knowledge and experience29. This means that
anyone re-creating the assessments might conclude with different results because
they may make different assessments based on their own knowledge and experience.
This is not necessarily wrong but it can lead to disputation and difficulty in resolving
issues. One solid achievement of Howarth’s work is the model which has at its core,
a comprehensive categorisation of the management of fire safety.
The management of fire safety is assisted by two important concepts; the fire risk
assessment and the fire strategy. According to the Best Practice Guide to Fire
Safety (Unknown date), published by the Fire Industry Association, the fire risk
assessment is:
“... an organised appraisal of your premises to enable you to identify
potential fire hazards and those who might be in danger in the event
of fire and their location. You should evaluate the risks arising from the
hazards and decide whether the existing fire precautions are adequate and
identify any measures that need to be taken to further remove or reduce
the fire risk.”
Whilst the description of the fire strategy given in Publicly Available Specification
28The term Responsible Person is defined in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
29Howarth’s experience in assessing fire safety is extensive. After completion of a long fire service
career largely involved with the enforcement of fire safety, he joined British Rail and Railtrack
carrying out fire assessments whilst further studying the subject at Bradford University.
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911 (2007) states:
"... prior to undertaking new build projects, making alterations to a
building, preparing fire system designs, or specifying fire prevention and
management practices, an overriding document setting out the base re-
quirements would greatly assist in the focus of subsequent, more detailed
specifications, reducing the need to go back to first principles when a new
aspect of the fire safety and protection provisions is foreseen. The doc-
ument is often referred to as a fire strategy, although other names such
as fire policy or fire plan are also used."
2.6.1. Fire risk assessment
The thrust of current fire safety legislation in the UK is the fire risk assessment, an
integral component of the management of fire safety. The assessment is carried out
by the occupier of a designated property as a requirement of the legislation. The
logic of the process is that the assessor identifies all possible ignition sources in a
property, all items that will burn if ignited and considers all those who will be at risk
should a fire start. He/she then assesses the likelihood of a fire starting or of a person
becoming trapped by a fire and reduces the risk of either of these happening to an
acceptable level, introducing measures to maintain these conditions and also control
any remaining risk. He/she re-assesses the risk at a suitable interval, decided by the
severity of the risk and/or a change in conditions, amending the control measures
to correspond with any new risks. These may be associated with different ignition
sources, different combustibles or different occupants and so on.
The approach to fire safety embodied in regulations in the UK is commensurate
with the approach to general health and safety brought in by the Health and Safety
at Work etc Act (1974) and refined by European Directives. There is much advice,
guidance and debate on what constitutes a suitable and sufficient fire risk assess-
ment required by the regulations offered by Todd and Ltd (2012); Chow (2002);
Ramachandran (1999), amongst others.
One of the main problems facing the application of fire risk assessment is the amount
of capability required by the fire risk assessor. It is unclear who has the necessary
competence to carry out an assessment. The booklet, A Short Guide to Making
your Premises Safe from Fire (2005), states that achieving fire safety is often a
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matter of common sense and that by working through the step-by-step process set
out in the booklet, the safest possible outcome will be achieved without the need
for specialist or formal knowledge and training. CFOA do accede, however, that in
more complicated premises or those premises with many people at risk such as care
homes, hospitals or large cinemas, more expert assistance may be needed
The IFE sees the conundrum as a continuum with, at the one end, the case of a small
organisation and, at the other end, a large organisation. It argues that the most
appropriate risk assessor in a small organisation will be an employee, insisting that,
although this person may overlook some matters that a more skilled risk assessor
would identify, they will understand and be better able to manage the fire risks in the
premises. In this type of organisation such a person will more readily ‘buy into’ the
fire risk assessment and, if they do overlook some matters, this is unlikely to increase
the risk to the occupants significantly. This view is endorsed by the Management
of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (1999), enacted in England and Wales,
where Regulation 7(8) asserts that a competent employee should be appointed to
assist with the risk assessment rather than someone from outside the organisation.
In a large organisation there are likely to be one or two individuals with the com-
petence to carry out or assist with the risk assessment in some, but not all, of the
premises belonging to that organisation. In this case the services of a suitable per-
son external to the organisation can be sought, as advised by Todd (circa 2010) on
behalf of CFOA.
The Guide, Competency Criteria for Fire Risk Assessors (2011)30, details what is
seen as the standard of competence necessary for third-party certifiers of fire risk
assessors to achieve. In a series of appendices, the document details the knowledge
and experience that a fire risk assessor should possess relevant to the type of prop-
erty that is being assessed. The concept behind the document is that of assisting
managers of companies and organisations to make decisions based on an acceptable
level of competency. This addresses one of the main reasons for enforcement by the
fire and rescue service; that of a failure, on the part of the responsible person; to
carry out a suitable and sufficient fire risk assessment.
Ramachandran (1999) discussed the evaluation of fire risk in a building without
30The Fire Risk Competency Council is made up from a broad group of relevant stakeholders
established following encouragement from the UK Government. Its objective is to establish
agreed, industry-wide, criteria against which the competence of a fire risk assessor can be
judged.
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reference to any legislation. He used mathematical models that could assist with
assessing the risk. He looked at the amount of damage caused to people and prop-
erty and found that, although a fire may be devastating to the local community in
terms of employment, viability of the local economy, community facility and so on,
nationally, the total loss from fire has very little impact on the remaining production
capacity of the rest of the UK
With regard to damage caused by fire, Ramachandran (1999) decided that there
were two types; direct damage and indirect damage. He defined direct damage,
as the obvious damage caused to people and property and indirect damage, as
that impacting on production, profits, employment and exports. The solution to
prevent and/or counter the amount of damage was having a system of management
in place before the fire occurred. A satisfactory management system would identify,
quantify and reduce the probability of ignitions occurring and reduce the amount of
fire damage as a consequence. Ramachandran (1999) also considered the capability
of the company or organisation to begin again the day after a fire incident had
occurred. This, he thought, was best dealt with by the mechanism of transferring
risk with insurance to protect a company’s assets.
2.6.2. Fire safety strategy
The term fire safety strategy is a collective phrase used to clarify and assist the
concept of managing fire safety. It has not been defined in fire safety legislation
but it has been described in British Standard 7974 (2001) as the combination of
fire safety measures that has been shown by reference to prescriptive codes or a fire
engineering study to be capable of satisfying the specified fire safety objectives. It
consists of a number of components structured around the need to protect people,
to reduce the impact of fire on its environment and to mitigate the interruption
to business processes. The fire safety strategy applies to public and commercial
buildings as well as wildland urban interfaces (WUI)31. Itis aimed at influencing the
evolution of a fire, protecting people from the products of combustion and making
sure that the cost of avoiding a fire is less expensive than that of experiencing a fire.
The management of fire safety, according to Stollard and Abrahams (1999) in their
31A wildland-urban interface (WUI) is the area where houses meet or merge with land that has
not been cultivated or has been set aside as wilderness. It is the setting where wildfires can
lead to the destruction of homes, the loss of eco-systems and the decline of wildlife.
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book Fire from First Principles, is part of the fire strategy. They considered that
the fire strategy was implicit in the design of a building. They thought that the
consideration of fire prevention fulfilled by the design team should be extended to
include other provisions of fire safety in need of management such as the provisions
for emergency evacuation, fire containment, fire extinguishment and so forth. This
would mean that the management of those fire safety measures throughout the
occupied lifetime of the building by a succession of different occupiers, should be
something that incorporates the decisions and assumptions contemplated by the
building design team before the building was constructed.
Stollard and Abrahams (1999) also point out another function of the management of
fire safety. This is that a building, throughout its lifetime, will gradually be altered,
adapted and modified and that any of the alterations, adaptations or modifications
might have a bearing on the fire safety measures provided as part of the construction
of the building. To keep control of this necessitates a rolling programme of full
and regular fire safety audits allowing new risks to be identified and appropriate
measures taken to address them. Stollard and Abrahams (1999) also mention that
the more familiar a person is with the layout of a building, the less difficult it will
be for them to escape from a fire. They use the fire at the Summerland complex as
an example of this and indicate that the lack of familiarity with the building was
a contributing factor to the high death toll that occurred as a result of that fire.
It could be argued, therefore, that the task of overcoming the difficulty of lack of
familiarity of the occupants is part of the fire strategy and another function of fire
safety management.
Using the Summerland fire as a focus (see a description of the Summerland fire on
page 32), it is worth looking at some of the defects brought out in the inquiry into
the fire and evaluating whether their resolution was another failing of fire safety
management. One of the recurring points in the testimonies of the survivors of that
fire was that parents, who were separated from their children in other parts of the
building, did not move towards the escape routes but, instead, went off in search of
their children:
Following the fire, the Isle of Man Examiner reported: “When the
alarm sounded mothers ran screaming for their children.”(Phillips, circa
2010).
A survivor stated: “Many children seemed to be on the lower floor,
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where there is a fairground and roundabouts. Parents, who must have
been on the upper floor where the bars and refreshment rooms are, were
rushing around searching frantically for their children.” (Phillips, circa
2010)
This aspect of human behaviour is referred to as The Summerland Effect, recorded
in the unpublished book, Summerland Fire Disaster by Phillips (circa 2010), and
led to a section in the publication Guide to Fire Precautions in Existing Places of
Entertainment and Like Premises (1990) which made the following points:
“Section 5.9: The inquiry into the fire at Summerland Leisure Centre
in August 1973 found that parents had tended to be separated from
their children since pursuits for each were located in different places and
floors. Instead of going directly to exits, parents naturally tried to find
their children, making their way against the flow of persons on the escape
routes, thus adding to the danger. In order to minimise the risk, if chil-
dren are to be accommodated separately from their parents or guardians
in places of entertainment, the following measures are recommended:
(a) the accommodation for children should be at or as near ground level
as practicable (or the level at which the final exits discharge). In no
circumstances should the accommodation for children be:
(i) on a floor above the level at which their parents or guardians
are accommodated unless the route of escape is through the
upper level; or
(ii) at basement level unless the children are adjacent to the
accommodation for parents or guardians;
(b) the room or enclosure for children should be adjacent to an external
wall and should not have fewer than 2 exits, one of which should be a
final exit;
(c) if the room adjoins parents accommodation, the aggregate width at
the exits from both areas, exclusive of the doors between the room and
the parents’ or guardians’ accommodation, should be sufficient for the
total number , i.e. children plus parents, guardians and other persons;
and
(d) a notice should be prominently displayed where the children are
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deposited, saying that in the event of an emergency children will be
escorted by a member of staff to a named collection point outside the
building.”
Whether some of these points of guidance were considered before the Summerland
complex was constructed and whether that guidance was passed on to the man-
agement of the completed building is difficult to say. What can be said with some
justification is that there is little evidence in the statements of the witnesses that
suggests that they were considered and children were certainly at locations other
than the guidance advises. But it is easy to see that such, seemingly trivial ad-
vice, could be overlooked and unless building managers see it as important and as a
function of managing fire safety, such advice will most likely be lost in the normal
day-to-day crises of building management.
2.7. What is the next step
The discipline of fire safety engineering and the principles of the fire risk assessment
and the fire strategy, impact on fire safety management to a large degree. The
criteria for adequate fire safety management includes, as reported by Ramachandran
(1999), an evaluation of the fire risk leading to strategies to prevent the fire occurring
and ways of transferring the risk. The measures to control the risk constitute the
standards to be achieved if the risk is to be managed adequately. Then, because the
use of a building develops over time, the impact of this change has to be monitored
and constantly compared with the principles and assumptions made by the building
designers while the building was still in the design stage. Altering the layout of a
building because of a change of occupancy or the use of a building by demolishing an
internal wall, for example, may affect the dynamics of the design of the building and
the calculations used to justify the layout and the occupancy. Therefore a constant
assessment of the changing risk is necessary in any building to guard against any
detrimental impact on the assumptions justifying its design.
Stollard and Abrahams (1999) describe the impact of fire safety engineering and its
principles as the first part in the strategy of fire safety management. They specify
audits of fire safety provisions in a building to allow new risks to be identified and
the appropriate measures taken to counter the dangers. They state that any large
building will gradually be altered, adapted and modified over time. Regular audits
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of the fire safety provisions will enable the provisions to be modified to cope with
the changes.
Stollard and Abrahams (1999) also describe the second part of the fire safety man-
agement strategy as controlling those actions necessary if an ignition occurs. Alter-
ations, adaptations and modifications to the layout, use or occupancy of a building
will inevitably have an impact on the provisions for safe evacuation from the build-
ing. Monitoring this and adjusting the evacuation plan accordingly being another
function of fire safety management.
The opinions of Malhotra (1986) on fire safety engineering, Ramachandran and Todd
and Associates (2012) on fire risk assessment and Stollard and Abrahams (1999) and
Howarth and Kara-Zaitri (1999) on fire safety management give a suggestion of their
importance. However, it is only when analysing the details of fire investigation into
well-documented fires causing multiple deaths and injuries that their importance
begins to become clear. For instance:
• the behaviour of parents inside the Summerland complex in the Isle of Man,
at the time of the fire in 1973, was not anticipated by the designers or the
managers of the building. Many of the parents who perished in the fire, did so
whilst attempting to get from one location in the building to another location
where they thought their children would be (see Phillips, circa 2010). It is
inconceivable that a building designer would presume that a parent would res-
cue themselves without first making provision for their children’s safe escape,
yet it appears that no provision to manage this aspect of human behaviour
was considered;
• at the fire incident in the Underground Station at King’s Cross in London in
1987, the concourse at the top of the escalators quickly became unsurviveable
to those trying to escape. The fire was thought to have been caused by a cigar-
ette igniting accumulated rubbish underneath one of the escalators and then
developed ferociously assisted by the layers and type of paint used, over many
years, to paint the escalator tunnel (see Fennell, 1988). The consequences of
not controlling smoking or of keeping the undersides of the escalators clear of
combustible rubbish or of the consequences of re-painting the escalator tunnel
had simply not been considered by the management of the Station;
• at the Bradford City Stadium fire in 1985, many of those that died, did so
while trying to get through the narrow and locked turnstiles at the rear of
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the stand (see Popplewell, 1985). Neither the speed and ferocity with which
the fire in the stand developed nor the need for people to evacuate through
the rear of the stand had been anticipated by the management of the football
ground;
• at the Station Nightclub in Rhode Island in 2003, 100 people died whilst
trying to escape from the single-storey building when the combustible linings
on the walls and ceiling of the stage were ignited by the fireworks of the band
during a concert. All the exits were available but the speed with which the
fire developed and the lack of direction given by members of the staff on duty
at the time meant that the majority of people tried to evacuate through the
front door of the building. The obstruction of a ticket table and the subsequent
narrowing of the entrance slowed down the evacuation until the majority of
the people who died were overcome by smoke within a few metres of the front
entrance door (see Grosshandler et al, 2005). The consequences of allowing
pyrotechnics to be set off during the performance or the lining of the walls and
ceiling received little consideration by the management of the club.
Given a continuum of public or private properties in all towns, cities and coun-
tries ranging from the one extreme of those with an excellent system of fire safety
management to those at the other extreme with a deplorable system of fire safety
management, it can be assumed that all fires in buildings, including notorious fire in-
cidents, are contained somewhere along the continuum. What can also be assumed,
because of the conclusions of investigations into the incidents, is that inadequate
fire safety management was a contributing factor at such fires as those at Summer-
land, King’s Cross, Bradford City Stadium and the Station Nightclub and played
some part in the tragedies that occurred. Therefore, logic dictates that adequate
fire safety management could have ameliorated the incidents in a some way.
How much the incidents could have been ameliorated can only be speculated about
but if the management of fire safety could be quantified then it would be possible to
measure its impact on them. If measurement were feasible and the impact was quan-
tified then the amount of rectification necessary to raise the system of management
above a given threshold could be calculated. This raises the need for a strategy of
targeting those companies or organisations that fall below the given threshold and
occupy buildings objectively shown to produce most fire damage.
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3.1. Introduction
The collection and analysis of data for use in this thesis was preceded by a review
of the literature (Chapter 2 on page 17). Reviewing the literature showed the de-
struction to property that has occurred by fire over many centuries because of the
types of building materials used and the ways that buildings were constructed. It
also indicated that construction and planning decisions can be made without com-
plete consideration for the potential hazards or consequences. This is evident, for
example, both in the fire at Summerland on page 32 and the explosion at PEPCON
on page 1. The literature has also indicated that the way that a building is managed
has an impact on its potential to harm its occupants. This is evident again in the
fire at Summerland on page 32, but also at the Station Nightclub on page 8 and the
Kiss nightclub on page 13.
There is little in the literature about the the amount of fire damage caused. In
fact, it quickly becomes obvious that the way that fire damage is measured and
recorded does not reveal the true cost of fire to the community (see section 1.5.1. on
page 14). Whether the amount of damage is linked to the standard of management
of the building is not fully explored by researchers such as Malhotra (1986) and
Ramachandran (1998).
Fire damage is financially accounted for by insurers and also reported on by Govern-
ment in publications such as Fire Statistics United Kingdom (2008) but, because it
cannot be measured and linked to the standard of management, good advice coming
from those sources can go unheeded because it is unspecific and lacks credibility.
Protecting life from fire in buildings appears to have overshadowed the protection of
the property and the sustainability of the occupying businesses. This can be better
understood if you consider that the management of fire safety is at the core of the fire
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risk assessment legislation in the UK. The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order
(2005), applicable in England and Wales, for instance, is only focused on the safety
of life; it pays little attention to the sustainability of business and the consequential
damage to the community or the environment. This is the gap that this research
concentrates on that justifies studying the relationship between fire damage and
fire safety management. The study investigates this relationship to determine the
relevance of the hypothesis:
The majority of fire damage resulting from property fires in the UK,
occurs as a result of a failure to manage fire safety successfully
Following on from the pre-stage literature review, the study involves three stages
using three different research methods (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1.: Methods used in this research
Stage Method Type of
study
Answers the
question...
Chapter (and
pages)
Pre-stage Literature
review
Qualitative Where the gap
in knowledge
lies
Chapter 2 (on
page 17)
1 Delphi method Qualitative How fire safety
is defined and
described
Chapter 4 (on
page 60)
2 Interviews Qualitative How fire safety
is managed and
enforced
Chapter 5 (on
page 82)
3 Case study Quantitative How fire damage
is defined and
described
Chapter 6 (on
page 103)
The research was carried out consecutively, using three different research methods,
documented as Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3. The reason for this order of stages was
not because one method was dependent on the completion of another but rather
that the two later stages were developments brought about by the earlier stage, to
progress the research. Looked at holistically, the three stages produce a synergistic
exposition of the relationship between fire damage and fire safety management.
Stage 1, the Delphi method, was necessary to provide a firm foundation to initiate
the research and to define a subject that lacks a distinct definition. A comprehensive
definition of fire safety was needed and, although, there are existing definitions of
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fire safety, they were not sufficiently complete. For example, the definition offered
in British Standard 9999 (2008), is a practical, but not exhaustive, list of factors
necessary for assessing the level of management in an organisation. This is a key
function in the implementation of the document but insufficient to define the whole
range of fire safety management. The Delphi method could exploit the technology
of electronic mail and an online survey website and pull together the opinions of
respected people in the field of fire safety. It was seen as a way of achieving the
most inclusive definition of fire safety management possible with a high level of
efficiency.
Stage 2, the interviews, was necessary to understand the influence of management
and legislation on fire safety. Loughborough University campus was chosen as a case
study because it was a good example of an assortment of different buildings on one
site, administered by one overall system of management. Carrying out interviews
of those people with influence on the management and enforcement of fire safety in
connection with Loughborough University campus was critical to understanding the
different motivations involved.
Stage 3, the case study, was necessary to quantify the amount of fire damage that
takes place in a defined area over a defined period. The area circumscribed as
Loughborough University campus is a fraction of the total area administered by
Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Fire Authority but a large site to be overseen
by one system of management. The different property types present on the campus
allowed it to be easily compared against the greater area of Leicester, Leicestershire
and Rutland. In addition, the data are organised to represent an intimation of the
cost of the consequences of fire on the campus, currently an unknown quantity.
Two of the stages take a qualitative approach to the research and the third takes a
quantitative approach but this is not detrimental to the study. Mixing qualitative
and quantitative methods is regarded as advantageous and it improves the validity of
the research because it examines a research topic from more than one vantage point
(Holtzhausen, 2001). The technique is described as triangulation and is a practice
advocated by Jick (1979). It represents a discursive approach to a subject that is
broad and complex and can combine the opposing approaches of quantitative and
qualitative studies (Holtzhausen, 2001). Jick (1979) contends that to use a mix of
methods in a research project assists in balancing out the strengths and weaknesses
inherent in each individual research method.
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The sequence for the progression of the research is given in Figure 3.1.
  Chapter 8
Conclusions
Figure 3.1.: Triangulation method of research
The following paragraphs explore each of the three stages to a greater degree and
justify the use of each method.
3.2. Stage 1: Delphi method
The concept of fire safety management can only be measured subjectively, there is
simply no agreed or objective system with which to measure it. It is a subjective
subject relying on subjective interpretation for its administration by practitioners
and regulators.
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The main reason that fire safety management cannot be measured is that it has
no standard or universally accepted definition. This may be, perhaps, because the
subject is difficult to define and no comprehensive definition has been attempted
but, more likely, it is because the subject is thought to be easy to define so it has
not demanded an overscrupulous definition.
However, any description is of little use to fire safety managers or for those who
enforce fire safety legislation unless it is accepted and agreed by all who will use it.
To reach an accepted definition, the Delphi method was used; the details of which
can be found in Chapter 4 of this thesis on page 60 but also reported by Baker et
al (2013).
The Delphi method is a method that has been used before in the field of fire safety.
Nelson (1982) used the professional judgement of a Delphi panel to evaluate the
components of a fire safety evaluation system for health care facilities in the USA.
Marchant et al (1982) used the Delphi method to evaluate the fire safety compon-
ents in patient areas within hospitals; essentially, to determine the relevant fire safety
components of the patient areas and to estimate their relative values and the coeffi-
cients of how they interact. Shields (1986) took the same method used by Marchant
et al (1982) and adapted it so that it could be applied to dwellings.
Marchant (1988) subsequently commented on the use of the Delphi method by
Shields (1986). One of the comments made was on the use of a central tenet of the
Delphi process, the principle of anonymity. This is where, during the Delphi process
each panel member remains anonymous from every other panel member. Marchant
(1988) was of the opinion that anonymity should be forfeited and replaced with face
to face meetings arguing that any of the disadvantages caused by dominant peer
pressure in such meetings would be balanced by the educative interaction between
intelligent people.
du Plessis and Human (2007), analysing the use of the Delphi method as an informed
decision-making tool, were persuaded differently. They thought that anonymity
amongst panel members allowing them to express their opinions freely without the
limiting factors of peer group pressure was its main advantage. It allowed panel
members to either, alter their original judgement or to hold on to their previous
opinion without losing face. There was a disadvantage, though, because they saw,
as a slight risk, that the cloak of anonymity might lead to a lack of accountability
amongst the panel members unless, as part of the process, they were asked to justify
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the opinions they gave.
For the purposes of the method detailed in this thesis, the argument put forward
by du Plessis and Human (2007) was accepted and implemented. Anonymity was
offered as a condition of becoming a panel member and it remains secured following
the dissolution of the panel.
3.3. Stage 2: Interviews
Fire safety management is not traditionally regarded as a science, that is, if the
definition of a science "is the pursuit of knowledge and understanding of the natural
and social world following a systematic methodology based on evidence."1 This truth
becomes obvious when speaking to the people involved in the practice and the
enforcement of the legislation. One person’s opinion of what constitutes the correct
management of fire safety in a particular building or location is a subjective opinion
and could be quite different from another’s opinion of the same building or the same
location.
There are many people who manage fire safety; every occupier of every home is
a fire safety manager in that they have to manage the ignition sources and the
combustible materials if they are to reduce the threat of ignition raised by heating
appliances and cooking appliances igniting the combustible materials found in every
home. The success of these residential fire safety managers is evident in that the
majority of people survive and live their lives quite comfortably without fire loss
though they are surrounded by ignition sources such as matches and electricity and
highly combustible materials such as natural gas and polyurethane foam furniture.
Most people would call this success a natural occurrence attributable to common
sense but, unfortunately, this is a subjective opinion that is not measurable and is
of little value to the researcher.
This thesis focuses on the management and regulation of fire safety in companies
and organisations rather than residential dwellings and uses the management of fire
safety on Loughborough University campus as an example of an organisation faced
with normal day to day legal and moral obligations.
1Source: The Science Council. A membership organisation that brings together learned societies
and professional bodies across science and its applications.
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Fire safety on Loughborough University campus is managed formally and is the
responsibility of Facilities Management who have appointed a fire safety manager for
the purpose. The role of fire safety manager operates within a management hierarchy
and budget and its responsibilities include the administration of fire safety in the
buildings necessary for producing a higher education environment on a university
campus. This includes over one hundred buildings of thirteen different property
types on a site measuring 438 acres.
Fire safety is regulated by UK legislation in the design and construction of buildings
by the regulatory authorities using the building codes and then, following construc-
tion when the building has become occupied, mainly by the Regulatory Reform (Fire
Safety) Order (2005). Fire safety officers from the UK fire and rescue service are
consulted in the fire provisions for the design of buildings under the building codes
and, under legislation, they have responsibility for administration and enforcement.
To explore the different opinions held by those who enforce fire safety or who have
the capability of influencing the fire safety management of Loughborough University
campus and to answer the question of ‘how is fire safety managed and regulated.’,
interviews were arranged with four people. These four people, it was thought, could
assist in explaining the differences.
The interviewees were:
• fire safety manager of Loughborough University campus with responsibility for
the administration of fire safety across the Loughborough University campus.
This interviewee had been employed in this role for eight years but had spent
28 previous years employed in an industry with a culture and environment
similar to the fire and rescue service;
• district fire officer for Charnwood with Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service
with responsibilities that include the operational response to an emergency
incident at Loughborough University campus. This interviewee had spent 19
years as an operational firefighter and fire officer and was responsible for the
management of fire safety on three fire stations. However, during his career,
he had not specialised in fire safety;
• senior fire safety officer for Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service with respons-
ibilities that include the enforcement of fire safety legislation on Loughborough
University campus. This interviewee had spent 26 years as an operational fire-
fighter and fire officer but had specialised in the enforcement of fire safety for
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the last fifteen years;
• consultant fire engineer who, although not directly influential with fire safety
on Loughborough University campus, nevertheless because of his experience
with fire safety in the insurance industry, could give an opinion with regard to
the way that the insurance industry considers fire safety on the campus. This
interviewee had been awarded a doctorate in fire engineering and had spent
the last few years working in the Fire Protection Association providing fire
safety advice to the insurance industry.
Interviewees, according to Kvale (1996), should be provided with an indication of
the topic to be discussed which can take the form of a rough outline or a sequence
of carefully worded questions. A rough outline with suggested questions would
be defined as a semi-structured interview. Each of the interview questions should
contain two aspects:
1. A thematic aspect with regard to the relationship between the question and
the topic for discussion; and
2. A dynamic aspect having regard to the the relationship between the interviewer
and the interviewee.
The object being to engender a positive contribution to knowledge by a favourable
interaction with the interviewee (Kvale, 1996).
Britten (1995) describes the techniques that can be used in medical research and
states that using interviews as a form of research, is well-established in the medical
world. She explains that this has developed from the clinical environment where a
clinician interviews a patient to arrive at a diagnosis. From that, it is a natural step
to interview a patient for the purpose of research. She states that there are three
main types of interview that can be successfully used; structured, semi-structured
and in-depth interviews.
Denscombe (2010) concentrates on advice for social research and believes that social
research has become a mechanism for many people to undertake small-scale research
as part of professional development. He advocates the use of surveys and interviews
as part of a research strategy to enable the completion of a research project.
Cerda (1981) used a survey when looking at the application of fire safety to archi-
tectural design. He sent a questionnaire for completion to schools of architecture,
fire authorities, architects in small and large practices in his research. Following
55
3.3 Stage 2: Interviews
analysis of his data, he concluded that, to address the problem of increasing fire
loss, educating the architect in the principles fire safety was a viable alternative to
legislating to enforce fire safety.
Qualitative analysis of interviews and a review of case studies was used by Puy-
baraud (2001) to investigate the failures of management in fires occurring during
the construction, repair or refurbishment of a building. Following analysis of the
data, she concluded her research by offering a qualitative model to the construction
industry, developed from her research findings. The model was intended to assist
with creating an effective fire safety strategy to eliminate and/or control fires during
construction activities.
In respect of this research, structured interviews were considered to be the best way
to garner data from interviewing the chosen four.
The interviews were structured with five questions, the same five questions for all
four interviewees, designed to draw out qualitative information about the admin-
istration of fire safety and different aspects of the management of fire safety on
Loughborough University campus.
Question 1 was designed to examine how the interviewees thought managing fire
safety assisted Loughborough University in meeting its regulatory re-
quirements.
Question 2 was designed to examine how the interviewees thought managing fire
safety assisted Loughborough University to prepare for any interruptions
in its business undertakings and enterprises.
Question 3 was designed to encourage the interviewees to express a view on the
relationship between fire damage and fire safety management.
Question 4 was designed to encourage the interviewees to state what benefits they
thought there were to Loughborough University arising from the current
CFOA campaign to reduce unwanted fire signals.
Question 5 was designed to encourage the interviewees to express a view on a per-
formance metric that could potentially measure the performance of the
fire and rescue service with regard to the reduction of fire damage.
The same five questions were used in each interview so that there would be a con-
sistent framework against which the responses could be analysed.
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The interviewees were aware of the questions before the interview took place. A
letter was sent to each potential interviewee (see Appendix 1 on page 167 for an
example of the letter) containing the five questions. This was thought necessary
because it indicated the nature of the interview discussion and it allowed the po-
tential interviewee the opportunity to consider their response before the interview
took place. Each interview was recorded with the interviewee’s permission and
transcribed. The transcriptions can be found in Appendices 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Details of the methodology, the questions and the results of the interviews can be
found in Chapter 5 on page 82. But also in Chapter 5 can be found:
• a list of items that emerged during the discussion, prompted by the questions,
that were relevant to, and have impact on the subject (see page 92);
• a list of the priorities with which each interviewee sees their role. Each inter-
viewee was asked to agree or dispute a list provided for them and, once agreed,
to place the items on the list in order of priority (see page 100).
3.4. Stage 3: Case study
Fire incident data was acquired from Loughborough University so that actual and
false alarms of fire within the boundaries of Loughborough University campus could
be analysed and used to assist with the definition and description of fire damage.
To give some context to this analysis Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service was
approached and fire incident data for the whole of Leicestershire, Leicester and
Rutland was acquired. This acquisition, which consisted of data between April
2009 and March 2012, enabled the potential for comparing the fire incident data
for Loughborough University campus against that of Leicestershire Fire and Rescue
Service using Loughborough University as a case study.
The comparison was desirable because of anecdotal evidence that Loughborough
University was managing fire safety quite well. The main indication of this was
the ratio between the number of times that a fire alarm operated within one of the
buildings on Loughborough University Campus and the number of time that the
fire and rescue service was requested to respond because of this. This ratio was
anecdotally said to be approximately 20:1.
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Case studies can be used to assist in understanding a complex subject and are often
used as a research method across many fields of study. Thomas (2011) defines
case studies as analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies,
institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods.
Using Loughborough University as a case study and comparing it against the larger
dataset from Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service, satisfies a criterion that Thomas
(2011) demands because it is a dataset of fire incident variables capable of being
analysed against the same variables in the larger dataset.
Yin (2008) looked at the design of case studies insisting that certain criteria should
be satisfied. He suggested that there should be sufficient data relevant to the research
subject and a robust rationale behind the research. The subject of the case study
should be firmly within the context of the research area. Yin (2008) determined four
tests to assess whether the case study was well grounded, efficient and of a good
enough quality.
It looked at
• whether the case study used data that was robust, relevant and measured
appropriate variables (construct validity);
• whether the analysis of the data was logical, explainable and made the correct
inferences (internal validity);
• whether the results of the study are applicable generally in similar circum-
stances and are capable of being replicated (external validity);
• whether the method is capable of being audited and found to be dependable
(reliability)
Yin (2008) acknowledged that the case study strategy was seen as the weak sibling
among other research methodologies. He challenged this notion by insisting that a
case study was not just a data collection tactic but a rigorous method of research.
Santos-Reyes and Beard (2002) used a case study to assist in developing a fire
safety management model. The safety management of a national organisation was
analysed and compared to existing safety management systems. The interest was,
not only in developing a fire safety management system model but also in proactively
measuring the performance of a safety management system rather than measuring
it reactively. Santos-Reyes and Beard (2002) concluded that the management of fire
safety was no different from the management of any category of safety and it needed
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to be addressed in a logical, structured manner in the same way. Measuring the
performance of the management system also needed to be done in the same manner
but proactively as the system operated. As the functions of each part of the overall
system are carried out their performance is monitored, creating the basis for the
functions of the next system which is dependent on the performance. This mode
of management is called recursive management and is at the heart of the model
formulated by Santos-Reyes and Beard (2002).
London Fire Brigade collect data from the investigation of fires in the London area
and populate a database known as the Real Fire Library. Steiner (1999) analysed
data from the Real Fire Library and developed a more systematic methodology
for the investigation of fires to be used by officers specialising in the discipline.
The methodology was meant to render more effective analysis that could be used by
London Fire Brigade’s fire safety department and in particular Steiner (1999) looked
at fires that originated in a lounge of a dwelling. Analysis of the data had indicated
that there was a preponderance of deaths in the lounge of dwellings. These were
associated with the ignition of upholstered furniture.
Finland has a national, internet-based, database named Pronto, containing data
regarding accidents, resources and emergency responses for communities in Fin-
land. Tillander (2004) used Pronto to investigate the ignition frequency, the con-
sequences of fires and the performance of the Finnish Fire Department. Using the
data, Tillander (2004) was able to generate new information and quantitative tools
to assist the assessment of fire risk. The new information was particularly suitable
for use in fire engineered design.
Further details of the data used in the case study and the results that came from
the analysis can be found in Chapter 6 on page 103.
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4.1. Introduction
The Delphi method is a method of generating authoritative information and guid-
ance in a discipline or area of study which is dominated by subjectivity. Introduced
in the 1950s by the American Douglas Aircraft Company, the Delphi method was
developed as a component of Project RAND (Research and Development) which
has since grown into the RAND Corporation, a non-profit organisation helping to
improve decision-making and public policy. The Delphi method was advanced as a
method by Dalkey (1969) of studying the imponderables of inter-continental war-
fare, a highly subjective area relying on the speculation, conjecture and guesswork
associated with deciphering scraps of intelligence gained by diverse means. The
method only offered subjective conclusions to scenarios posed in a subjective fields
but the strength of the conclusions came from two concepts; firstly, that a panel of
people, accomplished and knowledgeable in the field under scrutiny could give their
opinions and then evaluate their own opinion against the opinions of people in their
peer group and; secondly, they could do so in isolation with opportunity to alter
their opinion anonymously, without fear of being ridiculed.
The discipline of fire safety management is one such area of subjectivity which,
because of the lack of objective statistical evidence, is reliant on the experience and
knowledge of participants in the field to advise and give guidance on best practice.
It is possible for a system of fire safety management practiced by a company or
organisation to be considered as ‘good’ by one adviser but as ‘poor’ by another
simply because of the different knowledge base and experience of the two advisers.
In particular, in England and Wales, much weight is placed on the subjective opin-
ions of fire safety officers in their administration of the Regulatory Reform (Fire
Safety) Order (2005). Evidence to be used in the prosecution of offenders, is gath-
ered by fire safety officers via the mechanism of the fire safety audit, promulgated by
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the Chief Fire Officers’ Association (2008)1 and presented to the court in the form
of photographs, witness statements and the opinion of the fire safety officer. Most of
the Articles in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005), and consequently
the substance of the fire safety audit and the subjective prosecutory evidence, are
centred on the quality of fire safety management within a company or organisation.
Prosecutions account for only about 0.1% of the total number of fire safety audits
carried out in the course of one year but this represented 64 successful prosecu-
tions in England in 2010/11, as reported by Fire Statistics United Kingdom (2008),
largely based on subjective evidence evaluated by the court. Although subjective,
the evidence put forward by fire safety officers has proved to be extremely effective
and has resulted in the imprisonment of offenders and record fines for companies
and organisations.
Notwithstanding the success of fire safety officers in England and Wales in their
administration of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005), the focus by
the fire and rescue service is on those premises that pose the greatest threat to life
and the subjective evidence gathered in this endeavour has limited usage because
it is targeted towards the conviction of offenders. This is of little use to those who
fear they may become offenders. These are the fire safety managers who have the
responsibility of creating management systems with regard to fire safety that have
to satisfy the scrutiny of the regulators. The evidence that they see has secured
a conviction is only of value to them if the circumstances of the offence resemble
their own premises or situation. Even then they suspect that because the evidence
is of a subjective nature then two fire safety officers may interpret it in two different
ways and ultimately detrimental to them. Because there is no science of fire safety
management and also a lack of objective research into the subject there is little for
fire safety managers to use to validate their fire safety strategies.
This lack of a science is what prompted the formation of a Delphi panel of people
knowledgeable and experienced in the field of fire safety management. The criteria
used to choose them is given below in the next section but the people themselves
were those known to the author to have much experience and knowledge in the
field of fire safety. Their task was to conclude with a categorisation of the subject
which, because of the combined calibre of the panel, would be an authoritative
1The fire safety audit is a tool developed by the Chief Fire Officers’ Association (CFOA)
to assist in ascertaining how premises are being managed regarding fire safety. Guid-
ance regarding the fire safety audit and an explanation of the audit form can be found at
www.cfoa.org.uk/download/12191 (accessed on 1 March 2013).
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categorisation that stood a chance of becoming the accepted categorisation. An
accepted categorisation could be used as a basis for the objective measurement of
the subject using statistical data gathered by investigators at fire incidents. This
would fulfill the requirement of a science in the opinion of Lord Kelvin who said:
“when you cannot measure (a subject), when you cannot express it in
numbers, your knowledge of it is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind;
it may be the beginning of knowledge but you have scarcely, in your
thoughts, advanced it to the stage of science” Lord Kelvin (1824-1907)
Measuring fire safety management carries the potential to improve its performance.
Measurement enables statistics to be collated and analysed which will show the
categories that have the most effect in terms of property damage and number of
emergency responses. Carter et al (1992) thought that any programme or project
should have some measurement of the effectiveness of its objectives and alternative
ways should be evaluated to take advantage of the least cost. Measuring perfor-
mance over a period of years would provide feedback about the appropriateness and
effectiveness of the method chosen. Performance measures with regard to the man-
agement of fire safety can be created that can be used to improve performance. This
raises the possibility that the cost of fire could be reduced by addressing the root
cause of most structural fires; inadequate fire safety management. Linking statistical
evidence gathered from fire incidents to each category regarding the characteristics
of ignition and the type of property, would enable the creation of property pro-
files. Analysis of the profiles would enable predicting, forecasting and targeting of
the most damaging profiles. This could result in efficiency savings, benefits to the
community and the environment and allow the fire and rescue service to consider
re-balancing its reactive and proactive resources.
4.2. Method
The value of the Delphi method in the determination of a subjective issue is that
the determination can be said to be an authoritative one because it comes from
the deliberations of experienced and knowledgeable people in the field. This greatly
improves its chances of becoming the accepted determination. In the case of mea-
suring fire safety management, it is seen as only the first stage because successful
measurement using statistical data from fire incidents and fire investigations will, in
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time, validate or negate the determination.
Powell (2003) and Beech (1999) considered that the Delphi method could not be
counted as being an accepted scientific method. du Plessis and Human (2007)
counteract the claim that the Delphi method is more art than science by stating
that the Delphi technique could be seen as having added value because it has the
advantage of being able to explore qualitative data such as attitudes and moral
judgements. However, the conclusion they drew was that the technique could at
best be viewed as subjective opinions regarding problems that can not otherwise
be explored by means of more scientific instruments. It should only be used with
caution placing emphasis on measures to enhance validity and reliability.
The essential features of the Delphi method were identified by Dalkey (1969)and
designed to minimise the biasing effects of dominant individuals, of irrelevant com-
munications and of group pressure toward conformity as:
• anonymous response - the opinions of the group are obtained by formal ques-
tionnaire;
• iteration and controlled feedback - interaction is effected by a systematic exer-
cise conducted in several iterations with carefully controlled feedback between
rounds;
• statistical group response - the group opinion is defined as an appropriate
aggregate of individual opinions in the final round.
There is much in the literature, written by Dalkey (1969); Powell (2003); du Plessis
and Human (2007); Adler and Ziglio (1996) amongst others, about the Delphi
method. The exploration of its virtues is wide and diverse including use as a busi-
ness tool, use in the nursing and care professions and use in deciding where and in
what form the enemy might attack. Its original conception by the United States
Army was as a tool to gain advantage during the Cold War, a period of political
and military tension. However, there were three criteria advanced by Adler and
Ziglio (1996) that the need for the Delphi method should satisfy and that would
lend themselves to the determination in the subject of fire safety management:
1. The problem is not one that lends itself to precise analytical techniques, but
one that can benefit from collective subjective judgements;
2. The problem has no monitored history and there is inadequate information
regarding its present and future development;
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3. Addressing the problem requires the exploration and assessment of a variety
of issues with, potentially, many different outcomes.
Once the need of the Delphi method had been established the next stage was the
choice of the Delphi panel members. The panel was chosen after consideration of
the principles for expert opinion mooted by Rowe and Wright (2001) and Okoli and
Pawlowski (2004), whose principles include:
• using between five and twenty experts, as diverse as possible, with knowledge
and experience in the field of study;
• using questions that are clear and to the point, framed in a balanced manner
and do not contain irrelevant information;
• giving feedback that gauges the average estimate of the panel plus the various
perspectives of the other panel members.
Some more principles mooted by Adler and Ziglio (1996) further influenced the
choice of the panel. These looked at the attributes and practicalities of the panel
and insist that suitable people should have:
• the knowledge and experience necessary for the issues under investigation;
• the capacity, willingness and sufficient time to participate;
• sufficient communication skill to communicate effectively.
The literature regarding the formation of a Delphi panel suggested that the ideal
panel would consist of about twenty panelists, so a mix of attributes was sought to
arrive at this number. The panel consisted of practitioners, academics and enforcers
who were either consultants, employees or fire safety officers asked to take part
because of their experience, knowledge and influence in the subject on which they
were to deliberate. All had come by their experience, primarily, in the UK.
No category of person (scientist, underwriter, building owner etc.) was deliberately
excluded, but a fair balance of people with experience, knowledge and influence in
the field was achieved. The chosen mix was thought to reflect those who exercised
the most influence in the field.
The particular qualities of the three categories were seen by the author to be:
• practitioners having the task of balancing their legal responsibilities with the
business they are involved in;
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• academics having the opportunity of evaluating data and challenging the ex-
isting status;
• regulators having the task of interpreting and applying the legislation.
The amount of knowledge and experience of the panel members was critical to
the research so they were asked to supply information which would indicate their
combined ability. Fifty-six percent of panel members had been directly responsible
for the management of fire safety in a commercial, public or heritage building with
nearly half of these being so employed for over ten years. One hundred percent of
panel members had assessed and reported on buildings belonging to commercial,
public or heritage organisations with eighty-six per cent of them having made over
fifty assessments; seventy per cent of these, as a local authority fire officer; fifteen
per cent as a consultant and fifteen per cent as an employee (see Figures 4.1 and
4.2).
Figure 4.1.: Panel members who have been directly responsible for managing fire
safety
Twenty-one potential panel members were contacted by e-mail and the process again
explained in detail. Each had the option of accepting or declining to participate and
eighteen members decided to accept the invitation to participate. The sequence
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Figure 4.2.: Panel members who have been responsible for assessing and reporting
on fire safety management
of events was outlined to them (see Figure 4.3) along with the output that was
expected of them.
The task set before the Delphi panel was to deliberate on a given categorisation of
fire safety management in an attempt to reach a consensus on the heading of each
category, the definition of that category and an importance rating for the category.
The stated intention of the exercise was to achieve a list of categories that contained
the complete breadth of the subject in brief, concise form that could be used as the
basis for a measurement system.
The means of communication chosen was an online website. Bristol Online Surveys
(BOS) (website: http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/) allows the development, deploy-
ment and analysis of surveys via the internet with only a modicum of technical
knowledge being required. Once the survey questions were uploaded onto the web-
site the only requirements needed to complete the survey questions were a computer,
access to the internet and a login address.
One of the characteristics of the Delphi method is the anonymity of each Panel
member which acts to negate or, at least, reduce the influence of peer pressure or an
individual’s dominance. This means that care must be taken by the administrator,
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when using electronic mail, to send e-mails to panel members making sure that they
cannot determine, by investigation of the metadata connected to the e-mail, who
their fellow panel members are. This potential error was avoided by sending out
individual e-mails to each panel member.
Figure 4.3.: The sequence of events during the Delphi process
For information and with regard to the questions: some were asked using a Likert
scale of 0-5 for the response but which also invited a qualification with the answer.
These responses were rated either; in agreement, in disagreement or in qualified
agreement. A majority of the questions in the second iteration came from the
qualifications raised in the responses to the first set of questions. Other questions
asked for a written answer and were rated as either; in agreement, in disagreement,
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in qualified agreement or ambiguously answered. The ambiguous answers reflected
the future need to formulate the questions with care but they were not in sufficient
number to seriously affect the results.
The response of the panel on each issue was analysed and summarised by the ad-
ministrator in the form of a conclusion. The conclusions were fed back to the panel
for agreement.
One of the questions asked of the panel dealt with the anonymity of panel members.
The panel were asked if, when the process was concluded, they were willing to discard
anonymity and let their identities be known to their fellow panel members and,
subsequently, any interested parties. They were instructed that only by unanimous
agreement would this course of action be facilitated and just one declination would
mean that anonymity would be secured. In the event members chose to retain their
anonymity and so the identities of the panel members will not be divulged.
4.2.1. The Survey Questions
The purpose of the whole exercise was to arrive at a concise and simple categorisa-
tion of fire safety management, so it was imperative that the panel members were
given a starting point to focus their deliberations. Chosen for this purpose was a
categorisation of fire safety management contained in a thesis written in support of
a Master’s degree at Bradford University by Howarth (1999). Howarth’s task was
to investigate and compare the management of fire safety in a range of passenger
terminals throughout Europe. This necessitated the formulation of a succinct list
of categories regarding fire safety management, allowing easy comparison between
passenger terminals that could be illustrated as a model in the thesis. The Howarth
model (see page 70) consisted of ten categories with brief and concise definitions
that covered the supposed complete range of elements included in the term, fire
safety management. This list could be used as a classification and could go forward
to potentially supersede any other, less complete, fire safety management model if
it was robust, if it captured the whole of the subject and if it could be universally
accepted. The Howarth model offered a head start in the process of categorisation
and eventual measurement of the subject.
The questions in the first survey covered a small range of issues. The first two
questions were used to establish a calibre for the panel so the panel members were
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asked to provide information about their background and experiences with regard
to fire safety management (set out on page 65 and in Figures 4.1 on page 65 and
4.2 on page 66). Subsequent questions asked the panel’s opinion on the wisdom of
categorising fire safety management in this way. The approach taken to the concept
of the measurement of the subject (see Figure 4.3 on page 67) Whether or not the
categories were the correct categories.
The panel were asked to rank the importance of each category (see Figure 4.4 on
page 74) and this was significant because this represented the opinions of experienced
and knowledgeable people in the field of study.
The responses of each panel member were collected in the software of the online
website and downloaded directly into a spreadsheet. Each response was identified
by a reference number and a time stamp but it was not possible to link a response
to a panel member because there was no link between the reference number and
an individual panel member. This rendered each respondent anonymous from the
administrator as well as from the peer group.
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Table 4.1.: The Howarth Model of Fire Safety Management
1. ORGANISATION 6. REPORTING AND INVESTIGATING
FIRES
Fire safety policy statement in place Fire reporting procedure in place
Supporting fire safety standards All fires reported and investigated
Director of Safety in the organisation Other incidents investigated (e.g. false calls)
Fire safety manager appointed Lessons learnt from incidents (e.g. staff
briefing)
Quality management system in place Records kept/seen/assessed
2. RISK ASSESSMENT 7. FIRE TRAINING
Recognised method in place Arrangements in place
Applied at design/improvement/alteration
stage
Trained according to position (e.g. duty
manager)
Applied as a specific exercise Induction fire training given
Applied as an ongoing process Trained by qualified staff (e.g. a trainer)
Specialist advice available Records kept/seen/assessed
3. COMPLIANCE WITH FIRE SAFETY
LEGISLATION
8. MAINTENANCE OF FIRE
EQUIPMENT AND STANDARDS
Approval sought (e.g. applied for) Firefighting equipment provided, maintained
& recorded
Partly approved (e.g. work still in progress) Fire systems maintained and recorded
Full compliance (e.g. fire certificate issued) Process to maintain means of escape
Fire certificate (or equivalent) seen and valid Waste management regime in place
Full compliance plus (e.g. higher standard) Fire safety protocols for contractors in place
4. EMERGENCY PLANS AND FIRE
PROCEDURES
9. BUDGET
Emergency plans in place Funds for local jobs (e.g. replace
extinguishers)
Appropriate and up to date Funds for maintenance (e.g.. systems)
Fire procedure in place Improvement funds (e.g. major works)
Fire action notices displayed Appropriate, aware and involved
Plans and procedures tested/recorded Records kept/seen/assessed
5. COMMUNICATION AND
INFORMATION
10. AUDIT
Management communications (e.g.. dialogue
with tenants)
Appropriate method in place
Communications and information systems
(e.g. radio/PA)
Local audit
Fire warning system in place (e.g.
public/staff use)
Management audit
Fire service called to all suspected fires Independent audit
Arrangements tested/recorded/assessed Records kept/seen/assessed
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The first survey was analysed and the analysis was fed back to each panel member
by e-mail. It included the comments from each respondent as well as the response
from the administrator. The questions raised during the first survey were used to
influence the questions in the second survey which was administered in exactly the
same way as the first survey. Some of the issues raised in the second survey included,
whether or not:
• any panel member wished to alter any of their previous responses after con-
templation of all the other responses to the first survey
• the key to each category should be its relationship with its category heading
and not what was contained in it
• the category being aligned to a statutory duty (in UK legislation) gave it
special significance when compared with another category that was not so
aligned
• the contents of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005) should in-
fluence the structure of the categorisation
• there should be brief and concise descriptors of the categories such as in the
Howarth model or whether they should be more descriptive
• the reference to a fire warning system was appropriate under the category
heading of ‘Communications and information’
• the concept of fire prevention was encompassed in the category heading of
‘Reporting and investigation of fires’
• only items regarding fire safety management that are contained in the Regu-
latory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005) should be categorised and measured
• the panel agreed with the logic of weighting the categories in line with the
ranking of importance
• the panel agreed that the idea of the Delphi method was to use the knowledge
and experience of the panel members to set the initial direction of the potential
measurement of the subject and that the understanding of each category would
come from evidence as it accumulates over time
Following completion of the second survey, the analysis was again fed back to the
panel members.
71
4.3 Results
Analysis of the first and second surveys produced a set of conclusions following the
Delphi panel members’ deliberations. These were:
1. The ten fire safety management categories should be re-drafted to produce
more clarity in line with the responses from the panel.
2. The categories should be supported by brief and concise descriptors assisted
by a supplementary definition (following further work).
3. The key to each category should be its relationship with its category heading
and not necessarily what the category referred to.
4. Elements of fire safety management which were a statutory duty in UK leg-
islation should be measured commensurately with elements which were not a
UK statutory duty.
5. Where relevant, each category should have distinct, co-ordinated and consis-
tent references to the articles in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order
(2005).
6. Reference to the fire warning system should be contained within the category
headed as ‘Communications and information’.
7. Regarding the element of fire prevention as part of fire safety management,
and following further work, either that:
a) it should be split up into discrete parts and included in more than one
category; or
b) that it should exist in its own distinct category.
8. References in the analyses to the word weighting were misleading because the
word has a specific meaning in statistical work. The word weighting should be
substituted with the word impact. The impact of each category should depend
on its relevancy and its context in any given situation and that this should be
taken into account until, or unless, statistical evidence proves otherwise.
4.3. Results
There are two sets of results concluded by the Delphi panel:
1. The importance ranking of the ten categories; and
2. The ten definitive categories.
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4.3.1. The importance ranking given by Panel members
The panel members were asked to rate the categories in order of importance. They
were asked to give a score of 1 to 5 for each category where 1 represented important
and 5 represented unimportant. Figure 4.4 shows the order of ranking given by the
panel.
The importance ranking should be accepted for what it is, a best guess of the most
and least important categories of fire safety management. This should facilitate fu-
ture work in linking statistical data to each category for the purpose of measurement,
beginning with the category considered by the panel to be the most important.
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Figure 4.4.: The importance ranking determined by the Delphi panel
4.3.2. The Categories defined
The categories with their definitions are laid out below. They have been re-numbered
from their original numbers in the Howarth model ( on page 70) and now reflect
the order of ranking determined by the Delphi panel. The panel were asked to set
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the initial direction of the process of measurement by providing a categorisation of
the subject. They were aware that the understanding of each category would come
from evidence as it accumulates over time.
The references in italics at the end of each category refer to Articles in the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005). The addition of the reference fulfills a request
of the panel.
Category 1. Emergency plans and fire procedures
There should be evidence of proactive emergency planning for a wide range of fore-
seeable events accounting for:
• the use of the building;
• the fire growth characteristics; the type of occupants;
• the lines of communication between management and employees/occupants
etc.;
• the fire safety systems; the roles and levels of staff.
There should be evidence of contingency planning for such instances as: lack of staff
training; sickness and other unexpected absences of staff unexpected fire loadings
arson attacks etc.
There should be evidence of dissemination and clarification of emergency planning
with responsibilities and objectives clearly defined. These should be demonstrated
by use of:
• emergency plans;
• fire procedures;
• fire routines notices.
There should be evidence that emergency plans and procedures are tested periodi-
cally, lessons are learnt and solutions are put into effect.
Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 11 - Article 15 - Article 16 - Article 20
- Article 21 – Article 38
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Category 2. Risk assessment
There should be evidence of a recognised method of fire risk assessment in place
that:
• is carried out by a specialist with appropriate knowledge and experience;
• identifies fire hazards and people at risk; evaluates the risk to people and
property;
• puts controls in place to remove or reduce the hazard; records the significant
findings and disseminates them to employees and other relevant people;
• reviews the assessment and causes the emergency plans and procedures to be
revised after changes to the occupancy and/or the fire growth characteristics
of the building and its contents.
Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 8 - Article 9 - Article 11 - Article 12 -
Article 13(a) - Article 13(b) - Article 15 - Article 16 - Article 19 - Article 20
Category 3. Fire training
There should be evidence of arrangements for fire training incorporating: training
on induction;
• training according to position or role;
• training by trainers qualified to accepted standards;
• periodic refresher training.
Training content should include instruction on: fire prevention, fire protection and
fire evacuation procedures;
• new or changed risks, new or modified equipment and new technology;
• new systems of work and safe handling of hazardous and combustible sub-
stances; etc.
Evidence of training should be available in the form of written records.
Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 10 - Article 12 - Article 15 - Article 16
- Article 18 - Article 19 - Article 20 - Article 21 - Article 22
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Category 4. Maintenance of fire equipment and standards
There should be evidence of maintenance of fire equipment and standards that
demonstrates support for the principles incorporated in the fire strategy in respect
of occupancy, means of escape, fire prevention, fire loading, arson measures, fire
safety protocols for contractors etc. which includes:
• a pre-determined maintenance regime for all fire prevention, fire protection
and fire-fighting equipment and systems;
• a schedule of dynamic monitoring and maintenance of escape routes, waste
management systems etc. including alternative procedures for complications
discovered by dynamic monitoring.
Written evidence that demonstrates maintenance of fire equipment and standards
is being carried out should be available for inspection.
Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 8 - Article 11 - Article 13(a) - Article
13(b) - Article 14 - Article 15 - Article 16 - Article 17 - Article 18 - Article 20 -
Article 21 - Article 37 - Article 38
Category 5. Organisational arrangements
There should be evidence of responsibility for fire safety at the highest level of
the organisation with clear lines of responsibility throughout the organisation and
empowerment at an appropriate functional level.
This should be consolidated with a comprehensive fire safety policy developed to
expedite the fire strategy and supported by a quality management system that:
• plans and prepares for a wide range of foreseeable events using sufficiently
trained and competent people;
• controls:
– construction, building alterations and refurbishment;
– systems of work including hot work and work using hazardous and com-
bustible substances etc.;
– informs employees and other relevant people;
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– co-ordinates and promotes co-operation between responsible persons.
Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 8 - Article 10 - Article 11 - Article 12
- Article 13(a) - Article 13(b) - Article 15 - Article 16 - Article 17 - Article 18 -
Article 19 - Article 20 - Article 21 - Article 22 - Article 23 - Article 37 - Article 38
Category 6. Audit
There should be an audit of the fire safety management system carried out by an
independent auditor or an auditor capable of acting independently and it should be
recorded. It should demonstrate its examination of the system of management to
determine whether it takes account of:
• any implications for, or impact on, the fire strategy such as changes to the
occupancy and the fire growth characteristics;
• the awareness of employees and other persons, where relevant, of their duties
and requirements with respect to the fire strategy;
• the documentation system supports and reflects the practices;
• the fire strategy is based on advice given in, for example, Publicly Available
Specification 911 (2007) and British Standard 9999 (2008) and the fire strategy
is being followed;
• the solutions where parts of the fire strategy are not being followed for practical
reasons or for reasons of nonconformity;
• the areas where improvements can be made.
Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 11
Category 7. Communications and information
There should be evidence of written and verbal communication encouraging co-
operation and co-ordination to include:
• discourse between management, staff, occupants and occupier;
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• contractors and other persons; dissemination of relevant and appropriate in-
formation regarding the fire strategy which includes the findings of the fire
risk assessment;
• an appropriate relationship with the fire and rescue service which includes
notification of material changes in the risk profile;
• an appropriate system and equipment necessary for giving warning in case of
fire.
Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 9 - Article 10 - Article 11 - Article 12 -
Article 13(a) - Article 14 - Article 15 - Article 16 - Article 18 - Article 19 - Article
20 - Article 22 - Article 23
Category 8. Reporting and investigation of fires
There should be evidence of a management attitude towards fire safety that:
• reports, investigates and records all incidents (i.e. fires, near misses and false
alarms);
• debriefs personnel and evaluates all reports to learn lessons from the incidents;
• incorporates all lessons learnt from the incidents to make sure that they are
not repeated.
Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 8 - Article 11 - Article 12 - Article
13(b) - Article 19
Category 9. Budget
There should be evidence of appropriate financial budgeting for fire safety including
evidence of sufficient funds for:
• fire safety management;
• fire safety arrangements in building improvement and repair;
• fire systems and fire equipment and their maintenance;
• fire training.
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Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 11
Category 10. Compliance with legislation
There should be appropriate evidence of:
• compliance with relevant legislation including the Regulatory Reform (Fire
Safety) Order (2005) applicable in England and Wales;
• adherence to regulations applicable to building construction, alterations and
refurbishment.
Reference to the UK legislation applicable in England and Wales; the Regulatory
Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005): Article 8 - Article 9 - Article 10 - Article 11
- Article 12 - Article 13(a) - Article 13(b) - Article 14 - Article 15 - Article 16 -
Article 17 - Article 18 - Article 19 - Article 20 - Article 21 - Article 22 - Article 23
- Article 37 - Article 38
4.4. Summary
In summary, at the end of the Delphi process, there are a number of significant
achievements:
1. There is a categorisation of the concept of fire safety management that pur-
ports to encompass the whole breadth of the subject.
2. A mix of people qualified by knowledge and experience to hold an opinion
on one or more aspects of fire safety management, have deliberated on the
subject. The mix included current or past practitioners and regulators of the
subject who reflect the current influence on fire safety management in the UK.
3. A set of results based on the authority of the mix of experienced and knowl-
edgeable people and bolstered by a supervised process. A process where people
could give an initial opinion then alter that opinion anonymously and without
losing face, in the light of others’ opinions.
4. The potential for developing a deeper understanding of the relationship be-
tween fire damage and fire safety management by accumulating objective evi-
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dence against each distinctive category of fire safety management. Beginning
with the categories held by the process to be the most important.
5. A paper that describes the process titled, Categorisation of Fire Safety Man-
agement: Results of a Delphi Panel by Baker et al (2013) published in the
Fire Safety Journal.
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5. Interviews
5.1. Introduction
Face to face interviewing is particularly useful for eliciting information around a
subject and for questioning a response if that response is unexpected. This gives
an advantage over a survey where a misperception by the participant cannot easily
be corrected. An unexpected response can often open up a line of enquiry that
may not have been anticipated by the interviewer. Of course, the competence of the
interviewer is critical to the process and prior knowledge of the subject is a requisite.
When a series of interviews are planned for a research project, asking the same ques-
tions of the interviewees simplifies the analysis and allows comparisons between the
responses. Valenzuela and Shrivastava (2011) refer to this approach as a standard-
ised open-ended interview stating that it allows a degree of freedom and adaptability
in eliciting information from the interviewee while concluding in a faster interview.
Preparation for an interview is critical in regard to the location and setting and the
interviewee should be furnished with certain information. The interviewee should
be put at ease by the location and setting for the interview, they should be aware
of the probable length of the interview and not be worried about issues of confiden-
tiality. Permission must be obtained for the method of recording the interview and
assurances given for the use and storage of the data.
5.1.1. What is in this chapter
In this chapter can be found:
• the questions asked of the interviewees and their responses;
• items brought out in the interview discussions that were relevant to the subject
and need consideration in future research;
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• a list of priorities appropriate to each role, in order of the importance perceived
by the interviewee.
5.2. Method
In the case of the interviews carried out as part of this research, the four interviewees
were chosen because of their roles. They were considered to be in roles that were
best placed to give an opinion on the administration, supervision and management
of fire safety involving the Loughborough University campus.
Each interviewee agreed to be interviewed and chose the venue for the interview with
a choice of dates. They knew what questions would be asked and they were told that
the interview discussions would be based on the questions. They were asked to set
aside an hour of their time and, in the event, each interview lasted between 48 and
62 minutes. With regard to recording the interview, they were asked to agree that
the interview could be recorded so that it could be later transcribed for analysis.
The transcripts of the interviews can be found in Appendices 2 to 5 at the end of
this thesis.
The logic that was pursued to determine the choice of interviewees is set out in the
following:
Interviewee 1: The statistics indicate that Loughborough University deals with most
fire alarm actuations using university staff. This has resulted in a large
reduction in the number of times that it asks the local authority fire
service for assistance. Interviewing the fire safety manager for Lough-
borough University campus was seen as vital to begin to understand the
management system;
Interviewee 2: Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service divides its area of adminis-
tration up into districts so it was natural that the fire service officer
responsible for the district in which Loughborough University campus
was situated, should be interviewed. This fire officer’s primary function
is the operational performance of the three fire stations that cover the
Charnwood District (which includes Loughborough University campus)
so it was seen as necessary to explore the environment which has been
influenced by the large reduction in responses to the Loughborough Uni-
versity campus;
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Interviewee 3: Each fire and rescue service in the UK appoints an officer to admin-
ister and enforce its responsibilities to fire safety legislation. The Senior
Fire Safety Officer’s role in Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service is pri-
marily fire safety enforcement with a secondary role as an operational
officer with responsibility for fire safety issues at operational incidents.
His responses were of interest because most of the legislative enforcement
of fire safety surrounds the deficiencies in managing fire safety.
Interviewee 4: How the insurance industry view fire safety management was of inter-
est because fires start through the mismanagement of an ignition source
and a combustible material. Fire damage is the result of this occurrence
and the UK Government (2010-2011) report that the amount of fire dam-
age in England, Scotland and Wales is increasing year on year. Better
management of the occurrence would lead to a reduction in the amount
insurance companies pay out so an interview with someone familiar with
this area would allow an exploration of this area and how they viewed
fire safety management on Loughborough University campus.
The interviewees were:
Interviewee 1: Fire Safety Manager, Loughborough University Campus - eight years
in post with long previous experience in an emergency role with the
Mines Rescue Service (interviewed on 11 December 2012: length of in-
terview - 50 minutes);
Interviewee 2: Fire Service District Manager for Charnwood District, Leicestershire
Fire and Rescue Service - nineteen years operational service; responsible
for all fire service activity within the Charnwood area; individual perfor-
mance is measured by operational output (interviewed on 17 December
2012: length of interview - 48 minutes);
Interviewee 3: Group Manager Fire Prevention and Protection, Leicestershire Fire
and Rescue Service - twenty six years experience, fifteen years dealing
specifically with fire safety (interviewed on 15 January 2013: length of
interview - 56 minutes);
Interviewee 4: Consultant Fire Engineer - now a consultant fire engineer but with
five years experience at the Fire Protection Association dealing with
fire and risk management (interviewed on 18 January 2013: length of
interview - 62 minutes).
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5.2.1. The questions
Question 1: How does the management of fire safety assist a company or an or-
ganisation to meet the requirements of regulation and the scrutiny of
regulatory inspections.
Question 2: How does the management of fire safety assist in the protection of
property or the continuity of business.
Question 3: Do you think that a good standard of fire safety management reduces
the likelihood of fire damage and, if so, do you think there is a parallel
between the standard of fire safety management and the amount of fire
damage.
Question 4: What are the benefits of the current fire and rescue service campaign
to reduce unwanted fire signals. The benefits for the fire and rescue
service are that it reduces the number of false calls they receive with a
corresponding saving of time and money. Does it also lead to a reduction
in the amount of fire damage.
Question 5: Do you think it would be beneficial to measure the operational per-
formance of the fire and rescue service with a performance metric that
evaluates the efforts of companies and organisations that demonstrate
an improvement in business continuity or reduction of fire damage.
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Question 1
Question 1: How does the management of fire safety assist a company or
an organisation to meet the requirements of regulation and the scrutiny
of regulatory inspections?
1. The Fire Safety Manager:
a) uses the regulatory framework to organise his work using the fire risk
assessment as the vehicle to monitor standards of fire safety management
that he expects from each building manager.
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b) knows that by using the regulatory framework he is ready to be scruti-
nised by the fire safety officer as well as his own department.
c) uses the national standards but he is aware that these focus on life safety
and he is equally concerned with protecting the assets of the university
by which he means the university buildings, its resources and its ability
to continue supporting students after a fire incident. So he enhances the
assessment to include asset protection.
2. The District Fire Service Officer:
a) uses the regulations to provide a framework for the administration of fire
safety on the three fire stations he is responsible for, to provide a safe
place of work.
b) knows that by doing this he is prepared for the scrutiny of his fire safety
colleagues and can avoid the embarrassment of inadequate fire safety
standards.
c) also considers the critical functions of the three fire stations in case of fire
so that the fire appliances can still operate as normal following a fire in
one of the buildings.
3. The Senior Fire Safety Officer:
a) considers that the regulatory framework simplifies his tasks because if
there is a good standard of fire safety management there is more prospect
of creating good and robust partnerships with companies and organisa-
tions. This will assist in meeting the current Government’s wish for less
regulation.
b) reasons that although the regulatory focus is on life safety, any good fire
safety inspector would consider the protection of property from fire as well
as life safety and knows that if a building is being properly maintained,
there is less likelihood of a fire occurring. As a bonus for the company or
organisation, it is less likely to be targeted in a programme of inspections.
c) can see evidence of the consideration for property protection and business
continuity in the change of name of the CFOA1 Enforcement Working
1CFOA is the acronym for the Chief Fire Officers’ Association which describes itself as the pro-
fessional voice of the UK fire and rescue service, supporting members to fulfill their leadership
role in protecting local communities and making life safer through improved service delivery.
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Group to the CFOA Business Safety Group. This is CFOA’s acknowl-
edgement of the change in emphasis because it indicates that they are
embracing the Government’s wish to supporting business by reducing its
burdens and stimulating growth.
4. The Consultant Fire Engineer thinks that the insurance industry has little
interest in whether or not a company or organisation complies with regulation.
What does concern the insurers is how much of a financial risk to them the
destruction of the property is.
5.3.2. Question 2
Question 2: How does the management of fire safety assist in the protec-
tion of property or the continuity of business?
1. The Fire Safety Manager:
a) thinks that the fire risk assessment is not sufficient on its own to fully
protect property or to guarantee business continuity. However, if it is
enhanced to include property protection and business continuity, it can
be used to monitor the enhanced standard.
b) gives an example of introducing a standard to facilitate business continu-
ity using the utilisation of acetylene cylinders in some of the university
buildings. He is aware of the prohibitive operational decisions that are
being made by the fire and rescue service at incidents where acetylene
cylinders become involved in fire and sees the potential for huge disruption
on the campus. Information related to the disruption caused by incidents
involving acetylene can be found in a BBC News report on the BBC News
Website archive at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/7932429.stm (ac-
cessed on 10 January 2013)
2. The District Fire Service Officer thinks that more effective fire safety manage-
ment assists a business to become more resilient and more likely to survive a
fire incident.
3. The Senior Fire Safety Officer:
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a) thinks that fire safety management is the critical factor and uses his initial
assessment of it, when he enters a building, to influence his dealings with
that business.
b) insists that although the determinant for the inspection programme is
life safety, the bigger picture is considered by taking into account those
fire incident statistics recording a fire that has spread beyond its room of
origin. He uses this data to fine tune the inspection programme.
4. The Consultant Fire Engineer suggests that the insurance industry has no in-
terest in the quality of fire safety management in regard to property protection
or business continuity. This is because insurers see no gain in relying on the
involvement of a human because they know that a human will err and human
error is all too prevalent. They are swayed by the potential performance of
the building construction to physically prevent the spread of fire no matter
what. Good fire safety management, if it is present in the building, is seen as
a bonus.
5.3.3. Question 3
Question 3: Do you think that a good standard of fire safety management
reduces the likelihood of fire damage and, if so, do you think there is a
parallel between the standard of fire safety management and the amount
of fire damage?
1. The Fire Safety Manager:
a) thinks there is a correlation between the standard of fire safety manage-
ment and the amount of fire damage.
b) suggests that the amount of fire damage is reduced by:
i. a good standard of automatic fire detection;
ii. by monitoring the standard of fire safety management in each build-
ing and concentrating on those buildings which exhibit poor fire
safety management.
2. The District Fire Service Officer:
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a) thinks that a good standard of fire safety management reduces the like-
lihood of fire damage provided the ignition was not a deliberate act de-
signed to negate the management of fire safety.
b) thinks that a correlation exists between the standard of fire safety man-
agement and the amount of fire damage but the amount of fire damage
would depend on the type of property involved.
3. The Senior Fire Safety Officer thinks there is a direct correlation between fire
safety management and the amount of fire damage and an example of why this
would be is that of a fire door. If the fire door is of the required construction
and it operates correctly as it would in a building with a good standard of fire
safety management, then the fire would be confined in a defined area. This
means that the consequent damage would be less than it would be if the fire
door had not operated correctly.
4. The Consultant Fire Engineer thinks there is a direct correlation between fire
safety management and the amount of fire damage. An example that indicates
this is the case of a building in a UK university which accounted for 60% of the
income stream of the university. All occupants evacuated successfully when a
fire occurred in the building, however the building was lost, along with 60%
of the income stream, because of:
a) the lack of training in the use of fire extinguishers for the university staff;
b) the lack of liaison between the university and its local fire and rescue
service;
c) the lack of timely and expeditious information available for the use of the
fire service at the point of entry into the building. The firefighters made
their initial assessment deciding that they had not enough information to
enter the building safely taking into account that the building was now
empty of people.
5.3.4. Question 4
Question 4: What are the benefits of the current fire and rescue service
campaign to reduce unwanted fire signals? The benefits for the fire and
rescue service are that it reduces the number of false calls they receive
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with a corresponding saving of time and money. Does it also lead to a
reduction in the amount of fire damage?
1. The Fire Safety Manager:
a) suggests that the CFOA policy to reduce unwanted fire signals is encour-
aging companies and organisations to manage their systems better thus
improving the standard of fire safety management. The example given
is that of the University which has greatly reduced the number of false
alarms on campus by initiating a protocol of trained fire marshals assist-
ing in each building during daytime and security officers investigating fire
signals throughout the day and night. Currently, the fire service are only
being called to a confirmed fire which the protocol has decided cannot be
dealt with by university staff.
b) thinks that there is a direct benefit to the university from liaising and
forming a partnership with the fire and rescue service. The benefit comes
from becoming known to the fire officers and from the fire officers famil-
iarising themselves with the risks on the Campus.
2. The District Fire Service Officer thinks that the campaign is advantageous
in that it forces a company or an organisation to sort themselves out. This
would most likely cause a reduction in fire damage because of putting extra
effort into discovering a fire, training staff and having the correct extinguishers
ready to deal with a fire.
3. The Senior Fire Safety Officer:
a) suggests that the campaign has forced companies and organisations to
improve their management of fire safety if they have responded by forming
first-aid firefighting teams to tackle small fires instead of asking the fire
and rescue service for assistance;
b) thinks that the main driver for the policy on unwanted fire signals is to
cut down on the number of vehicle movements by the fire and rescue
service;
c) is not aware of any research into whether fire damage has reduced or
increased as a result of the policy;
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d) thinks that the biggest impact has been on the alarm receiving centres
(ARC) who have had to deal with the different ways that fire and rescue
services have chosen to implement the policy.
4. The Consultant Fire Engineer:
a) thinks that a benefit of the policy on unwanted fire signals is that it
gives the occupant more confidence that when the fire alarm sounds,
it is likely to be an actual fire. This is because the policy is forcing
building managers to maintain their fire alarm systems so that there are
no extraneous fire signals giving false alarms.
b) suggests the policy may lead to an increase in fire damage because of the
delay in calling the fire and rescue service that is being built into the
system.
5.3.5. Question 5
Question 5: Do you think it would be beneficial to measure the oper-
ational performance of the fire and rescue service with a performance
metric that evaluates the efforts of companies and organisations that
demonstrate an improvement in business continuity or reduction of fire
damage?
1. The Fire Safety Manager:
a) thinks that a performance metric that measured the performance of the
fire and rescue service on its ability to encourage companies and organ-
isations to demonstrate an improvement in business continuity or a re-
duction in fire damage would be beneficial to the university. The main
barrier is the reluctance of the fire and rescue service to give advice and
encouragement when that same advice and encouragement might be held
to be negligent at some point in the future. They, defensively, choose to
put the onus back on the occupier by declining to give advice.
b) cannot see how the logic of how the fire and rescue service would be
measured.
2. The District Fire Service Officer:
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a) cannot see a link between the performance of the fire and rescue service
and the management of a commercial site;
b) thinks that even if the concept of measuring the performance of the fire
and rescue service was feasible there is insufficient in common with dif-
ferent parts of the area administered by a fire and rescue service for a
comparison between areas to make any sense;
c) thinks that fire safety officers know too little about the technological
solutions to fire safety problems for them to have any influence on a
company or an organisation;
d) reasons that when a fire occurs, particularly in new modern buildings, the
occupiers would prefer to demolish the building and re-build it because
that is the cheaper option.
3. The Senior Fire Safety Officer:
a) thinks that a performance measure would be a good idea and an indica-
tion of the value of proactive resources in the fire and rescue service.
4. The Consultant Fire Engineer:
a) thinks that the concept of measuring the performance of the fire and
rescue service would encourage and motivate it to focus its resources in
a different way, a more proactive way;
b) suggests that the performance could be measured in terms of monetary
loss.
5.4. Items emerging from the discussions
Some items surfaced during the interviews as extensions to the responses which
referred to current issues and which were considered relevant to the subject of the
thesis. The items have been listed below.
5.4.1. Dynamic risk assessment
The way that an operational firefighter assesses how to deal with a fire incident is
handled by dynamic risk assessment, a method described in the Fire and Rescue
Manual: Volume 2: Fire Service Operations (2008), as
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“the continuous assessment of risk in the rapidly changing circumstances
of an operational incident, which is done in order to implement the con-
trol measures necessary to ensure an acceptable level of safety”
The product of the assessment will determine how the incident is handled and is
based on the amount of risk that the firefighters are prepared to accept. Firefighters
will take a larger risk to save a life that they believe they can save than they will to
save property that they believe is already lost.
Other factors that may be crucial to the prosperity of the company or organisation
because a building, perhaps, contains unique information or equipment vital to its
survival is unlikely to change the dynamic risk assessment unless the fire service
commander already knows this through prior liaison or there is some compelling
information available at the time.
The two foci, life safety and property protection, are central to the methodology
of dynamic risk assessment and are presented in Fire and Rescue Manual: Volume
2: Fire Service Operations (2008) as a statement given to firefighters to be applied
when making their dynamic risk assessment:
We may risk our lives a lot, in a highly calculated manner, to protect
saveable lives;
We may risk our lives a little, in a highly controlled manner, to protect
saveable property;
We will not risk our lives at all for lives or property that are already lost.
The definition of ‘saveable lives’, ‘saveable property’ and ‘lives or property already
lost’ is obviously pivotal to the implementation of this guide. Of course, the pro-
vision of information at the point of entry into a building to assist the firefighters
when making their assessment is a function of fire safety management. An exam-
ple of this is when at an incident at Cambridge University, suitable, sufficient and
timely information would have mitigated against the trouble and disruption that
the incident actually caused. Because of a lack of such information, a small chem-
ical fire in a fire-proof solvent cupboard in a university building that should have
taken only a few minutes to deal with actually resulted in many fire service resources
being committed to the incident and traffic flow through Cambridge being severely
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compromised for about three hours2.
5.4.2. Focus on life safety
The focus on life safety in England and Wales specifies fire resistance of building
elements in Approved Document B (2010) to support that focus; as such, the regula-
tions are indifferent to the protection of the property or the survival of the company
or organisation. Architects and building designers are guided by Approved Docu-
ment B (2010) and tend to focus on the minimum that they have to comply with
to satisfy them. How the building looks, the materials used in its construction and
how it is be used throughout its lifespan, for instance, are far more interesting to
them. Of course, the focus on life safety will inevitably provide some fire protection
to the property and itsability to function the day after a fire.
The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005) also focuses on life safety and
serves the protection of property from fire only by default. The targets set by the
fire and rescue service to assist it to fulfill this focus on life safety provide little or no
incentive to reduce fire damage. There is cause for complaint from the community if
the fire and rescue service does not perform adequately and fails to reach its targets
but there is less cause for complaint if the fire and rescue service does not reach
targets that have never been set.
5.4.3. Unwanted fire signals
The high incidence of false alarm calls received by the fire and rescue service ini-
tiated the practice of challenging emergency calls to make sure of the appropriate
emergency response. This practice was outlined in the document A Guide to Reduc-
ing the Number of False Alarms from Fire-detection and Fire-alarm Systems (2004).
False alarm calls are seen as a disruption to business and cause of loss of confidence
in fire warning systems by the public. False alarms also unnecessarily increase the
risk for road users, divert essential fire and rescue resources and impact on fire and
rescue training and work programmes.
2Details relating to this incident can be found on the Fire Industry Association web-
site at http://www.fia.uk.com/en/Information/Details/index.cfm/Cambridge-University-lab-
evacuated-following-fire (accessed on 10 January 2013)
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The policy, CFOA Protocol for the Reduction of False Alarms and Unwanted Fire
Signals (2010), which sets out the protocol introduced a system of filtering emer-
gency calls to guide the staff of the fire control centre staff and the alarm receiving
agencies in how to carry out the policy. The responsibility for reducing false alarms
rests with the person responsible for the premises, who is encouraged to employ
competent contractors to install, manage and maintain the fire warning system.
At the core of the policy is a process of filtering the emergency calls received via
999/112 or any other acceptable source. This is done by working with the alarm re-
ceiving centres (collectively called fire alarm monitoring organisations (FAMO) who
have agreed to the Code of Practice: Best Practice for Summoning a Fire Response
via Fire Alarm Monitoring Organisations (2010) which sets out the terms with which
they should contract with their clients and with which they reach agreement with
the individual fire and rescue services. This is meant to provide a consistent ap-
proach to reducing the incidence of false alarms and the number of unwanted fire
signals transmitted to the fire and rescue service whilst providing an appropriate
response for those calls which are not filtered out by the filtering process.
The Fire Protection Association published a report on unwanted fire signals to in-
form the insurance industry. One of the conclusions of the Report to Insurers: RI11
(2012) was that, in practice, the CFOA policy was not achieving its aims. What
it was achieving was a saving of the time and effort expended on false alarm calls
by the fire and rescue service and a reduction in the number of fire appliance move-
ments. However, there was little evidence of the follow up of fire safety activities
suggested in the protocol, to improve fire safety management or to carry out regu-
latory enforcement in the companies or organisations that were the worst offenders.
5.4.4. Competent fire safety management
With due regard to the balance between appetite for business profits and the con-
siderations for fire safety and security in a business or an organisation, it could
be that the appetite for profit outweighs all other considerations. For instance, it
could be argued that, in the case of a large warehouse fire, reported on by Robinson
and Baker (2006), that destroyed a large portion of a company’s stock, immediately
threatening the existence of the company, critical fire safety information was not
acted upon because it was not given the importance it deserved.
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At this particular incident, some hours before the fire started in the midst of high
storage racking in a large warehouse, a telephone message with critical fire safety
information stating that the sprinkler system was inoperative, was received by the
management of the company. This information was quickly forgotten because it
was not valued as important by the manager who processed the information. Had
the perception been different and the manager had realised the risk that was being
taken, a number of options for action could have been considered that would have
detected the ignition and allowed the management to deal with it successfully. All
of the options would have incurred a financial cost but the cost would have been a
fraction of the eventual cost of the consequences of the fire.
5.4.5. Estimated Maximum Loss
The pricing of insurance policies is based on a concept called Estimated Maximum
Loss (EML). EML represents the maximum possible economic loss envisaged. This
means that the presence of a sprinkler system or an automatic fire detection system
will do nothing to reduce the EML because such systems are not guaranteed to oper-
ate relying, as they do, on the correct design, installation and maintenance provided
by a system of management. Insurers are distrustful of the human element involved
in a management system. A fire protection component that does have a positive
influence on the EML is compartmentation within a building; a physical barrier that
separates part of the building ensuring that all of it is unlikely to be affected by a
fire. The EML on a building split into two equal halves by compartmentation would
attract an EML of 50% whilst an open plan building would attract an EML of 100%
because of the absence of compartmentation.
The pricing of insurance policies is not based solely on the EML, it is also influenced
by historical loss statistics for different types of occupancy, different types of industry
and different types of construction. However, it does suggest that good fire safety
management observed in a routine survey carried out by an insurance company is
unlikely to affect the pricing of an insurance policy in a building that is the same
type that statistics show is often subject to fire.
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5.4.6. Fire safety information
Section 38 of Approved Document B (2010) requires that the person carrying out
building work must provide sufficient information for persons to operate and main-
tain a new building or an extended building, in reasonable safety. Regarding fire
safety, basic information amounts to the location and nature of the fire safety pro-
visions in a small building but in the case of a larger building it means a much
more detailed record of the fire safety strategy and the procedures for operating and
maintaining any and all of the fire provisions.
5.4.7. Fire safety engineering
A building that has been constructed with a fire safety engineered design can differ
from one that has been designed and constructed as per the requirements of a
building code in many ways. The reason for a fire engineered solution is that it can
be used to design buildings outside of the constraints of building codes overcoming,
for instance, particular building issues that are difficult to resolve in more traditional
ways.
However, fire safety, in the case of a building that has a fire safety engineered
solution within its design, cannot be treated in the same way that it can be treated
in a more traditional building. For instance, to correctly plan an alteration or
building refurbishment, the original design and reasons for the fire safety engineering,
concepts required in British Standard 7974 (2001), have to be completely understood
by the person or team planning the work because changing any one of them may
affect the level of safety inherent in the design.
The problem does not only apply to the occupier of a building that designs and car-
ries out alterations without using the proper authorities. In the case of an occupier
who does use the proper authorities, the problem transfers from the occupier to the
building control officer and the fire officer. These people, in consultation, must fully
understand the implications of the original design, which they may previously have
had no knowledge of, and also how the applied for alteration affects and changes the
original design so that they can fully evaluate whether the level of safety has been
altered and whether the original design objectives are still valid
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5.4.8. Profiles of property types
Because of the influence of the document Safe as Houses (1998), the average fire-
fighter appreciates and recognises the profile of the most likely victims of fire in
their area and is aware of how often they can expect to attend a fire involving a fire
death. They are also aware of the areas of their station ground where they should
target their fire prevention efforts with fire risk assessments and the provision of free
smoke alarms, to reduce the risk of fire deaths .
Conversely, the average firefighter has much less knowledge of the type of property
most likely to suffer significant fire damage on their station ground. They possess
very little knowledge of the economics of fire damage and how they can proactively
reduce the risk of loss of jobs, loss of amenities and damage to the infrastructure of
the local community unless they have studied the subject on an individual basis.
One reason for this lack of information may be the effect of performance measures.
Currently firefighters have metrics that measure their performance in their oper-
ational theatre as well as the areas of their administration and one of the most
important operational measures is that of fire deaths in accidental dwelling fires.
Fire deaths are an emotional and political issue for any community. Performance
metrics that measure the amount of damage to property, the environment, the com-
munity etc. are currently not present in the UK.
The profile of the most likely person to become a victim is described as hard to
reach by local authority departments and, to continually meet their targets, fire and
rescue services in England and Wales have had to think of innovative ways to enable
them to be reached. Thus the metric is seen as important by firefighters and much
research and the dissemination of this research has been done within the fire and
rescue service.
5.4.9. Protection of the environment
With regard to protection of the environment in England and Wales, the fire and
rescue service is subject to environmental protection legislation and could potentially
be prosecuted and liable for the clean up costs following an emergency incident. The
relevant legislation is the Water Resources Act (1991)- controlling surface, ground
and coastal waters; The Water Industry Act (1999)- controlling sewerage systems;
The Groundwater Regulations (1998)- controlling groundwater and land/soil; The
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Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) Regulations (2005)- controlling hazardous
waste.
There are defences available for the fire and rescue service based on three criteria:
• the entry is caused or permitted, or the discharge is made in any emergency
in order to avoid danger to life or health;
• that person takes all steps as are reasonably practicable in the circumstances
for minimising the extent of the entry or discharge and of its polluting effects;
and
• particulars of the entry or discharge are furnished to the Environment Agency
as soon as reasonably practicable after the entry occurs.
The fire and rescue service in England, Scotland and Wales is encouraged to protect
the environment under the Fire and Rescue Services Act (2004). The fire and
rescue service in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales also has a duty
to co-operate with environmental agencies under the the Civil Contingencies Act
(2004) to work together with environment agencies in emergencies, incident response
planning and information sharing. The Civil Contingencies Act (2004) defines an
environmental emergency as
an event or situation, which threatens serious damage to human welfare
in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or war or
terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK.
The Civil Contingencies Act (2004) requires that the clearing up of a site, water-
course or groundwater after an incident is the duty of the land owner, site occu-
pier/operator or polluter.
5.4.10. Primary Authority Scheme
With regard to the primary authority scheme administered by the Local Better
Rregulation Office (LBRO) and the guidance published under the Regulatory En-
forcement and Sanctions Act (2009). This is open to any business, charity or other
organisation that is regulated by two or more local authorities in respect of a rel-
evant function. A relevant function covers matters that are commonly referred to
as trading standards, environmental health, fire safety etc. and an example of a
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business that might enter into a partnership with a local authority is one that has
multi-sites in a number of different local authority areas .
A local authority can form a partnership in respect of the relevant functions that
the local authority has regulatory responsibility. In the case of the fire and rescue
service, this includes the licensing of petroleum and the storage of fireworks but a
consultation is currently underway to extend this to include fire safety.
5.5. Priorities of different roles
At the end of each interview a written list of tasks was put in front of the interviewee
with a request to agree the relevance and comprehensiveness of the list to their role
and then to put the tasks on the list in order of priority.
The lists of tasks are presented below. The order in which they are printed is the
order to which the interviewee agreed.
Priority ranking Interviewee 1: Fire Safety Manager
1 Meeting regulatory requirements
2 Good performance of fire strategy
3 Reducing the number of alarm actuations
4 Being ready for inspection
5 Co-operating with and advising others
Priority ranking Interviewee 2: District Fire Service Officer
Equal 1st Reducing the number of emergency responses
Equal 1st Measurement of operational performance
Equal 1st Reducing the number of unwanted fire signals
Equal 4th Responding to calls with the correct response
Equal 4th Policing the regulations
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Priority ranking Interviewee 3: Senior Fire Safety Officer
Equal 1st Encouraging citizens to become responsible for
their own safety
Equal 1st Ensuring compliance with the Fire Safety Order
Equal 3rd Reducing the number of emergency responses
Equal 3rd Responding with the appropriate operational
response
Equal 3rd Assisting and supporting business continuity
Equal 6th Reducing the number of unwanted fire signals
Equal 6th Contributing to the community by partnership
working
Priority ranking Interviewee 4: Consultant Fire Engineer
1 Reducing the amount of fire damage overall
2 Generating repeat business from clients
3 Measuring the current standard of fire safety
management
4 Measuring the resilience of management systems
The purpose of carrying out the exercise was to assist in identifying the motivations
of each interviewee in respect of their role, to inform the analysis of the interview
responses.
As the results show, Interviewees 1 and 4 were able to determine their orders of
priority but the two fire officers experienced difficulty in this task, finally deciding
that some of their tasks were of equal importance.
5.6. Summary
In summary, the four interviews give us a better understanding of the context in
which fire safety is carried out on Loughborough University campus. The intervie-
wees, save for the consultant fire engineer, can directly influence how fire safety is
managed and enforced. Therefore it is important that their motivations are iden-
tified, understood and taken into account so that fire safety can be implemented
optimally.
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The list of agreed priorities adds to this information allowing the reader to make
some assessment for themselves, whether or not the priority is correct.
Arranging face-to-face interviews and using a framework of questions allowed com-
parisons to be made between the responses of each interviewee. Whilst the method
allowed other relevant concepts to be discussed.
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6.1. Introduction
To investigate the character and nature of fire damage, a case study has been used
which examines fire incident data collated by Loughborough University and fire
incident data collated by Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS) referred
to as LUData and LFRSData respectively. The case study compares the mean fire
damage recorded over the five-year period of LUData against the three-year period
of LFRSData recorded across the same variables in both datasets.
Comparing LUData against LFRSData gives a number of advantages:
1. It places Loughborough University campus in the context of the county of
Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland.
2. It gives a sense of the magnitude of the amount of damage on a small area
when compared with the amount of damage in a much larger area.
3. It highlights the differences between the LUData and the LFRSData with
regard to frequencies of recorded damage amongst different variables; such as
property types, time of day, month of the year, cause of incident and so forth.
Highlighting the differences gives a sense of the performance of fire safety with
regard to each of the variables.
4. It justifies the need for organisations such as universities to collect fire incident
data in the same manner that it is collected by the fire and rescue service. In
the case of universities, this would enable them to benchmark their amount
of fire damage against each other and also compare the amount with that
recorded nationally.
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6.1.1. Description of Loughborough University Campus
Loughborough University campus sits at the edge of the town of Loughborough. On
its 438 acre site there are over a hundred buildings necessary to carry out its role as a
leading UK university encompassing international research in diverse fields of study,
effective teaching in many disciplines and facilities to accommodate, stimulate and
support students and staff.
Many of the buildings on the campus have been built within the last few years
and there is a gradient between the new modern buildings and the older more tradi-
tional buildings, However, there is always development and refurbishment of existing
buildings to enable Loughborough University to maintain its competitive edge in the
world of academia. This provides a constant challenge to the fire safety manager
who tries to preclude future fire safety problems by giving advice on building layout
during the design stage as well as carrying out fire risk assessments for the occupied
buildings.
Between 2006 and 2010 there were 3145 recorded activations of a fire alarm in one of
the hundred or so buildings on Loughborough University campus. Each activation
of an alarm, of course, could be either a fire incident or a false alarm, so on 3145
occasions there needed to be an adequate response to each alarm. The University
has a protocol that deals with each alarm activation and which tries to make sure
that the response is adequate and correct. For its response, it can either deal with
the alarm activation itself or it can use the ‘999’ emergency system to summon the
assistance of the fire and rescue service. The records show that the fire and rescue
service were summoned 89 times during that five-year period, representing 2.8% of
the total. This means that the University staff successfully dealt with the 97.2% of
the alarm activations without outside assistance.
This is considered unusual in England and Wales, especially with regard to a uni-
versity campus which, along with hospitals and airports, is responsible for many
responses that turn out to be false alarms. So much so, during the last decade,
the fire and rescue service has taken action to reduce the number of responses to
false alarm calls it deals with, choosing to work with the biggest offenders and give
advice on how they should be reduced1. Loughborough University’s success in this
1See the press release from London Fire Brigade Brigade saves mil-
lions by reducing false alarm call outs at http://www.london-
fire.gov.uk/news/LatestNewsReleases_PR2937.asp#.UffpxawlMv4 (accessed 30 July 2013)
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regard was worth investigating and for this purpose fire incident data were acquired
from Loughborough University covering the period January 2006 to December 2010
(referred to in this thesis as LUData).
6.1.2. Description of Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service
(LFRS)
The unitary authorities of Leicester City, Leicestershire County and Rutland County
are served by a combined fire authority responsible for the service delivery of Le-
icestershire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS). The University town of Loughborough
sits in the north west of the area administered by LFRS and accommodates one of
LFRSs twenty fire stations.
Fire incident data are collected by all UK individual fire and rescue services and used
for local analysis. The data are also returned to Government for national analysis.
Fire incident data were acquired by the author from LFRS for the purposes of this
thesis regarding fire incidents in the whole of the area administered by LFRS for
the period April 2009 to March 2012 (referred to in this thesis as LFRSData).
6.2. Method
6.2.1. Cleansing2 the data
The task of data cleansing is pursued to satisfy the maxim “error qui non resis-
tur, approbatur”, translated as “an error that is not resisted is deemed to have been
approved” which acknowledges the popular book, ‘Doctor and Student’ published
in the 16th Century by Saint-Germain (1518), in regard to the dialogue between a
doctor of divinity and a student of law. Simply put, it is the process of correct-
ing inaccurate, incomplete or illogical data to improve the quality of the dataset,
inevitably, leading to a more accurate analysis.
The LFRSData was received in a cleansed state. The dedicated data team at LFRS
are experienced at cleansing data and know the standards that are expected of them
2Data cleansing is the process of amending or removing data in a database that is incorrect,
incomplete, improperly formatted, or duplicated.
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by the UK Government who are the recipients of fire incident data from UK fire and
rescue services. The LFRSData acquired was in a prepared state, ready for analysis.
The LUData, however, was not received in the same cleansed state. Whereas, with
regard to the LFRSData; the production of the data, its expected quality and its
expected usage is well known and handled by an experienced team, this is not the
case with regard to the LUData. The LUData is used by the University fire safety
manager as a reference to compile reports for higher management and to submit
reports to the Universities Safety and Health Association (USHA)3. The reports to
higher management are usually quarterly reports containing details of fire incident
statistics for the previous quarter, details of any fire incident of note and a copy of
the statistics submitted to USHA. Consequently, because of the small usage of the
data and the associated subsequent lack of rigour in its collection, the LUData was
not received in a satisfactory state to compare with the LFRSData.
In cleansing the LUData, it was necessary to anticipate what the person who entered
the record actually had in mind when the record was made. So an exercise in trawling
through the LUData records was carried out to correct and complete inaccurate
records and to amend illogical or erroneous data.
Following this, the LUData had to be arranged and presented in a way that was
comparable with the LFRSData to enable an analysis to take place. The first action
was to sort the records in a consecutive list in chronological order from January
2006 to December 2010. A new variable was created and to make each record a
distinctive record, each record was assigned a unique reference number.
6.2.2. Variables
A total of nine new variables were created as can be seen in Table 6.1 along with a
brief explanation of how the variable was created.
The lead in creating all nine variables came from the LFRSData which was collated
and arranged to reflect the format given in the Incident Recording System (2009).
This format relies on coding and prescripted words and phrases, so the challenge
was to make the LUData reflect the coding and prescripted words by correctly
interpreting the original entry.
3The Universities Safety and Health Association (USHA) is an organisation for the promotion of
safety and health in higher education.
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Table 6.1.: Variables created in the LUData to be comparable with variables
present in the LFRSData
Name of created variable Origination of the created variable
Unique reference number Created from numbering the records, consecutively,
from the first incident in 2006 to the last incident in
2010
Property type Created by comparison against the three terms used
in the Incident Recording System (2009): Residential,
Other Residential and Non-Residential
Property category Created by research of the building name on the
Loughborough University website and Campus Map
then categorising it against the property categories
listed in the publication Incident Recording System
(2009)
Time in hours Created by filtering the time in the original data for
each hour in a twenty-four hour period
Month Created by filtering the date in the original data for
each month in each year
Year Created by filtering the date in the original data for
each year
Accidental or deliberate Created by analysis of the variable ‘Cause’ and
reference to the publication Incident Recording
System (2009)
Cause of the incident Created by analysis of the variable ‘Cause’ and
reference to the publication Incident Recording
System (2009)
Total amount of damage Created by analysis of the comments recorded in the
dataset
There is no statistical framework that is accepted as a national framework in the
UK. Perhaps the Incident Recording System (2009) is the nearest that comes to a
national framework because of its use by the fire and rescue services throughout
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
Variable: Property type With regard to the variable ‘Property type’, research was
carried out to identify all the buildings on the Loughborough University campus
and designate them as a property type present in the list in the Incident Recording
System (2009). This produced thirteen property types out of the 107 buildings (see
Table 6.2).
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Table 6.2.: Number and type of each property type present in the LUDataset
Property type Number of each property
type in LUData
Education 30
Entertainment and culture 4
Food and drink 5
Hotel/motel 1
Hospitals and medical care 1
Industrial manufacturing 1
Industrial processing 2
Laboratory/research establishment 12
Offices and call centres 16
Retail 2
Sporting venues 14
Sports pavilion/shower block/changing facility 2
Student Hall of Residence 19
Variables: ‘Time in hours’, ‘Month’, ‘Year’
With regard to the variables ‘Time in hours’, ‘Month’ and ‘Year’. These were created
by assigning them a code and then filtering the codes:
‘Time in hours’: the time of the incident was entered in the record with the hour
and the minutes, for example; 14:54 or 09:31. So twenty-four codes were
created; the first code being ‘Midnight to 1’: the second being, 1 to 2: the
third, 2 to 3 and so on until the twenty-fourth: 23 to Midnight. The records
were filtered and the variable ‘Time in hours’ created.
‘Month’: the month of the incident was entered in the record with day and month,
for example; 21 Jun 08. So twelve codes were created; the first being Jan-
uary and the last being December. The records were filtered and the variable
‘Month’ created.
‘Year’: the year of the incident was entered in the record as part of the date, for
example; 21 Jun 08. So five codes were created; the first being 2006 and the
last being 2010. The records were filtered and the variable ‘Year’ created.
Variable: ‘Accidental or deliberate’
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Table 6.3.: Number of records for property types in both datasets
Property type Number (and
percentage) of
records in
LUData
Number (and
percentage) of
records in
LFRSData
Education 250 (7.9%) 46 (8.3%)
Entertainment and culture 79 (2.5%) 25 (4.5%)
Food and drink 123 (3.9%) 69 (12.5%)
Hotel/motel 21 (0.7%) 9 (1.6%)
Hospitals and medical care 1 (0%) 47 (8.5%)
Industrial manufacturing 2 (0.1%) 153 (27.8%)
Industrial processing 9 (0.3%) 34 (6.2%)
Laboratory/research
establishment
24 (0.8%) 1 (0.2%)
Offices and call centres 123 (3.9%) 40 (7.3%)
Retail 6 0.2%) 101 (18.3%)
Sporting venues 114 (3.6%) 7 (1.3%)
Sports pavilion/shower
block/changing facility
14 (0.4%) 3 (0.5%)
Student Hall of Residence 2379 (75.6%) 16 (2.9%)
With regard to the variable ‘Accidental or deliberate’. This was a new variable cre-
ated from the ‘Cause’ variable present in the LUData. Each record was assessed and
assigned into one of five categories of incident listed in the IRS Guidance document
to create the new variable. Each incident was categorised with suitable reference to
British Standard 5839 (2002+2008), as either:
• Accidental: an actual fire that has been set accidentally;
• Deliberate: an actual fire that has been set deliberately;
• False alarm - accidental: false alarms with good intent, in which a person
operates a manual call point or otherwise initiates a fire signal in the belief
that there is a fire, when no fire actually exists;
• False alarm - faulty equipment: in which the call has resulted from a fault in
the system;
• False alarm - malicious: in which a person operates a manual call point or
causes a fire detector to initiate a fire signal, whilst knowing that there is no
fire;
• False alarm - unknown.
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Variable: ‘Cause of the incident’
With regard to the variable ‘Cause of the incident’. This was a new variable also
created from the ‘Cause’ variable present in the LUData. Each record was assessed
and assigned into one of fifteen categories of incident listed in the IRS Guidance
document to create a new variable. The fifteen categories are listed in Table 6.4 on
the next page.
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Table 6.4.: Categories listed for the variable ‘Cause of the incident’ in both datasets
Variable: The cause of the incident Number of
records in
LUData
Number of
records in
the
LFRSData
Accumulation of flammable material 0 25
Bonfire going out of control 0 1
By phone (malicious telephone call) 2 0
Careless handling due to careless disposal 3 18
Careless handling: due to knocking over 0 2
Careless handling: due to sleep or
unconsciousness
0 1
Combustible article too close to heat
source (or fire)
1 39
Contaminants 765 0
Cooking chip pan/deep fat fryer 0 21
Cooking: other cooking 88 29
External factors (power surge, storm etc.) 16 0
Fault in equipment or appliance 3 98
Faulty fuel supply: electricity 0 67
Faulty fuel supply: petrol product 0 3
Faulty leads to equipment or appliance 0 20
Fire (the nature of the fire is unspecified) 591 0
Heat source and combustibles brought
together deliberately
0 101
Human (accidentally/carelessly setting
off alarm)
727 0
Natural occurrences (sunlight, friction
etc.)
0 4
Negligent use of equipment or appliance
(heat source)
4 22
Not applicable 0 3
Other 0 31
Other intentional burning going out of
control
5 4
Overheating, unknown cause 11 60
Person too close to heat source (or fire) 0 1
Playing with fire (or heat source) 0 1
System: heat (fire detection system) 1 0
System: other (fire detection system) 425 0
Unknown 497 0
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Variable: ‘Amount of damage’
With regard to the variable ‘Amount of damage’. This was a new variable created
to reflect the same variable present in the LFRSData made up of 13 codes. Each
record where damage could have taken place was assessed and assigned into one of
the codings for the amount of damage to create the new variable. The codings are
listed in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5.: Details of coding used in the variable: Amount of damage
Variable:
Amount of
damage in m2
Coding No. of records
in the LUData
No. of records
in the
LFRSData
No damage 0 2459 70
Up to 5 1 680 229
6 to 10 2 6 56
11 to 20 3 0 41
21 to 50 4 0 40
51 to 100 5 0 42
101 to 200 6 0 25
201 to 500 7 0 15
501 to 1000 8 0 14
1001 to 2000 9 0 10
2001 to 5000 10 0 5
5001 to 10,000 11 0 3
Over 10,000 12 0 1
Variable: ‘Costing of damage’
With regard to costing of damage, it was thought desirous to infer how much the
amount of fire damage in the LUData was costing in financial terms. The location
of 75.6% of the fire incidents records were recorded as being in the property type;
Student Hall of Residence, so this made it easy to postulate the consequences of a
small fire in a student bedroom or common kitchen. Such an incident would involve
the replacement of certain electrical and wooden items; cooker, microwave, table,
bed, desk and so on, cleaning and re-decoration of the room and the replacement
of firefighting media. There would also be the inherent cost of the University staff
who dealt with the incident and the fire and rescue service (if they were requested
to attend the incident) and any residual costs incurred with the ‘re-housing’ of
the student. This was not to denigrate the cost to the student in terms of lost
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coursework, destroyed or damaged by heat, smoke or water but the value of that
was impossible to evaluate.
A value of £1000 was decided on as the value of a fire that caused up to 5 square
metres of damage (Code 1 in Table 6.5) and £2000 for a fire that caused between 6
and 10 square metres of damage (Code 2 in Table 6.5). Some estimated costs can be
seen in Table 6.6. These were thought to be reasonable values for the consequences
of a fire in students accommodation.
Table 6.6.: Estimated costs resulting from a fire in student accommodation
Details of cost Estimated cost
Replacement/maintenance of cooker/microwave £200
Replacement of table/bed/desk £200
Cleaning and re-decoration of room £200
Servicing of fire extinguisher £20
Cost of university staff £200
Cost of re-housing student £200
Replacement of miscellaneous items (stationery, clothes etc.) £200
6.2.3. How many records in the LUdata
The data acquired from Loughborough University are the records for each fire inci-
dent on the university campus during the period from 2005 to 2011. However, the
years 2005 and 2011 were not complete years so were discarded leaving five complete
years from 2006 to 2010. The original data amounted to 3750 records but with the
removal of the 2005 and 2011 records, the data was reduced to 3148 records.
Table 6.7.: Number of records in the LUdata
Year Number of records
2006 611
2007 693
2008 628
2009 649
2010 567
Total 3148
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6.3. Results
The charts on the following pages represent the result of analysing and comparing
the fire incident data from Loughborough University between January 2006 and
December 2010 and fire incident data from Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service
between April 2009 and March 2012.
6.3.1. Comparisons between LUData and LFRSData
6.3.1.1. Comparison of the consistency of data
The two sets of data, LUData and LFRSData, were incongruent, in their acquired
states, in terms of the time periods that they covered. The LUData contain records
from January 2006 to December 2010 whilst, the LFRSData contain records from
April 2009 to March 2012. This means that the data only coincide from April 2009
to December 2010, a period of 18 months. So the question was asked; were the data
compatible and in sufficient agreement that they could be held to be credible when
LUData was compared against LFRSData.
Two charts were prepared showing the number of fire incidents per month for all
the years in both sets of data to look for consistency in the data (see Figure 6.1).
The average number of fire incidents for each month was calculated and the cells of
the chart annotated to show whether or not the number was equal to, or above or
below the average number:
• In the case of the LUData 55% of the records indicated average or above
average (denoted by a dark grey coloured cell) and 45% of the records indicated
below average (denoted by a white cell).
• In the case of the LFRSData 58.3% of the records indicated average or above
average (denoted by a dark grey coloured cell) and 41.7% of the records indi-
cated below average (denoted by a white cell).
This indicated a consistency of data but examination of the distribution of dark grey
cells in the two charts also showed consistency because the average number of cells
for each year in the LUData calculated to 6.6 and, in the LFRSData, calculated to
7.
114
6.3 Results
Lastly, each of the charts indicate a trend of reducing numbers from the earlier to
the later years; this also indicates a consistency between the two sets of data.
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Figure 6.1.: Consistency comparison between the two datasets
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6.3.1.2. Comparison of the amount of damage
Figure 6.2 shows a comparison between the two datasets, regarding the amount of
recorded damage, the data has been turned into percentages so that the comparison
is meaningful. There is no damage above 6 to 10 square metres recorded in the
LUData.
Figure 6.2.: Comparison of the mean amount of damage
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6.3.1.3. Comparison of the amount of damage per property type
Figure 6.3 shows a comparison between the two datasets, regarding the mean amount
of damage recorded against property types; the amount of damage is shown as a
percentage. The largest amount of damage in the LUData is recorded against the
property type; Student Hall of Residence. The largest amount of damage in the
LFRSData is recorded against two property types; Industrial manufacturing and
Industrial processing.
The mean amount of damage per property type
LUData
LFRSData
Figure 6.3.: Comparison of the mean amount of damage per property type
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6.3.1.4. Comparison of the amount of damage per month
Figure 6.4 shows a comparison between the two datasets, regarding the mean amount
of damage recorded against the month; the amount of damage is shown as a percent-
age. The largest amount of damage in the LUdata occurs in October. The largest
amount of damage in the LFRSData occurs in May.
The mean amount of damage per month
LUData
LFRSData
Figure 6.4.: Comparison of the mean amount of damage per month
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6.3.1.5. Comparison of the amount of damage per time of day
Figure 6.5 shows a comparison between the two datasets, regarding the mean amount
of damage recorded against the time of day; the amount of damage is shown as a
percentage. The largest amount of damage in the LUData occurs between 16:00 and
22:00. The largest amount in the LFRSData occurs between 23:00 and Midnight
but there is a peak of activity between 05:00 and 07:00.
The mean amount of damage per time of day
LUData
LFRSData
Figure 6.5.: Comparison of the mean amount of damage per time of day
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6.3.1.6. Comparison of the amount of damage per incident type
Figure 6.6 shows a comparison between the two datasets, regarding the mean amount
of damage recorded against the type of incident; the amount of damage is shown as
a percentage. The largest amount of damage in the LUData occurs as a result of
‘Good intent false alarm’. The largest amount of damage in the LFRSData occurs
as a result of ‘Accidental’.
LUData
LFRSData
The mean amount of damage per incident type
Figure 6.6.: Comparison of the mean amount of damage per incident type
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6.3.1.7. Comparison of the amount of damage per incident cause
Figure 6.7 shows a comparison between the two datasets, regarding the mean amount
of damage recorded against the cause of the incident; the amount of damage is shown
as a percentage. The largest amount of damage in the LUData is caused by ‘Fire’.
The largest amount of damage in the LFRSData is ‘Heat source and combustibles
brought together deliberately’ and ‘Combustible articles too close to heat source (or
fire)’.
The mean amount of damage per incident cause
LUData
LFRSData
Figure 6.7.: Comparison of the mean amount of damage per incident cause
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6.3.2. The amount of damage In the LUData expressed in GBP
6.3.2.1. Amount of damage per property category expressed in GBP
Figure 6.8 shows an estimate of the cost of damage to Loughborough University
based on the amount of damage to each property type. The cost has been calculated
using the arbitrary sum of £1000 to represent a unit of damage4. The largest
cost comes from fire damage associated with the property type; Student Hall of
Residence. This amounts to about £120,000, averaging £24,000 per year.
LUData
Figure 6.8.: The mean amount of damage per property category expressed in GBP
(LUData)
4To see how the £1000 unit was arrived at see 113
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6.3.2.2. Amount of damage per month expressed in GBP
Figure 6.9 shows an estimate of the cost of damage to Loughborough University
based on the amount of damage to each property type. The cost has been calculated
using the arbitrary sum of £1000 to represent a unit of damage5. The largest cost
comes from fire damage associated with the months of October and November. This
amounts to about £220,000 averaging £44,000 per year.
LUData
Figure 6.9.: The mean amount of damage per month expressed in GBP (LUData)
5To see how the £1000 unit was arrived at see 113
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6.3.2.3. Amount of damage per time of day expressed in GBP
Figure 6.10 shows an estimate of the cost of damage to Loughborough University
based on the amount of damage to each property type. The cost has been calculated
using the arbitrary sum of £1000 to represent a unit of damage6. The largest cost
comes from fire damage associated with the period of time between 16:00 and 22:00.
This amounts to about £56,500, averaging £11,300 per year.
LUData
Figure 6.10.: The mean amount of damage per time of day expressed in GBP
(LUData)
6To see how the £1000 unit was arrived at see 113
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6.3.2.4. Amount of damage per type of incident expressed in GBP
Figure 6.11 shows an estimate of the cost of damage to Loughborough University
based on the amount of damage to each property type. The cost has been calculated
using the arbitrary sum of £1000 to represent a unit of damage7. The largest cost
comes from fire damage associated ‘Good intent False alarm’. This amounts to about
£114,000, averaging £22,800 per year.
LUData
Figure 6.11.: The mean amount of damage per type of incident expressed in GBP
(LUData)
7To see how the £1000 unit was arrived at see 113
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6.3.2.5. Amount of damage per cause of incident expressed in GBP
Figure 6.12 shows an estimate of the cost of damage to Loughborough University
based on the amount of damage to each property type. The cost has been calculated
using the arbitrary sum of £1000 to represent a unit of damage8. The largest
cost comes from fire damage associated ‘Fire’. This amounts to about £114,400,
averaging £22,900 per year.
LUData
Figure 6.12.: The mean amount of damage per supposed cause expressed in GBP
(LUData)
8To see how the £1000 unit was arrived at see 113
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7. Analysis
7.1. The Delphi process
The results of the Delphi process are based on subjective opinion and not supported
by statistical evidence. It could be argued that this is no better than the subjective
opinion of any person professing an opinion. What gives the opinion of the Delphi
panel its edge is the calibre of the panel members and the process through which
the opinion was gained.
An effort was made to gather together significant people with experience and in-
fluence in the field of fire safety management. The competence and calibre of the
panel members is demonstrably high and between them, they have much experience,
gained primarily in the UK, in either managing fire safety or regulating others who
manage fire safety. The mix of people was thought to reflect the present situation
in the UK amongst those who have most influence on the practice of fire safety
management.
The panel was made up of either academics with a specialism of the subject, current
or past practitioners of the subject or regulators of the UK legislation in England
and Wales; the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005), which is dominated
by the subject.
All panel members had been involved in assessing and reporting on the standard of
fire safety management in commercial, public and heritage buildings. Almost 90%
had assessed and reported on fire safety management in more than 50 buildings. So
in an administered process and in relative comfort the panel have:
• considered a list of categories of fire safety management purporting to cover
the scope of the subject;
• given their opinion on the suitability and appropriateness of the categories;
• considered their initial responses in the light of the other members’ responses;
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• had the opportunity to alter their responses without embarrassment and with-
out knowing whose response has influenced them.
It has to be accepted that an individual of the same calibre as the average panel
member could easily dispute the results having arrived at a different conclusion.
Their conclusion would be based on their unique blend of knowledge and experience
but it would not be invested with the same authority. The value of the panel’s
conclusion lies in the fact that it has been deliberated on and accepted by a peer
group of specialists having had the opportunity to alter their individual judgement
in the light of the judgement of others. Whether or not it is correct will be answered
in the light of experience when sufficient statistical evidence has been collected to
either validate or negate the opinion of the panel.
The usefulness of the conclusion is that it can be assumed to be correct because it
is an authoritative determination and can be used confidently as a foundation in
the process of measurement. It enables the process of determining what categories
to focus on, what variables should be exploited and what is the best way to collect
them.
7.1.1. Analysis of the Delphi process
An aspiration of this thesis is that the categorisation of the ten categories of fire
safety management achieved as a result of the Delphi process, should be accepted
as the authoritative categorisation of fire safety management. The categorisation
warrants the status of authoritative because of the experience and knowledge of the
members of the Delphi panel who deliberated on it, and the rigour with which the
process was administered.
The starting point for the panel was the Howarth model of fire safety manage-
ment devised by Howarth (1999) on page 70. This model was chosen because of
its extensive range and its exhaustive categories. The model itself had emerged
from a capable and knowledgeable thesis put together by a retired fire officer who
had specialised, during his fire service career, as a fire safety officer. He had used
the opportunity of study to examine the fire safety standards present in passenger
interchanges throughout Europe and had put together a system of measuring the
management of fire safety so that some comparison between the passenger inter-
changes could be made.
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It is worth noting that, during the process of peer review for the paper written to
promulgate the Delphi process results, one of the peer reviewers questioned the com-
prehensiveness of the ten categories, asking if there was an eleventh category. This,
of course, remains unknown, but the very reason for asking a panel of experienced
and knowledgeable people in the field to consider the subject was to reduce this
unknown as much as possible.
The results of the Delphi process are given in Chapter 4 on page 72 but the Delphi
process threw up a number of issues that had to be settled first. The following
subsections throw some light on these issues.
7.1.2. The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005)
(RRFSO)
During the process of administration it appeared, to the administrator (i.e the author
of this thesis), that there was a general acceptance, among some panel members,
that the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005) regulated the whole scope
of fire safety management. This was disappointing but, perhaps, inevitable because
the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005) has such a large impact on the
professional lives on all of the panel and, indeed, in the UK fire industry as a whole.
The components of fire safety management mentioned in the articles of the Regula-
tory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005) do not cover the whole scope of fire safety
management as set out in the Howarth model on page 70. For example, the Regula-
tory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (2005) does not directly regulate, for instance; the
organisation of a company with regard to fire safety; the reporting and investigation
of fire incidents; the allocation of a fire safety budget; the carrying out of a fire safety
audit and so on, all components of the Howarth model. It could be argued that the
provision of these components is inferred by the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)
Order (2005) because they are intrinsic to a good fire safety management system
but the argument lacks vigour because there is no offence incurred if, for example,
there is no fire safety budget or no audit schedule in place. Whereas, if there is
no suitable and sufficient risk assessment in place, there is a definite breach of the
regulation. As a result of becoming aware of this and because of the dominance of
the legislation in England and Wales, the panel requested that each category should
be referenced to the relevant Articles in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order
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(2005) (see Subsection 4.3.2 on page 74).
The dominance of the legislation also prompted a further question; whether a cat-
egory that was aligned with the articles in the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)
Order (2005) qualified that category for special significance. The question was soon
settled by the panel, however, who decided that elements of fire safety management
which were a statutory duty under UK legislation should be measured commensu-
rately with elements which were not a statutory duty. This was decided on the basis
that whether a category assumes special significance or not should be determined
by objective evidence and not by legislation or subjective opinion.
7.1.3. Definition of each category
A balance regarding the definition of each category was sought. The wish of the
administrator was that each category should not be over-defined because, no matter
how authoritative the resultant categorisation was, it would always be a subjective
definition of a subjective subject based on the collective knowledge and experience of
the panel. It remains the administrator’s wish that each category becomes defined
by objective (statistical) evidence over time. This made it imperative that the initial
definition was sufficient to indicate the breadth of the category but with only enough
depth to delineate it from the other categories. The panel determined that the
descriptors for each category should be brief and concise rather than comprehensive
and this was achieved mostly by use of the phrase “There should be evidence of ...” ;
this grammatical mechanism resolves the components that should be evidenced but
not what the evidence should be (see Sub-section 4.3.2 on page 74).
Another important matter resolved by the panel in connection with the definition
of the category was the question of whether the meaning, nature and significance
of each category should be its relationship with its heading or whether it should be
what was contained in its descriptor. The panel determined that the relationship
should be with the category heading because objective evidence collated over time
may displace what is contained in the descriptor.
7.1.4. Communications and information
The inclusion of a fire warning system under the category heading of ‘Communica-
tions and information’, as included in the Howarth model, was seen as inappropri-
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ate by some panel members. The debate centred around the semantics of the word
communications because some members thought that this category was more about
human dialogue and conversation rather than the sounds made by a mechanical sys-
tem. There was even some reference to a different point of view on this point under
Scottish legislation and that reference to a fire warning system was more appropri-
ate under some other heading otherwise it could cause confusion. The suggested
heading being the category; ‘Emergency plans and fire procedures’. However, af-
ter deliberation the panel agreed that the reference to a fire warning system was
appropriate under the heading of ‘Communications and information’.
7.1.5. Fire prevention
During the process the panel members were asked whether they thought that the
concept of fire prevention was already included as a function of the category; ‘Reporting
and investigation of fires. They determined that it was not and that it should not
be included because fire prevention’ was a proactive activity and ‘Reporting and
investigation’ were reactive activities. Some members were of the opinion that it
was a function of the category ‘Risk assessment’ because this was a mechanism that
evaluated the likelihood of a fire occurring and fire prevention was a form of risk
control.
In fact, this point was never settled during the process. The conclusion was that
there were two alternatives and further work needs to be done to determine the most
appropriate one. Either:
1. that Fire prevention should be split up into discrete parts and included in
more than one category; or
2. that Fire prevention should exist in its own distinct category.
7.1.6. Consensus
There were many important items deliberated on during the process and it was
the task of the administrator to decide when a consensus of opinions was evident.
However, there is no definition of a consensus in the Delphi method. In general,
a consensus can mean a general agreement of opinions, an opinion shared by the
majority of participants or a stability of opinion as suggested by Scheibe (1975). In
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the case of this Delphi process, a consensus was taken to be the general summation
of opinions, in respect of the issue under consideration., These were distilled into
one opinion and fed back to the panel for agreement. Absence of objection to this
opinion was taken to be confirmation that there was a consensus.
7.1.7. Potential benefits
Measuring fire safety management offers a number of benefits. Types of property or
business can be profiled in a way that corresponds with their measurement of fire
safety management. The profiles that result in the greatest amount of fire damage
could be offered advice and guidance about how to alter their management model
so that the threat of fire could be reduced. Improving fire safety management is a
solution because it will result in fewer ignitions requiring fewer responses by the fire
and rescue service and, by inference, less damage by fire. Fewer responses will also
allow the fire and rescue service to focus on their proactive resources to maintain
and enhance the improvement in fire safety management. However, a subject such
as fire safety management can only be measured accurately if it is distinctly and
definitively categorised and the categorisation will only be utilised by fire safety
managers and the fire and rescue service if it is supported by relevant, statistical
evidence.
7.2. The interviews: Discussion
The interviews were carried out in order to gain a better understanding of the
motivation of the participants who have influence on the management of fire safety
in England and Wales, particularly on the Loughborough University campus. There
were four interviews and they were executed in the order in which they are set out
in this thesis. This chronology was deliberate and it allowed the first interviewee,
the university fire safety manager, to set the tone against which the other interviews
were compared. The author felt that this was important because this one interviewee
had the responsibility of solving the day to day practical problems of fire safety
management in a large organisation. The only other interviewee who also had day
to day responsibility for fire safety management was the district fire officer who had
day to day responsibility on three fire stations. This was significant but not on the
scale of the hundred or so buildings on the Loughborough University campus.
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With regard to the motivation of each of the interviewees and particularly their
impact on the Loughborough University Campus:
The university fire safety manager has direct control over the management of fire
safety on the university campus so his motivation stems from his professional-
ism, the incentive of performing well and the accountability to his management
hierarchy.
The district fire officer is motivated by the number of emergency responses to the
campus whether for actual fires or for false calls. An increase in the number
of calls (to actual fires or to false alarms) would prompt him to investigate
further in an effort to reduce them.
The senior fire safety officer is motivated by the interpretation and implementa-
tion of Government fire safety policy and the administration and enforcement
of fire safety legislation throughout Leicestershire. He has no specific affin-
ity with the university campus but in that respect his motivation stems from
the way that the university fire safety manager interprets and implements fire
safety legislation.
The consultant fire engineer has spent a proportion of his career working for the
Fire Protection Association (FPA). This is the body set up to advise the
insurance industry on matters to do with all aspects of fire in construction.
His opinion was sought because of his experience working with insurers in
respect of fire safety. Another advantage was that he was also familiar with the
university campus. The motivation of the insurance industry is to ultimately
make a profit from the process of transferring the financial risk of loss for a
payment. As it transpires in the interview, the insurance industry has very
little concern of the quality of fire safety management in any building and so
has little influence on the university fire safety manager.
7.2.1. Analysis of the interviews
Question 1 (from Sub-section 5.3.1 on page 85) was designed to explore how each
interviewee regarded the use of a fire safety management system in meeting
fire regulations.
The university fire safety manager, not surprisingly, used to the rigorous man-
agement system of the university, used the regulatory framework as a steer on
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what needed to be managed and how it should be managed. This approach
prepared him for any occasional inspections by the fire safety officer but did
not fully prepare him for the scrutiny of the management system that he is
part of. The reason for this is because the regulatory framework does not
cover the whole scope of fire safety management. The regulations focus on the
conditions to satisfy adequate protection to life and do not cover the condi-
tions necessary for the protection of property and assets or those necessary to
protect against business disruption.
The district fire officer, it was interesting to note, focused as he was on the oper-
ational readiness of the three fire stations under his control, saw the question
about fire safety management as being applicable to the operational readiness
of those three fire stations. This is indicative and revealing of the two arms
of the fire and rescue service; one arm being the operational reactivity of a
fire-fighting force able to deal with a whole range of emergencies that may
crop up within an urban environment at any time. The other arm proactively
administering the enforcement of fire safety legislation in that same environ-
ment. The district fire officer clearly saw that his own role was an operational
one and that the role of enforcement of fire safety legislation was a specialist
role to be carried out by specialist officers.
The senior fire safety officer was keen to point out that he was working to bring
about less regulation on business and commerce in line with the wishes of the
current UK Government. He was confident that a competent fire safety officer,
carrying out inspections, would not only think of protection to life but would
also be thinking of the life of the building and the long-term health of the
occupying business even though this was not a requirement of the legislation.
He was also keen to point out the role of CFOA in their wish to assist and not
hinder business in the UK.
The consultant fire engineer stated that the insurance industry’s only interest in
compliance with regulations was whether they had any impact on the potential
financial risk from the destruction of the property by fire.
Question 2 (from Sub-section 5.3.2 on page 87) was designed explore the views of
the interviewees on the limitations of a fire safety management system.
The university fire safety manager was under no illusions that a fire safety man-
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agement system that was sufficient to satisfy the regulations was not sufficient
to protect the university campus against the impact and consequences of fire.
He gave the example of acetylene cylinders which could be found scattered
around the university campus. These were used and stored within the rele-
vant regulations but despite this, they contained the potential to disrupt the
business continuity of the university for at least twenty-four hours if they be-
came involved in a fire. He knew that wise management of acetylene and other
such potential disrupters, was a requirement of a good fire safety management
system.
The district fire officer understood that any business with an effective fire safety
management system would be more likely to survive a fire incident.
The senior fire safety officer, on entering a building, allows his immediate assess-
ment of the management of fire safety, to influence his dealings with the build-
ing occupiers. He sees this as a critical factor of fire safety management and
the sign of an experienced fire safety officer. He prepares himself and his
inspection team for building inspections by analysing fire incident data to de-
termine the behaviour of fire in previous building fires. Specifically, he looks
for the incidents where the fire has spread beyond its room of origin in the
building and equates this with poor fire safety management. This is because
the fire is most likely to spread when those aspects of fire safety management
that should be under control, are not under control. These are things such
as a fire door wedged open, or a breach in the compartmentation, or doors
and windows left open when a building has been evacuated and so on. These
aspects, and others, he recognises as being indicative of poor management of
fire safety.
The consultant fire engineer suggests that the level of fire safety management has
no bearing on the view taken by the insurance industry. The insurers view is
that anything that depends on the involvement of humans is flawed because
human error will mean that, at some point, a fire safety management system
will fail and a destructive fire will ensue. What an insurer is influenced by is
the fail-safe aspect of building materials and building design such as compart-
mentation.
Question 3 (from Sub-section 5.3.3 on page 88) was designed to explore the re-
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lationship between the level of fire safety management and the level of fire
damage.
All four interviewees were of the opinion that there was a correlation between the
level of fire safety management and the amount of fire damage but with some pro-
visos.
The university fire safety manager suggested that the aspect of fire safety man-
agement that reduced the amount of fire damage was a good standard of fire
detection and close monitoring on those university buildings which, in his
judgement, exhibited poor fire safety management.
The district fire officer thought a correlation existed but it was dependent on the
type of property involved and whether a deliberate act had been perpetrated,
designed to circumvent the fire safety management system in a building.
The senior fire safety officer used the example of a fire-resisting door to illustrate
the correlation. If, because of a good standard of fire safety management, the
correct fire-rated door was fitted and properly maintained as self-closing, it
would carry out its appointed task and confine a fire to a defined area resulting
in less fire damage. This was not likely to happen with a poor standard of fire
safety management.
The consultant fire engineer also gave an example of the correlation by relating
a story involving a university in southern England. This university was de-
pendent on one of its buildings for 60% of its income stream. A fire occurred
in the building that he described as a simple fire, because of where the fire
occurred and when it occurred. The ignition source was a chemical reaction
being supervised by a student, that ignited waste paper in a fume cupboard.
The ignition could have been quickly and easily dealt with by a confident per-
son with a modicum of training but instead the fire quickly got out of hand.
Then, because of a series of other errors, introduced because of a lack of fire
safety planning, caused the responding fire crews to distrust the information
they were being told, forcing them to adopt a defensive approach to their fire-
fighting. This approach resulted in the loss of the building and the immediate
end to 60% of the university’s income stream.
Question 4 (from Sub-section 5.3.4 on page 89) was designed to ascertain the inter-
viewees’ views on the current CFOA campaign to reduce unwanted fire signals
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and whether they thought the campaign had an impact on the amount of fire
damage?
The university fire safety manager thought that the success of the campaign was
evident in the records of the university in the number of times that the assis-
tance of the local fire and rescue service was requested. The current policy of
the university was a result of the campaign and involved a system of trained
fire marshals and security officers who investigated and dealt with fire signals
both day and night. The assistance of the fire and rescue service was only
requested when an actual fire was confirmed or a false alarm could not be
confirmed.
However, this success had also created a problem in that because of the reduced
number of times that the local fire crews attended the campus, there was a
need to formally invite them on to the site so that they could familiarise
themselves with the topography and facilities present on campus. In fact, a
partnership between the university and the fire and rescue service had been
set up to better manage the problem.
The district fire officer thinks that the campaign is advantageous in that it forces
a company or an organisation to organise its attitude towards fire safety. Most
likely, this causes a reduction in fire damage brought about by the process of
putting extra effort into discovering a fire, training staff to deal with a fire and
having the correct extinguishers ready to do so.
The senior fire safety officer also thinks that the campaign has caused a pressure
on companies and organisations to prepare to deal with discovering and tack-
ling small fires. The biggest impact has been on the alarm receiving centres
(ARC) who are having to deal with the different ways that individual fire and
rescue services are choosing to implement the policy. There has been little
research on whether the campaign has caused a reduction in fire damage but
the main driver of the campaign was to cut down on the movements of fire
and rescue vehicles.
The consultant fire engineer also thinks that the campaign is forcing building
owners to better manage their fire alarm systems and one effect of this is
that building occupiers have more confidence in the effectiveness of their fire
warning systems. He thinks that an increase in fire damage is likely to result
from the policy because of the delay in calling the fire and rescue service being
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built into the system.
Question 5 (from Sub-section 5.3.5 on page 91) was designed to explore the in-
terviewees’ thoughts on the potential of a performance metric placed on the
fire and rescue service. The performance metric would evaluate and score
the efforts of companies and organisations to improve their efforts in business
continuity and a reduction in fire damage.
The university fire safety manager thought that such a metric would benefit the
university but would not work unless the fire and rescue service changed their
attitude in giving advice and encouragement to those who asked for it. The
current approach adopted by the fire and rescue service was to avoid giving
an answer and to put the onus back on the occupier who was advised to seek
help elsewhere. He thought that this situation was the result of the fire and
rescue service seeking to avoid liability, at some point in the future, for giving
incorrect advice.
The district fire officer said that there was no link between the fire and rescue
service and the management of a commercial site and that fire safety officers
knew too little about the technological solutions to fire safety problems to
have any influence. In any case, it was his opinion that an occupier of a
modern building would probably prefer to demolish the building following a
fire because it was the cheaper option. Also, the manner in which each fire and
rescue service was divided into geographical areas which were quite different
from each other, it was too difficult for one area to be measured against another
in such a way.
The senior fire safety officer could see the potential of indicating to others the
value of proactive resources in the fire and rescue service.
The consultant fire engineer thought that measurement of this aspect of the fire
and rescue service would encourage and motivate it to focus its resources in
a different, more proactive way. He suggested that the performance could be
measured in terms of monetary loss.
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7.2.2. Relevant themes emerging from the interviews
The ten items reported in Chapter 5 on page 92, were brought out in the discussions
surrounding the questions in the interviews. They have been gleaned from the
transcripts of the interviews in Appendices 2 to 5 and set aside as a separate list.
They represent diverse subjects but the author has tried to set them out in order
of importance when viewed in the light of the subject of this thesis. For instance,
the first five, itemised below, have the capacity to cause more or less fire damage in
relation to the way that they are implemented:
• The dynamic risk assessment model (mentioned on page 92) used by the fire
and rescue service discourages offensive firefighting unless it is justified. Of-
fensive, rather than defensive firefighting, is where the firefighting is carried
out within the hazardous area, for example, within a building that is on fire.
This type of firefighting can be justified, and is considered to be normal in a
house fire, for instance, where the risk posed to the firefighter is outweighed
by the high likelihood that the effort can save lives or in an industrial property
where the risks can be easily identified and resolved. However, in cases where
there are no lives that can be saved or the risks within the property cannot
be readily identified and are considered to be too great, then the firefighting
is likely to be defensive firefighting. This is where the firefighters carry out
their task from outside the hazardous area. Defensive firefighting inevitably
leads to greater fire damage but valuing that damage is difficult as the only
objective measure of it is the record in the IRS; that is, the measurement of
horizontal area damaged by heat, smoke and water.
• The focus on life safety (mentioned on page 94) in legislation also impacts on
the amount of fire damage because it creates an environment where there are
no requirements for occupiers to make sure their buildings continue to exist
following a fire. The legislation, in effect says that provided that everyone
who is at risk can evacuate safely if fire breaks out, then there is no further
requirement to make sure the building or business is fit for its purpose the next
day. This is likely to lead to more fire damage because, sadly, many building
occupiers will only carry out requirements insisted on by legislation.
• Unwanted fire signals (mentioned on page 94) are the subject of the CFOA
policy to reduce the movements of fire and rescue vehicles where the call
for assistance is likely to be a false call, usually from automatic fire warning
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systems. However, in the cases where an actual call is treated as a false call,
there is likely to be a delay in the response to the call and is likely to lead to
a greater amount of fire damage.
• Competent fire safety management (mentioned on page 95) will either have
resources and systems to deal with small fires and where this is not the case
will have procedures to call for assistance from the fire and rescue service. This
will keep the amount of damage and disruption caused by fires to a minimum
and, in any case, kept to what is considered to be acceptable by the competent
fire safety management system. The corollary to this is that an incompetent
fire safety management will not keep the amount of fire damage or business
disruption to a minimum.
• Estimated maximum loss (mentioned on page 96) is the insurer’s phrase for
the probable amount of loss that is likely if a fire occurs within a building.
There is little incentive for the occupier to develop a well performing system for
managing fire safety, because the insurer is unlikely to take this into account
in the cost of the premiums. If the occupier knows that the fire insurance view
is one that envisages the whole building burning down, the occupier is less
likely to work towards preventing a fire occurring. The potential is that this
could lead to a greater amount of fire damage.
The other items are all relevant to the subject but can be categorised differently
from the five items listed above. For instance, the provision of fire safety information
(mentioned on page 97) for the use of occupiers of newly constructed or extended
buildings is a requirement of Approved Document B (2010) in England and Wales.
This information should be the core of the fire safety strategy for a building; the
details of fire equipment and systems need to be incorporated into a schedule of
testing and maintenance, the design objectives need to kept in focus when alterations
or extensions are planned, the evacuation assumptions need to be considered when
the occupancy is changed and so on. Yet the requirement is for the provision of the
information but there is little guidance on how the information should be utilised
which is essential if its benefits are to be realised.
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7.2.3. Priorities
As part of the interviews, the interviewees were asked to confirm the main priorities
demanded of them by their role (see page 100). There were four distinct approaches
to their roles.
The fire safety manager and the district fire officer both confirmed that their main
priority was to meet the expectations that they felt were fundamental to their role.
In the case of the district fire officer, there were formal performance targets set to
assist in his management planning to meet the expectations. However, the details of
those expectations were different. In the case of the fire safety manager the details
were about preventing fire on the university campus and minimising the damage if
fire did occur; in the case of the district fire officer the expectations were about the
operational efficiency and effectiveness of the firefighting resources under his control.
This predominance on the reactive side of the fire and rescue service gives the district
fire officer a different view of Loughborough University campus from the fire safety
manager. The district fire officer looks at the university campus and sees the biggest
risk as the risk to the lives of sleeping students and the difficulties involved in rescuing
them. The fire safety manager, on the other hand, looks at the university campus
and sees the disruption to business caused as a consequence of a fire as an equitable
risk. Perhaps, this is because it is a more likely occurrence than a fire casualty in
accommodation blocks that he considers are well fire-protected.
The senior fire safety officer saw one of his main priorities as tapping into the ca-
pacity in companies, organisations and the general public to be more responsible for
their own safety. The other being to make sure that fire regulations are enforced
throughout Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. This seems quite smart thinking
because it is not difficult to see that if he achieves the former then the latter will
become that much easier to enforce.
The consultant fire engineer, having been asked, of course, to think in terms of his
former experiences working with insurers, was quite certain of the main priority of
an insurer; that of running a business. So the priorities are to reduce the amount
paid out by reducing the amount of damage and to satisfy the customer so that he
stays as a customer.
The four interviewees are all players in the game of fire safety being played on the
Loughborough University campus and they all, in some part, have influence on the
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standard that is achieved. The standard that is achieved can be regarded as a
normal standard simply by considering that:
• the fire safety manager is not under pressure because of abnormal fire losses;
• the district fire officer is not under pressure because his firefighting resources
are not attending emergencies on the university campus too regularly in com-
parison with elsewhere;
• the senior fire safety officer has no pressing need to enforce fire legislation on
the managers at Loughborough University;
• the university insurer’s are not threatening to increase premiums because the
losses through fire on the campus are considered to be too great.
Although very crude, this analysis of the current fire safety standard on Loughbor-
ough University represents tolerability in four of the main influencers of it. Therefore
it actually represents a measurement of what could be considered as an average or
an above average standard of fire safety management.
7.3. Case study: data analysis
The two sets of data, LFRSData and LUData, are dissimilar and have fundamental
differences between them. The data sets are different because of the periods of time
that they cover. However, the differences are resolvable and the datasets have been
manipulated to produce comparable datasets.
Both sets of data record incidents in which a fire-fighting force was mobilised in
response to an alarm or signal. In the case of Loughborough University, it is rela-
tively easy to put into context the number of alarm activations in a certain type of
property because the total number of that type of property present on the campus
is known. This enables the reader to form an opinion regarding the magnitude of
the data (see Table 6.2 on page 108 and Table 6.3 on page 109).
For instance; if the records showed that there were five fire incidents in one property
type in one year and there were twenty buildings defined as that property type on the
campus then the reader may form the opinion that five incidents in twenty buildings
is quite a serious affair that would warrant further investigation. The difficulty is
revealed in the LFRS data when the records show, for example, that there were fifty
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fire incidents in one year with no knowledge of how many instances of that property
type are present in the the Leicestershire building stock. The reader cannot form
an identical opinion because the information is dissimilar. However, in any case it
would be rash to imagine that the Loughborough University campus is a microcosm
of Leicestershire County so any comparison between the two should be viewed with
caution.
The LFRSData has been collected digitally via prescripted drop-down menus using
the guidance in the Incident Recording System (2009) whilst the collection of the
LUData has not been collected to a similar prescription.
7.3.1. Quality of records
The quality of the records in the LFRSdata is superior to the quality of the records
in the LUData but there is insufficient information to claim that one set of records
is more accurate than the other. The LFRSData is subject to much more scrutiny
by LFRS itself but also because the data are submitted to Government and there is
embarrassment if the data are found to be inaccurate. There is much less scrutiny
in the case of the LUData but this gives no reason to believe that the records are
any less accurate.
The main disadvantage with regard to the LUData is the format of the variables and
the amount of data they contain. Many of the variables do not contain a full record,
there is information missing in some of the variables for that record and many of the
variables contained the same information but with spelling mistakes and/or slightly
different grammar. Data cleansing was necessary for the LUData but not for the
LFRSData which overcomes most of the problems by having prescripted phrases in
the software used to collate the data.
7.3.1.1. Consistency of data
Figure 6.1 on page 116 gives information regarding the comparison of the two
datasets. This shows the number of actual incidents per month for each of the
periods in the two datasets. The average number for each month has been calcu-
lated and the cell shadings indicate which months have a below average number
and which months have an average or above average number. Two items of interest
stand out from this table:
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• The figures are fairly consistent with, in the LUData, 28 cells below average
and 32 cells equal to or above average; whilst in the LFRS data, there are 15
cells below the average figure and 21 cells either equal to or above the average
figure. It is difficult to discern any trend to suggest that the average figure is
increasing or decreasing in either of the datasets from year to year.
• The average figures are remarkably similar when comparing one dataset against
the other. This is remarkable when you consider that one dataset records ac-
tual incidents on a university campus and the other records actual incidents
for the whole of Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland!
7.3.1.2. The amount of fire damage
The analysis compares the records in the LUData that record fire damage against
the records in the LFRSData that record fire damage with regard to the amount
of damage caused because of a fire. The term amount of fire damage needs some
explanation because there are many consequences of fire that could arguably be
identified as fire damage.
With regard to the LFRSData the variable used is that originating from the data
collected to answer Question 8.25 on page 83 of the Incident Recording System
(2009). The definition of fire damage for this variable is given as:
“the total horizontal area damaged (by flame and/or heat and/or smoke
and/or water etc) in sq.m (at stop)”.
This definition needs some explanation of how it has been interpreted.
Fire damage has been interpreted as damage to the construction and the contents of
a horizontal area of a property by heat, smoke and water. There is a time element
involved in the definition given as; when the Incident Commander relays the verbal
Stop message to Fire Control.
The assessment of damage is made by the Incident Commander at the scene of the
incident. It is measured in square metres and it is hastily produced as a result of the
circumstances in which it is made. The time the assessment is made has been taken
as the point in time when the Incident Commander decides that “no more help is
required and that the personnel and appliances already in attendance or requested
are sufficient, except for any necessary reliefs”. This definition has been taken from
the Fire Service Drill Book (1985).
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With regard to the LUData, the definition of the amount of fire damage inherent in
the LFRSData has been applied to the LUData records using the clues provided by
the test contained in the records.
7.3.1.3. Amount of damage per property type
There are many more property types in the LFRSData that are not present in the
LUData. The property types on the university campus reflect the specialist nature
of such an organisation while the property types in the LFRSData reflect the whole
range of properties necessary for people living in cities, towns and villages. Nev-
ertheless, thirteen property types can be identified which can be compared against
the LFRSData (see on page 118).
With regard to the mean amount of damage for each type of property, there is a
Pareto distribution1 reflected in the LUData regarding the amount of damage in one
property type, that of the Student Hall of Residence. About 80% of the damage can
be attributed to incidents in this one type of property.
In the LFRSData 85% of the damage is split between three types of property (In-
dustrial manufacturing 53%, Industrial processing 22% and Offices and call centres
10%).
7.3.1.4. Amount of damage per month
Both sets of data can be divided into calendar months and although there are more
months in the LUData (60 months) than there are in the LFRSData (36 months),
because of the mathematical device of using percentages the two results are compa-
rable.
With regard to the mean amount of damage for each month (see the chart on
page 119), there is a peak of damage in the LUData in October (21%) and November
(12%). In contrast there is a dip of damage in July (3%) and August (3%).
The LFRSData has three peaks; the biggest in May (25%), a smaller one in June
(15%) and the smallest in January (12%). There is also a three-month dip in the
LFRSData; August (3%), September (2%) and October (3%).
1A Pareto distribution demonstrates a power law that states that a majority (about 80%) of the
effects come from a minority (about 20%) of the causes. This type of distribution has been
identified in examples such as the size of cities, the magnitude of earthquakes, the frequency of
forest fires, the distribution of wealth in a country etc.
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7.3.1.5. Amount of damage per time of day
With regard to the mean amount of damage for the time of day (see the chart on
page 120), most damage occurs in the evening between 17:00 and 22:00 with a peak
of damage (10%) occurring between 18:00 and 19:00. The least damage, with an
average amount of damage of 2%, occurring between midnight and 11:00.
The LFRSData has four peaks of damage; the highest peak occurring between 23:00
and midnight (18%), next highest between 06:00 and 07:00 (12%), next highest
between 19:00 to 20:00 (9%) and the smallest peak of 8% between 13:00 to 14:00. The
times of the day when the least damage (below 2%) occurs are spread throughout
the day; 02:00 to 03:00, 05:00 to 06:00, 15:00 to 16:00, 18:00 to 19:00 and 22:00 to
23:00. These include three periods when the least amount of damage (0.5%) occurs;
between 02:00 to 03:00, 05:00 to 06:00 and 22:00 to 23:00.
7.3.1.6. Amount of damage per type of incident
With regard to the mean amount of damage for each type of incident (see the chart
on page 121), both sets of data indicate a Pareto distribution. In the LUData the
incident type ‘Good intent false alarm’ accounts for 82.4% of the damage. In the
LFRSData, the incident type ‘Accidental’ accounts for 73.5% of the damage and if
you add the 5.9% of damage for the incident type ‘Good intent false alarm’, the two
incident types account for 79.4% of the damage.
7.3.1.7. Amount of damage per incident cause
With regard to the mean amount of damage for each incident cause (see the chart
on page 122), a Pareto distribution is again indicated in the LUData. The incident
cause of ‘Fire’ accounting for 82.5% of the damage with the next largest cause of
12.3% of ‘Cooking, other cooking’.
There is no such Pareto distribution in the LFRSData where the top three causes
only account 59.8% of the damage. These are ‘Heat and source combustibles brought
together deliberately’ (25%), ‘Combustible articles too close to heat source’ (22.5%)
and ‘Fault in equipment or appliance’ (12.3%).
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7.3.1.8. Profile of most likely source of fire damage
Analysing different characteristics of fire damage; the cause of an incident, the time
of day or the month of the year etc. means that a profile of fire damage can be built
up around the property of a company or an organisation such as Loughborough
University campus. Already, a pattern can be seen to be emerging from the analysis
that suggests that the most likely circumstance for fire damage to occur is caused
by an incident in the early evening, in October, in a student’s quarters. This can be
further refined by describing the nature of the incident as a ‘false alarm: accidental’.
This could mean a smell of burning from an overheated light fitting or some burnt
toast in a toaster or food in a pan or hot air from a fan heater or steam from a
shower etc. These are all causes recorded in the LUData and expressed as ‘false
alarm: accidental’.
It may seem unusual and even incorrect that fire damage should be recorded against
a false alarm but this is not so, the fact that an incident is a false alarm does not
mean to say that there is no fire damage. Incident Recording System (2009) lists;
overheating light/fitting; overheating appliance; fire elsewhere (not at location);
toaster/toast; other cooking; controlled burning; air conditioning; steam; smoking
chimney; reflected light/sun-light; other as possible reasons for recording false alarms
made accidentally. All of these (except, possibly, air conditioning) involve damage
by either heat or smoke or water and would attract a record in the dataset of the
amount of damage.
The fire damage recorded in the LFRSData records the horizontal area affected by
flame and/or heat and/or smoke and/or water etc., but there are many difficulties
connected with this evaluation and there is not much guidance for the person who
makes it. It is a hastily produced evaluation that is lacking in several ways. One
way in which it is lacking is that it does not record the importance, worth or value
of the fire damage.
There is no measurement of fire damage in the LUData because the university
incident recording system is not sufficiently refined to record it. The measurement
used in the LUData has been deduced by reference to the recorded text, the guidance
in the Incident Recording System (2009) and the awareness that over 80% of the
incidents occur within the student’s quarters. This has allowed assumptions to be
made about the records in the LUData because, for example, in a lot of cases, the
ignition will have occurred in a student’s study bedroom, kitchen or common room
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and it is safe to assume that the fire damage will have been confined to the ranges
of 1 to 5 square metres or 6 to 10 square metres.
7.3.1.9. Costing fire damage
In the LFRSData, the fire officer making the assessment of how much fire damage
occurs, looks at the effects of heat on the contents and structure of the room or
building, the discolouration of the decor for signs of smoke damage and the effect
of water on the contents or stock and then physically paces the area to obtain a
measurement. This measurement does not, at all, take into account the value of the
fire damage in terms of, for instance, how important to an occupier’s employment
the incident is. How important to the survival of a company the incident is. How
important to the wealth of the country or community the incident is. How important
to the protection of the environment the incident is. and so forth.
So, with regard to the LUData, taking the 80% of fire damage that occurs in the
property type, Student Hall of Residence, the variable code of 1 to 5 square metres
could be said to represent a study bedroom. This could be empty and unoccupied
but other evidence suggests that this is not the case and it is likely to be occupied.
If occupied there will be a bed, a desk, a wardrobe; there will be clothes, computers,
mobile phones etc.; there will be books, study papers, writing equipment etc.; there
are also the fixtures and fittings such as lighting units, shelving, decor etc. that
could all suffer a degree of damage dependent on the temperature reached or the
thickness of smoke that evolved.
For the purposes of this research, the cost of replacing damaged contents, purging a
room of the smell of smoke and re-decorating has been set at £1000 (see explanation
on page 113). This arbitrary sum been used to add more meaning to the results
which can be seen on page 123 onwards.
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8.1. Introduction
The choice of subject for this thesis; the relationship between fire damage and the
management of fire safety, was initiated by the experience related in the Preface (see
page viii) regarding a fire in a warehouse. The message arising from this particular
fire incident is that excessive fire damage may have occurred because of a failing in
a component(s) of the fire safety management system that was in place at the time.
Therefore, the logical corollary of this circumstance is that a more proportionate
amount of fire damage would have been the case given a higher standard of fire
safety management. It is this concept that gives rise to the hypothesis embodied in
this thesis:
Hypothesis: If an acceptable standard of fire safety management is prac-
ticed in a company/organisation, then there is likely to be less fire damage
when a fire occurs.
There are some general assumptions contained in the hypothesis, that:
• there is a correlation between the standard of fire safety management and the
amount of fire damage;
• there is no measure of the standard of fire safety management available for use
by the occupier of a property; and
• there is no measure of fire damage that comprehensively takes into account all
of the impact felt on, for example, the community or the environment.
Arising from the hypothesis are some general questions:
• what can be done to counter the misperceptions, probably caused by the lack
of objective information, regarding the root causes of fire, particularly fires
associated with certain property types or certain categories of building
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• how can people be made aware of the long-term consequences of fire when most
people’s exposure to the damage caused by fire is experienced vicariously
• how can the standard of fire safety management associated with a certain type
of property or business be measured
The thesis responds to these general questions by attempting to answer them and
it recognises that, in answering them, it needs to follow a methodology of acquiring
basic information. The methodology is designed to produce basic information about
fire safety and fire damage.
The Delphi process (found in Chapter 4 on page 60) defines and describes what fire
safety is by categorising the components necessary in a company or an organisation
to manage it correctly. This result can be used to underpin future attempts to
measure it by providing objective evidence linked to each component and allowing
the evidence to determine the value of each component. To be able to do this with
confidence it is necessary to have a credible definition for evidence gatherers to
accept and to work with. The categorisation provides a credible definition.
The interviews (found in Chapter 5 on page 82) produce information about the con-
text in which the management and enforcement of fire safety is carried out. They
assist in the explanation of how fire safety is managed and enforced using a specific
example. The interviews focus on one location, that of the campus of Loughbor-
ough University, and they include the three people who exert most influence on
the fire safety practiced at that location. These are the manager with a direct re-
sponsibility to the location, the fire officer whose responsibility includes operational
activities regarding the location and the fire officer whose responsibility includes the
enforcement of fire safety legislation at the location. The fourth interviewee has no
direct influence but was asked, because of his knowledge and experience, to give the
insurer’s viewpoint towards fire safety at the location.
The case study (found in Chapter 6 on page 103) continues in using the university
campus as a focus and gives some basic information about the amount of fire damage
occurring as a result of that use. The amount and type of fire damage on the small
geographical area of the university campus is described and compared against the
bigger geographical area administered by Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service.
The university campus, although a large site is only a small fraction of the bigger
area but the data have been manipulated to allow a like-for-like comparison. Finally,
the amount of fire damage occurring on the university campus is costed so that the
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financial value of the fire damage can be appreciated.
The methods used in this thesis and described above, go some way to answering
the general questions arising from the hypothesis. Acquisition of objective evidence
linked to the components of fire safety will assist in clarifying the misperceptions that
people have and will make them aware of the root causes of fire damage. Statistical
research into the relationships between fire safety and fire damage particularly with
regard to property types, can motivate building occupiers to raise the standard of
their fire safety strategies, Analysis of the objective evidence and the relationships
will also assist in confirming that the hypothesis is factual.
8.2. Strengths and weaknesses of the research
8.2.1. Limitations of the study
The study investigates a complex association. Fire safety management and fire
damage are largely subjective subjects because of the lack of objective research and
the lack of metrics which make reference to them. Both fire safety management and
fire damage conceal complex elements that are in need of simplification.
The results of the Delphi method only add to this subjectivity, they do not objec-
tively define and describe fire safety management they only give another subjective
description of it. The value of this, however, is that it is a collective opinion by
people experienced and knowledgeable in the field, knowingly taking part in an ex-
ercise that can be confirmed or confounded in the future by objective evidence. The
advantage this gives to further research is the chance for researchers to concentrate
on collecting evidence for those categories thought to have the most impact, thus
accelerating the potential benefits.
Analysis of the interviews gives great insight into the different positions held by those
involved in practicing and enforcing fire safety management on the Loughborough
University campus. It demonstrates that the current regulations being enforced in
England and Wales do not cover the whole breadth of fire safety management. It
also shows that there are a number of issues such as; the application of dynamic
risk assessment, the focus on life safety rather than property protection or business
disruption, the campaign to reduce unwanted fire signals and so on that impact on
fire safety. Their impact on the management of fire safety or the amount of fire
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damage has not been investigated and evaluated in this research but the issues have
been recorded and are noted for further research.
Analysis of data collected regularly and rigorously has proven to be effective and
reliable in many fields as a predictive tool and is already in use in the field of
fire safety. Lunn (2010), for instance, uses data analysis in the production of the
Integrated Risk Management Plan to determine performance targets for aspects of
fire safety. To do this with credibility, Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service employ
analysts dedicated to making sure the data used for analysis is clean, correct and
robust. This gives a high confidence level to the accuracy of the data acquired
for use in this research. Unfortunately, this is not so with the data acquired from
Loughborough University because the need for scrupulous accuracy has not yet been
achieved. Consequently, there is not such a high confidence level in the data acquired
from this source.
The measurement for fire damage in the LFRSData acquired for use in this research
has an inherent limitation because of the way that the measurement is made and
because of the criteria used in its estimation. In addition to this there is a further
limitation inherent in the LUData because of the paucity of information in the
dataset. This has necessitated the need for further estimates to be made.
The limitation in the LFRSData is built-in to the way that the measurement is col-
lected nationally by the fire and rescue service and is unlikely to change unless there
is sufficient pressure to modify it and appropriate metrics with which to measure
additional criteria. Given sufficient motivation in the direction that this research
offers, there would be an increase in pressure to collect a more detailed measure of
fire damage or to divert current data to be analysed in a new way.
8.2.2. Theoretical implications and practical recommendations
8.2.2.1. Delphi process (Chapter 4 on page 60}
The contribution that the Delphi process has made to the research is the categori-
sation of fire safety management made credible by the knowledge, experience and
consensus of the panel members. The panel members were chosen because of their
perceived status by the author and this was confirmed by themselves when asked
during the process. This makes the results difficult to argue against even though
they are only a subjective judgement.
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The categorisation also fills a gap for a comprehensive definition of fire safety man-
agement. Definitions exist, notably in British Standard 9999 (2008) and in Publicly
Available Specification 911 (2007) but they have not been produced to be compre-
hensive definitions. The categorisation reported in this research complements those
definitions but has aspirations for something greater. It aspires to be a taxonomy
or classification of the subject based on objective evidence that could be used as a
measurement of the management of fire safety.
Acceptance of the categorisation could lead to the next step in a series of steps
resulting in the ability to measure fire safety management. If the categorisation is
accepted and used as a foundation, then each category could be used as a container
to hold objective evidence gleaned from the fire incident database. This is a big
step because decisions have to be made about what objective evidence should be
associated with each category. The presumption is that much necessary evidence
is not currently collected so research must be targeted regarding what evidence is
required and how it should be collected.
A lead in deciding what evidence could be collected would be taken by adapting the
analysis of a fire incident to follow the analysis of a criminal case. The questions
asked by Dern et al (2009) in respect of a criminal case analysis could be easily
adapted to the analysis of a fire incident.
Part of the results arrived at by the panel members was an importance rating for each
of the ten categories. The purpose of this was to save time in future research. The
categories judged as most important by the panel members were so judged because
of their subjective perception that they were the most influential. So it makes
sense that the most important categories should be the focus of attention before the
categories judged the least important. This should allow optimum progress to be
made.
8.2.2.2. Interviews (Chapter 5 on page 82)
The contribution that the interviews have made to research are to highlight the
differing views of people who are involved in the management and enforcement of
fire safety particularly on one site. That there are diverse views is not surprising
because of the different priorities brought out during the interviews between the
necessity of practicing effective fire safety and the impetus of an enforcing legisla-
tion. What is surprising is that of the different aspects to the management of fire
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safety only protection of life is reinforced by legislation and of direct interest to the
enforcement officers. There is a real need for fire safety practitioners to understand
this standpoint and for practical ways in which they can carry out their roles to look
after all other aspects of fire safety.
What is also intriguing is the way that different concepts, relevant to fire safety
and raised during the interview discussions, work against the protection of property
and the continuity of business. These are listed and can be found on page 92 and
include dynamic risk assessment, the unwanted fire signals initiative, the concept of
estimated maximum loss and so on. They constitute concepts brought in to solve
specific problems but which can be detrimental to properties and businesses. The
need here is for research into each of the concepts to better understand their impact.
The objective would be to give those who practice fire safety tools to ameliorate their
effects.
8.2.2.3. Case study (Chapter 6 on page 103)
The contribution of the case study to the research is to analyse fire damage in a
framework that will be of use to management planning. The results give a contextual
view of fire damage on a university campus that could be used to inform plans drawn
up by the management to make the most effective use of university staff. Associating
fire damage with the time of day, the time of year, the type of property and so on,
gives a useful model that indicates the probability of when or where fire damage is
most likely to take place. This could convert into when or where staff should be
most vigilant or when and where most precautionary strategies should be carried
out.
Comparing the campus results against the larger area administered by Leicestershire
Fire and Rescue Service allows an assessment of scale to be carried out. The data
have been manipulated so that data are being compared against like data so the
frequency of fire damage on the university campus can be compared against the
frequency of damage in the larger area. Disparity of results encourages investigations
and explanations of why this is so leading to greater understanding and focus on
ways to reduce fire damage.
Converting the results into a financial value draws attention to the amount of money
fire costs a major university. This should motivate effort to reduce it.
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As explained earlier, the data acquired from Loughborough University (LUData)
has been cleansed and manipulated to allow the comparisons that have been made
against the data acquired from Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRSData).
To enable easy comparisons commensurate with the analysis model used in this
thesis, LUData would have to be collected in the same variables as those in the
Incident Recording System (2009). This could be achieved with appropriate training
given to university staff who currently collect data.
Data is currently sent by Loughborough University to the University Safety and
Health Association (USHA)1 who collate fire statistics from UK Universities. Data
collected includes the frequencies and type of fire alarm activations, fire incidents,
cooking-related fires, fire-related injuries and so on. However, it would be beneficial
for USHA to collect variables commensurable with those used in Incident Recording
System (2009). This synchronicity would produce the capability of benchmarking
and measuring the performance of one university against another whilst still being
able to analyse the data against the national dataset of the IRS.
8.3. Conclusion
This thesis represents the details of the research documented in it, but it does not
fully answer the research questions that it has posed. This is far from an admittance
of failure because there is still much to do before fire safety can be regarded as a
true science and provide the objective evidence that can be analysed to provide the
answers. The research has provided much useful information that will, potentially,
make a contribution to combating the destructive consequences of uncontrolled fire
but more usefully, it has set out a paradigm in which that contribution could prove
to be far more substantial and effective.
The research falls in between two disciplines, the study of fire engineering and the
study of management; or the application of science and technology and the appli-
cation of sociology. This is a partnership already present in the study of human
behaviour when faced with the products of combustion in the confinement of a
building and has a big influence in the design of buildings in Europe and the USA,
particularly. The management of fire safety deals with the occupation of the build-
1Data currently being collated by USHA will shortly be collated by the Higher Education Statistics
Agency (HESA).
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ing following construction and exists for the whole of its life. It is subject to much
misperception, ignorance and complacency leading to the destruction, loss of trade
and damage to communities that is reported daily by the news media. Research
into this area is critical to the reversal of this situation.
Management of fire safety is important and its importance lies in reducing the
amount of damage and the amount of impact which is the consequence of fire.
This research contributes to that aim and opens the way to further research that
could profitably benefit commercial companies, the fire and rescue service and the
community.
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A. Appendix 1: Example of the
letter sent to the interviewees
Dear (name deleted),
I am a research student in the School of Civil and Building Engineering at Lough-
borough University. The subject of my research is the management of fire safety and
I am interested in how its principles are applied in the management of fire safety on
the Loughborough University Campus.
As part of my research, I would like to interview you in your role as University Fire
Officer. I have included some questions that would form the basis for discussion so
that, if you agree to be interviewed, you will have some notion of the areas I am
interested in:
Question 1 How does the management of fire safety assist Loughborough University
(or any company or organisation) to meet the requirements of regulation and
the scrutiny of regulatory inspections?
Question 2 How does the management of fire safety assist in the protection of
University property or the continuity of University business?
Question 3 Do you think that a good standard of fire safety management reduces
the likelihood of fire damage and, if so, does this suggest there is a paral-
lel between the standard of fire safety management and the amount of fire
damage?
Question 4 What are the benefits of the current fire and rescue service campaign
to reduce unwanted fire signals? The benefits for the fire and rescue service
are that it reduces the number of false calls they receive with a corresponding
saving of time, effort and money. What are the benefits of the campaign with
regard to Loughborough University (or any company or organisation)?
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Question 5 Do you think it would be beneficial to measure the operational perfor-
mance of the fire and rescue service with a performance metric that evaluates
the efforts of companies and organisations that demonstrate an improvement
in business continuity or a reduction in the amount of fire damage?
I envisage that an interview may take up to an hour of your time and I would be
grateful if the interview could take place at your location, perhaps a meeting room,
if that is possible? I would prefer to record the interview so that I might transcribe
the discussion afterwards but I realise that you may not find this acceptable so, in
this event, I would have to make written notes. Please let me know if you have an
objection to the recording of the interview?
I have some dates for a potential meeting before the Christmas Break, I would be
grateful if you could express a preference or state whether you prefer to wait until
the New Year:
Week beginning 26 November; either Monday 26, Tuesday 27, Thursday 29 or Friday
30.
Week beginning 3 December; either Thursday 6 or Friday 7 (am only).
Week beginning 10 December; either Monday 10 (pm only), Tuesday 11, Thursday
13 or Friday 14.
Week beginning 17 December; either Monday 17, Tuesday 18, Thursday 20 or Friday
21.
I do not require a formal reply to this letter but I would be grateful of an e-mail or
a telephone call signaling your acceptance to be interviewed and confirmation of a
date. You will find my mobile telephone number and e-mail address above.
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B. Appendix 2: Transcript of
interview with Loughborough
University Fire Safety Officer
Loughborough University
11 December 2012
Author: What is your full title?1
Loughborough University Fire Safety Officer: Fire Safety Officer for Loughborough2
University Campus.3
A: How long have you been in that role?4
LUFSO: My role here at the University is into its eighth year, in the new year, and5
prior to that, twenty-eight years in the (name of organisation removed); which is a6
similar background to the fire and rescue service.7
A: You are part of the Health and Safety Department of Loughborough University?8
LUFSO:Yes.9
A: I wanted to interview yourself. I am going to interview (name removed), who10
is the District Manager for Charnwood or North West Leicestershire or whatever?11
I’m trying to arrange an interview with (name removed). I think you know (name12
removed). He is probably the most experienced fire safety officer, at the moment in13
Leicestershire. I thought about interviewing (name removed), who is the Head of14
Fire Engineering for the FPA1.15
I tried to formulate the questions I sent you by looking from your viewpoint and all16
the other viewpoints and formulating questions that would be consistent amongst17
the interviewees.18
1FPA is an acronym for the Fire protection Association. An independent source of information
and advice relating to all aspects of fire safety, risk management and loss prevention.
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I also have a list of items, which I shall come to later, because I want to find out19
whether they are relevant to you and whether they are inclusive and how you would20
rate them in importance.21
We will start off with the questions first.22
LUFSO:OK.23
A: It is all about fire safety management, as you already know. My thesis is all24
about fire safety management.25
The first question was; how does the management of fire safety assist a company26
or an organisation, in this case Loughborough University, to meet the requirements27
of regulation and the scrutiny of regulatory inspections? So it is really about your28
relationship with the regulatory authority which is, in this case, Leicestershire Fire29
and Rescue Service.30
LUFSO:Yes, the fire and rescue service at Leicester who have done nineteen build-31
ings, so far.32
A: How does your management role, or your role as; is it supervisory of the frame-33
work of fire safety management?34
LUFSO:Basically, I am the competent person that carries out the fire risk assess-35
ments and I identify any shortfalls. I raise those shortfalls on what we call ‘action36
trackers’. If its a minimal task, I raise what’s called a ‘green ticket’ and say; look,37
I’ve just done a fire risk assessment or audit of so and so building. Three of the38
doors are not closing correctly, can you get them put right? It goes into the system39
and it is picked up.40
A: Do you accept that a fire risk assessment is about the management of fire safety41
in a building?42
LUFSO:No. Fire risk assessment is an audit of a building at that time to see43
whether you are hitting or; it is a benchmark to see whether you are benching44
at the requirements that you should be meeting with the current Standards and45
Guidance documents available to you. The management of it is to maintain at that46
level, to keep it at that level. So the Universities management of the system is a47
little bit, kind of, awkward to manage in respect that the fire alarm systems, the48
emergency lighting systems which are all subject to routine service and maintenance49
inspections by outside, external engineers who are accredited engineers. I have found50
a few pitfalls in some of their work, because we are relying on them to say that we51
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are compliant. I’m ticking the risk assessment to say it is compliant because I don’t52
audit them or check them. I just figure that they’ve got a certificate and we’ve had53
an inspection and it has met the criteria. But I go into the building, I have found54
shortfalls and I snag that against the department within the Facilities Management55
who oversee that and say that this is not good. We are paying these and we are not56
getting best value for money.57
A: You are not just a fire risk assessor ...58
LUFSO: I’m not just a fire risk assessor?59
A: ... because, I have just witnessed that you give advice to people who approach60
you with plans in their hands. That is not fire risk assessment. That is fire safety61
engineering.62
LUFSO:I give advice, yes. I say where it should be a compartment line, should this63
door be FD thirty or sixty minutes fire resistance? I use common sense that if its a64
staircase it needs to be in a thirty or a sixty depending on its design strategy. I try65
and put the compartment through the building wherever I can.66
A: Your fire risk assessment ...67
LUFSO:I assess for all that. Have we got compartmentalisation. Have we got...68
A: ... when you do a fire risk assessment. What you are doing is auditing whether69
that building is being managed properly.70
LUFSO:Yes, meeting a standard.71
A: So you are auditing fire safety management.72
LUFSO:Yes, but this is now about shortfalls such as emergency lighting. Going into73
buildings and saying, what the University do at the moment here is have a monthly74
inspection, which is a walk-through, basically. Then every year they do a three-hour75
burn-off.76
What I have said is; how do I know that the emergency lighting which is installed in77
this building is adequate to meet the current needs from a means of escape and also78
the other sections that are covered in British Standards as regards safely shutting79
down machinery etc?80
A: Which is a valid question ...81
LUFSO:Absolutely. And they can’t answer it because what they are not doing a Lux82
value and we haven’t got floor plans that clearly show me where all the emergency83
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lighting is so I could look on the 2D plan and say there is sufficient lighting there.84
And again, I have gone into buildings in the hours of darkness, myself, put the85
building into emergency light situation and proven the fact that there is not; either86
there isn’t any or it is not adequate. So again there are lots of pitfalls.87
A: How does that enable the University to meet the statutory requirements?88
LUFSO:All it does it enables me to fire up an e-mail with the risk assessment to89
say that it is non-compliant. It goes into the action-tracker and I give it, initially,90
a period of time to get it put right. Unless it’s absolutely life-threatening. Which,91
fortunately for us, we’ve never come across that shortfall, we’re not meeting the92
standards, good guidance, and I give them a time to assess that and, if they have93
not done it, I give them a ‘red code’ and it goes red.94
A: So you manage the ...95
LUFSO:I kind of, don’t manage, I’m a kind of prod. I’m prodding them all the96
time.97
A: ... you’ve put a framework in position and you try and use that framework?98
LUFSO:Yes, but it sometimes takes a long time because, as you know with the Uni-99
versity; they’re currently and constantly changing the use of the building, the layout100
of the building, they’re upgrading the building, they’re even considering demolish-101
ing the building. And with all these different sets in place there is a reluctance, 10 minutes102
sometimes, to do some of this work and I have to be forceful, sometimes, by saying103
that you are non-compliant with the regulations now.104
A prime example was that we had a fire alarm system that was a 240 volt system.105
Not compliant; its been non-compliant for years. So, basically, you say to them;106
you need to do something about it because its non-compliant because, if you don’t,107
and something goes wrong, you are just going to kick yourself. Because you just do108
diligence in the whole thing. So the management side of it is sometimes an annoyance109
that you can’t be confident and say; there’s the FRA2 and I know everything is okay110
and I go around the corner and no it’s not. Someone has gone in there and done111
some work and, hey ho, we’re in a mess again.112
A: Let’s go on to Question 2. How does the management of fire safety assist in the113
protection of property or the continuity of University business?114
2FRA is an acronym for Fire Risk Assessment. The audit of property required under the Regu-
latory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
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LUFSO:It’s this ... (break in transmission) ... most of it but it has to be continually115
audited by myself to say it is meeting the current standards.116
A: A fire risk assessment is for the protection of life ...117
LUFSO: Absolutely.118
A: ... it’s not for the protection or, not necessarily, for the protection of of property.119
This is only by default, really.120
LUFSO: Absolutely but in the fire risk assessment I do life and assets. I encapsulate121
both because, in my opinion ...122
A: So you have an enhanced fire risk assessment ...123
LUFSO:Yes or comprehensive, as I would call it.124
A: ... enhanced so far as the regulations are concerned.125
LUFSO: Yes. I’ve covered the life but I’m also going for the University’s assets. A lot126
of the things that I do recommend from an asset protection point of view is that they127
remove the flammable substances, gases and materials out of the buildings which128
will enable the fire service to be more, kind of, confident in, possibly, penetrating129
the building to extinguish the fire in the area of origin or compartment rather than130
contain the fire from the outside because of this risk factor against firefighters. So,131
yes, I drive that in, if I can.132
A: Is that on your own volition, or is that ...133
LUFSO:Yes, I think it is because when I came here, initially there were lots of life134
safety issues. There were Halls of Residence that were not to the current levels of135
L2. They were just, basically, well there were no M systems but there were L4s3136
which was just not acceptable.137
A: Do you think that property protection and continuity of business should be part138
of ...139
LUFSO:Absolutely. Because it’s business continuity. Other than that you have to140
have a very, very good business continuity plan that will allow you to lose a building141
but you have a system in place that will allow you to pick up the next day and142
operate again. With the University and the size of our buildings that, to me, is not143
do-able. If you lost the Chemistry building, you’re not going to pick that up and144
3L2 and L4 are references to types of fire alarm system found in British Standard 5839.
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run with it somewhere else and you are not going to have a Chemistry building sat145
there as a mothball in the event of; because that is just not cost-effective. So, as I146
see it, we have to bolt it down as much as possible so that there is little or no risk147
of losing a building.148
A: There was a fire recently in the Wolfson building?149
LUFSO:Yes, but it was contained to an office. It gutted the office with smoke150
damage to the offices adjacent and a bit of smoke damage to the corridors and false151
ceilings, but that was it.152
It was quite an expensive bill because of the clean-up of the stink of smoke. That is153
the biggest issue with fires. It is the smoke damage rather than the fire damage that154
is the cost and the disruption because it goes further than the fire. The fire, itself,155
is just that room. So gut it, take everything out, fix what’s damaged and re-paint156
and decorate. The smoke damage has gone quite a way down, the smell and things157
like that ...158
A: There would also be files and work in that room.159
LUFSO:Yes, all the lost records. Here is a picture of it. I did a report on it which I160
can send you if it’s of any help to you.161
A: I wasn’t on the campus at the time but I read about it in my daily horizon scan.162
It popped up in the horizon scan.163
So presumably the fire brigade attended that?164
LUFSO:Yes.165
A: ... and they will be ... (break in transmission)166
LUFSO:That’s the office and that’s the cause; one of those ( of a soft drink removed)167
fridges.168
A: Was it?169
LUFSO: That’s a video. I do a running commentary because I try to tell them170
where the fire started.171
A: Will you have anything off the fire brigade for that?172
LUFSO: No, they won’t give it to me. I asked them and they said, no, that’s our173
report. I argued with him (the fire officer). It was (name removed), at the time,174
whom I know quite well and he said, yes, I think this is all caused through, there’s175
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a water pipe just above it, so that’s caused through heavy rain and water has come176
through. I said, no (name removed), it’s that, mate. No, no, no.177
(Name removed), I’m not a fire inspector but, look at it? There’s a piece of equip-178
ment that has basically gone and, if you look underneath, it’s completely charred179
away at the shelf above it. It’s not water contamination that’s caused that and it180
would not cause it to break into fire, it would just short it out. We have trip systems181
here so it’s not that. This piece of equipment has failed functionally. overheated and182
caught fire and then it has tripped the power out. Not water contamination which183
would just trip the power out. This is a new building. The fuse rating systems are184
so designed that they pick up on an earth leakage very quickly.185
A: So, in respect of that, what would you like from the fire service?186
LUFSO: Well, I would like to see their report. What they assumed and everything.187
But it’s kind of ‘secret service’ sometimes. I rang Control (Fire Control) and got188
the time-lines so I got the exact; when did you get the call? What time did you189
despatch? What time did you arrive? They give you all that an I’ve got all that in190
my report. So I know the time line is correct but ...191
A: So there is some information coming through?192
LUFSO: Yes, but the difference of opinion of source of fire; I think I am right. But193
I’m not a fire investigation expert and he was adamant that it was water. So I said;194
well you put what you want on your report but I’m telling you, it isn’t water.195
A: Question three. Do you think that a good standard of fire safety management196
reduces the likelihood of fire damage and, if so, do you think there is a parallel197
between the standard of fire safety management and the amount of fire damage?198
LUFSO: Absolutely.199
A: Is there a correlation between the two?200
LUFSO: Fire management, first of all, most definitely. We manage our fire alarm201
systems very well. We investigate every signal, virtually, which normally will turn202
out to be false; through the occupancy mainly of students, 98% of them. But if you203
have a good standard of fire safety management in place, you are reducing the risk204
already because the risk isn’t there.205
I would say one of our risks that is still not easily manageable is that, if you go206
into a lot of our old buildings, probably in the building that you work in, and there207
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are portable heaters dotted here, there and everywhere and they really should not208
be there because the University is saying, we provide adequate fixed heating. Now,209
I know that can become very debatable but the problem we have is the portable210
heaters are, kind of, pushed back to the department or school, to manage and some211
schools manage it very well; everything is labeled, it’s functioning, it’s PAT4 tested212
and they’ve took on our guidance that, if you do need a heater, is an oil-filled213
radiator heater not a convector heater or a radiant bar heater or a halogen heater.214
Other areas, you go in and its a free-for-all especially where there are a lot of PHDs5.215
They just bring it in and you don’t know where it is coming from? It could be from216
a car-boot sale, out of a skip. Those are the ones that we aren’t managing and those217
are all of the ignition sources sitting there waiting to go, bang! (Ironic laughter).218
A: Thinking about fire damage and thinking about this office in the Wolfson building.219
The fire, you said, or most, or the majority of the fire damage was contained in the220
office.221
LUFSO: Well the fire damage was contained, other than the smoke.222
A: Smoke damage went elsewhere?223
LUFSO: Went into the two offices, definitely, but it also breached into the corridor224
a bit and some other offices over the cracks in the compartment between the offices225
which don’t need to be fire compartments in their own entirety.226
A: What I’m trying to get at here is; what role did fire safety management play in227
reducing the amount of damage? Fire starts; the building ...228
LUFSO: Having a fire alarm system to a standard of L2 which is interfaced to229
the University Gatehouse which triggered an investigation signal, immediately the230
detection system had gone into an alarm. Which had a response of two security231
officers because it was in the out-of-hours; this happened at five in the morning, 20 minutes232
and within five minutes of the initial signal, the fire and rescue service were on site.233
Sorry, within ten minutes.234
A: So, thinking about your last fire risk assessment of the Wolfson Building, what235
score would you give out of ten for the fire safety management in the Wolfson School?236
LUFSO: In the Wolfson School? Nine out of ten. It’s one of the best school’s237
buildings that is managed, internally, by the School themselves, all the PAT testing,238
4Portable appliance testing (PAT) is the term used to describe the examination of electrical
appliances and equipment to ensure they are safe to use.
5PHD is the term used to describe students studying for the qualification of Doctor of Philosophy.
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everything on a register. You can’t move in there without their departmental safety239
officer jumping on you. Very, very proactive. That is, in my opinion, the creme-de-240
la-creme of the University buildings as regards fire safety management.241
A: So it’s the best place to have a fire?242
LUFSO: It was.243
A: If you have to have a fire, that’s the best place to have one (ironic laughter).244
LUFSO: Now, if that had happened in ‘S’ Building, there is a totally different fire245
safety management culture.246
A: I think you have answered that question. There is a correlation between a good247
standard of fire safety management and the amount of damage?248
LUFSO: Yes.249
A: OK, next question. There is a current fire service campaign to reduce unwanted250
calls, which you are aware of?251
LUFSO: Yes.252
A: The benefits to the fire and rescue service are that it reduces the number of false253
calls they receive, with a corresponding saving of time and money; for them. Does254
it also lead to a reduction in the amount of fire damage?255
Is there a correlation between them, cutting down the number of unwanted alarms,256
however they do and, I think that, certainly the London Fire Brigade is looking at257
bringing in, or finalising a system of fining. They have the ability and are threatening258
to do it. But does all the work they do to cut down on the number of unwanted fire259
calls reduce the amount of fire damage overall? In your opinion, does it do anything260
to the amount of fire damage?261
LUFSO: All it has done is to put more of an ownership onto the end-user or the262
owner of the building to ensure that they have got a suitable system that is not263
constantly going into fault and causing complacency within the building. So it is264
making you manage the system far better, so it’s improved that. Rather than just265
someone say, I’ve got a fire alarm system; job done; tick box; move on. Yes, but its266
always going into fault; not my problem, the fire service deal with that.267
So it’s dealt with that very good and the University is a prime example. I came here268
seven years ago and we were calling the fire service, on average, eight times a week to269
false alarms. Very quickly, I picked up on that and said we have got to do something270
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about that and we have also got to meet, at the time then, the design constraints271
of CFOA6 and also the regulatory format that was incubating and ready to come272
into play. Very quickly we got teams of people trained up to become fire marshals;273
we got security 24/7, belts and braces, investigating signals and very quickly, we274
reduced the fire service attendance from eight a week to now, they are ringing us275
to come on site to say, can we come and have a look around? Basically, moved it276
out other than genuine fires, they are only getting called to genuine fires. So we’ve277
managed it, so it has improved that and it has made us make sure that our systems278
are working to the design aspect, in other words, they only alarm when there is an279
issue.280
What we can’t manage at the moment and it’s a very hard one to manage, false281
alarms generated in the Halls of Residence as the culture is continually changing.282
You can’t keep that culture in place. As soon as you get the occupancy for 2012283
understanding the importance and respect; 2013, new fresher intake; we’re back to284
square one again. So it’s a constant battle that we are improving the fire alarm285
systems in major refurbs to reduce the sensitivity of the detector heads.286
A: So the benefits of the fire brigade’s campaign then to reduce unwanted calls ...287
LUFSO: ... has made this University, along with other establishments, look at their288
systems to ensure that they do function in the requirements that they are designed289
to rather than generate unwanted false alarms themselves.290
A: So would you say that the University functions better?291
LUFSO: Yes.292
A: So there is a direct benefit for the University from that campaign?293
LUFSO: There is, definitely. Working together with the fire service, last year, we294
were appointed an award. Literally, out of the whole of Leicestershire, we stood out295
as the ambassadors at that time. Now we’ve moved forward with the local station.296
It is working well for Loughborough (University).297
A: That’s good.298
Next question, then. The fire brigade used to have performance indicators, national299
performance indicators supervised by Government which this Government has now300
taken away but most fire brigades, so far as I am aware, have kept some of them301
6CFOA is an acronym for the Chief Fire Officer’s Association. The professional voice and sup-
porting organisation for the leaders of UK fire and rescue services.
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and introduced some of their own. So that they can say to the public, this is your302
fire brigade, we are performing brilliantly and here is the proof for it. That is how303
they use them.304
In your opinion, do you think it would be beneficial to measure the performance of305
the fire brigade with a performance measure that evaluates the efforts of Loughbor-306
ough University to demonstrate; if you can demonstrate an improvement in your307
property protection or business continuity because of the efforts of the fire brigade308
or do you think there would be. Hmm, I’m not putting this right. A performance309
measure that says that you have; the fire brigade has assisted you to improve your310
property protection and business continuity ...311
LUFSO: ... if that was available, yes, but I don’t know how the fire brigade would312
be able to assist us, though because I don’t always find them as a hive of assurance313
or guidance because whenever I have asked them for guidance or information, I’ve314
been given; it’s up to your risk assessment. That is not a help to me.315
A: A lot of people think that is unsatisfactory.316
LUFSO: I would say, if you had an injury and there was an ambulance over the317
road, where would you go for that injury, initially? You would go to the ambulance318
people because you would think that that person in that vehicle is an ambassador319
of what that badge says. So the same thing to me is; if I’ve got a fire issue and I’ve320
got a fire authority on my doorstep whom I can contact then who is the best person321
to contact for advice and guidance? That department; but that department, and I322
think it’s all to do with litigation, will not guide you because they are frightened323
that if you take their word for it and it’s not quite right, there is a litigation claim324
against them. It is just ridiculous! And that is how bad it has got.325
A: That’s the area that I’m focusing in on because ...326
LUFSO: Yes, and I think the weakest point of the fire and rescue service is that they327
cannot advise and guide people to make a better fire safety environment. They can328
be quite ruthless and come in and give you incorrect improvement notices which this329
University was unfortunate enough to occur through the inadequacy of an inspecting330
officer at the time. Which is wrong because that just puts backs up. That breaches331
a brick wall not jelled (??), it just pushes a brick wall that; you’re saying this and332
we’re doing that; don’t agree with you. It’s a challenge.333
A: It’s difficult to get back at them.334
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LUFSO: Absolutely, yes. Well they, kind of, say well it’s our opinion and I could335
say that it’s my opinion is I like red doors but you said blue. It’s an opinion. An336
opinion is not stand-able in court.337
So I’m disappointed and I have this all the time whenever I’ve rung up; all I want338
to do, like I’ve done with you, I have got my own opinion in my head but I’m not so339
confident, I just go, yes, that’s right, and write it. I want to throw it across someone340
else and get their opinion. People like yourself, in a non-obligated role that the341
fire protection officers employed by the fire service, have been great at giving their342
opinions, their views and we’ve, kind of, batted it out and possibly realised that,343
no, my opinion is not quite right, you know, I’ve picked up some more information344
and reviewed it. But the fire service just won’t help you on that and I just find that345
very disappointing; very unhelpful.346
A: I think my logic is that if there is a correlation between the standard of fire safety347
management and the amount of fire damage, nationally and not just on the campus, 30 minutes348
nationally, then focusing on fire safety management would reduce the amount of349
damage. So if there is a correlation there then focusing on fire safety management is350
a good thing. Now I don’t see why the fire brigade shouldn’t concentrate, or focus351
on the fire safety management of places like Loughborough University and to give352
advice and to do the things, initiatives that would assist. They have already proved353
they can do this by focusing on fire deaths in accidental dwelling fires, reducing by354
roughly half, the amount of fire deaths of people in their own homes, because they’ve355
took the trouble to focus on it and done something about it. They could also take356
the trouble to focus on fire safety management because community fire safety, or357
focusing on fire deaths isn’t statutory, they don’t have to do it. So why aren’t they;358
because at the moment, the fire deaths is going down but ...359
LUFSO: ... property fires is going up, isn’t it?360
A: ... property fires are going up; or the amount of damage is going up.361
LUFSO: Because, to a degree, fire crews aren’t, as they were years ago, going in362
there and fighting the fire at its origin. They are just sitting out there because of363
the risk assessments and parameters that have been placed upon them to commit364
crews in, aren’t they? That’s how I see it, they; which is correct because I was in365
the (name of organisation removed) and it was ‘gung ho’, go on. Get in there! And366
in you went.367
A: It’s interesting you say that because that has already been put to me but I don’t368
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see any evidence of that?369
LUFSO: Well I do in ...370
A: I want to quiz these fire brigade officers; where is the evidence? You’re saying it371
but where is the evidence that is saying ...372
LUFSO: Well it’s the kind of feedback that I get. When I first put this past; as373
you know I do these fire safety information packs in the hazardous buildings.When374
I first put this past the fire safety forum that I used to go to at HQ7. The second375
in command use to chair it, I forget his name but he is still there, the guy under376
(name removed) ...377
A: (Name removed)?40 minutes378
LUFSO: (Name removed), that’s it. (Name removed) used to chair it and, basically,379
they were kind of saying that no matter how much information you put on, they380
will decide at the time and if they think there is a risk, they won’t go in. They381
are not going to put fire crews in; and I appreciate that because you can replace382
property, you can’t replace a life. And I know they have a format that even when383
there are lives there; are the lives saveable? If the lives aren’t saveable they are384
not committing crews even when there’s people in there, because a block of flats385
is going to collapse on top of them. And this has really been enhanced further by386
the unfortunate deaths of fire fighters in the last recent two or three years. So I387
kind of get the feeling that unless they really are 100% sure they aren’t going to388
put anyone at risk and they aren’t going to penetrate your building they are just389
going to contain them. And so it is down to us to have as best as possible fire safety390
management and defence in place to contain these fires.391
A: I haven’t seen the evidence that says that it is these big warehouses that are392
burning down that is causing this rising fire damage. I don’t know where that393
evidence is?394
LUFSO: I don’t know. It is just that I have picked it up ...395
A: You’ve said it and other people have said it.396
LUFSO: Yes, I say that I have just picked it up, you know, it’s the initial OiC8;397
there’s a lot of pressure put on his shoulders, or her shoulders, that makes that398
7HQ stands for Headquarters and refers to the administration centre of the fire and rescue service.
8OiC ian acronym for Officer in Charge.
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choice; am I deploying crews or not? Unless there are lives at stake it’s, kind of,399
step back, whoa, hang on a minute! It’s just a building full of contents. So what?400
A: That might be the reason ...401
LUFSO: Yes, and it’s the health and safety blame culture that has driven the fire402
service to be so defensive.403
A: That is definitely true, yes.404
LUFSO: They are not going to commit as they would have done years ago. They405
are very defensive.406
A prime example; I went to a talk up in (name removed) University where they407
discussed the recent fires in Chemistry buildings in universities and (name removed)408
University was absolutely madness! Basically, the origin of the fire was in a fume409
cabinet which was a sixty-minute, fire-resisting fume cabinet in its own design. And,410
basically, the actual source of the ignition was; the student had had some kind of411
absorbent paper and spilt a bit of flammable substance, put the absorbent paper412
and soaked it up. Put it into the waste bin inside the flam cabinet but, for some413
reason, there must have been a chemical reaction with something else in there and it414
caught fire. The student wasn’t trained in fire-fighting equipment or, the person not415
the student, wasn’t trained in fire-fighting equipment and was unsure whether to416
use one or not and decided just to shut the door and set the alarm off. Very quickly417
the fire crews came to the scene and as soon as they realised, or was informed, it418
was a fume cabinet, they were not prepared to penetrate anybody into that building419
until they knew what the contents in this cabinet was. That took twenty minutes to420
establish and in between that time they called out; the Hazmat, the DIM Vehicle;421
and they closed off half of, not (name of city removed); (name of city removed)422
because (name of city removed) is a kind of awkward place to get through and the423
Universities are in the centre. Because of what they did, they closed off and shut424
down (name of city removed), or a quarter of (name of city removed). Which, when425
they eventually got to prove it was nothing, the fire had extinguished itself inside426
the cabinet through lack of oxygen. That was it. The whole thing went ballistically427
mad over nothing, in one respect.428
You know, rather than saying, well here is the information, here is what is in the429
building; like I have got, you are not going to consider just taking crews in there to430
see and establish it back to the fire zone. As I got it, it was just a ‘stay-back’ that431
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was all the time, they were staying back. No-one was going into that building until432
they got that information. Which, kind of, whoa crikey...433
A: So I get from what you are saying that, your opinion is, the fire brigade don’t434
really help with advice on property protection or business continuity?435
LUFSO: They certainly don’t help when you’ve got a query and I’ve rung up, they436
don’t really help, kind of, very tentatively skip around it so you can’t, in any way,437
say that you said we could do this and the majority of the time, the majority of the438
answers I’ve got; well it’s your risk assessment. At the end of the day, it’s your risk439
assessment, at the end of the day. It’s you who have got to satisfy yourself, it’s your440
risk assessment. And I’m thinking; I’m quite aware it’s my risk assessment but I’m441
just wanting to run something past you, get a view or get a guidance on it and I442
just, don’t get it!443
A: OK.444
LUFSO: Yes, not helpful.445
A: I don’t intend to; I mean I intend to use this information in my thesis but I’m446
certainly not going to try to embarrass you.447
LUFSO: No, (author’s name), I don’t mind at all. To me it’s not personal, it’s just448
my views are that things could be better and I think that what you might do, might449
improve it. Hopefully, if someone reads it at the right level.450
A: I hope so too.451
I’ve got some points here which are the general viewpoint of yourself, in your role.452
Firstly, to meet the requirements of regulations?453
LUFSO: Yes.454
A: To be prepared for the scrutiny of those regulations by the fire brigade?455
LUFSO: Yes.456
A: To get the best performance that you can from the fire safety strategy in any457
building?458
LUFSO: Yes.459
A: To reduce the number of times that the alarm goes off?460
LUFSO: Yes.461
A: To co-operate with the people who manage each of the buildings?462
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LUFSO: ... and advise. I would advise and co-operate, really. Sometimes, if I just463
co-operated with them, my co-operation is more like advice about; you need to be464
doing this to stop that. Rather than just co-operating with them. It’s like the465
Chemistry building. I can’t co-operate with that it’s ...466
A: Point taken. Would you be able to put those in some sort of priority order? Or467
would you think that they are all the same?468
LUFSO: Well, your priority of the RRO9 is to meet the requirements so, if this is469
under the RRO or whatever, then it has to be your first priority because you have470
got to meet that, initially.471
A: This is under your role as Fire Safety Manager for Loughborough University472
and what you’ve already said is that, yes, you’ll deal with the life safety but you’ll473
also deal with property protection and business continuity; even though they aren’t474
regulatory requirements.475
LUFSO: Yes, can I put a mark on this? I think that still needs to be 1 because476
that is my benchmark and that is what I’m going to try and meet. I think, then477
it’s to get the best performance from the fire strategy. Then the need to reduce the478
number of false alarm actuations because, not so much on the fire and rescue service479
because we are managing them ourselves, but it’s still a burden that we can still get480
complacency. And we can affect business continuity so I need to reduce that. I’m 40 minutes481
prepared, then that. So that is my order, I think.482
A: Is anything missing from that list? Anything glaring? I’m sure there are little483
bits? Anything glaring, anything big?484
LUFSO: No, I don’t think so, (author’s name). No. Not off the cuff, I can’t see. I485
meet the requirements of the fire assessment. Get the best performance from the fire486
safety strategy and management of the building, is that one. Because if we’ve got487
that in place and that’s already ticking all the boxes, we’ve pretty well harnessed it.488
A: The fire safety strategy I’ve took from that PAS 91110. Which really deals with489
the management of means of escape, the management of; there are five different490
things ...491
LUFSO: Yes, this is what (name of company removed) were working on that with492
9RRO is a term used to refer to the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
10‘PAS911: Fire Strategies - Guidance and Framework for their Formulation’ published by the
Publicly Available Specification 911 (2007)
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their PAS 711 to get your best fire safety management.493
A: The fire safety strategy encompasses the whole of the management of fire safety494
within a building.495
LUFSO: You’ve always got to be prepared for scrutiny, not just from the fire and496
rescue service but we can get scrutinised from Facilities Management because it is497
cost and I get scrutinised from the departments. Why? So I’m challenged at every498
angle. (Name removed) will say you need to do something here. Why? Show me499
where? Show me where it says? So I’m always scrutinised and, by the time I’m500
scrutinised by the fire and rescue service, I’ve done that, gone down the avenue,501
found out what nook and cranny I have to produce to say, this is why you need502
to have; maybe this is one about signs. Because the Facilities Management, the503
architectural side, don’t want any safety signs on any building. They hate that504
because it kills their vision and I say; don’t care, you have got to have it. So where505
does it say I have to have it? So I surfed and surfed and surfed but, unfortunately, it506
didn’t say you have to have a ‘fire action notice’ by every manual call-point. What507
I did surf and find was that you need to have a management system in place where508
you can be sure that all your staff know what to do in the event of. I said, because509
we don’t have that, we’re a ‘floating population’, you have to have this until you’re510
sure you’ve got that. And I used that as a lever to go in. So I did a lot of research511
on that myself, looking at all the Guidance Documents for it.512
A: It’s interesting what you said about a fire alarm system, a 240 volt fire alarm513
system because it’s not that the fire alarm system is wrong because it is 240 volts514
and it doesn’t meet the current British Standard. Does it actually meet the needs515
of the fire risk assessment, is the question?516
LUFSO: Well, is there a suitable and sufficient, possibly means possibly of warning,517
but it is not reliable. Because for that 240 volt, there is no back-up ...518
A: What you are doing, I guess, is trying to standardise because it makes your job519
easier ...520
LUFSO: Well, you bring yourself right up to this peak, well, you are looking for the521
peak of perfection, aren’t you? Now to get that you need a big open cheque book522
so let’s get there.523
A: If your standard says that you have to have a routine notice by every call-point. If524
11PAS7 refers to an, as yet, unpublished document giving advice on fire safety management.
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your standard says that, the architectural department are questioning your standard525
so you have to go back to; well it doesn’t actually say that, that’s the standard that526
I’m putting in. That’s where you have to compromise.527
LUFSO: It’s the University guidance, the University fire strategy we have. A lot of528
it is built on Building Regulations. A prime example we’ve had just recently had a529
challenge with one of them where, basically, where they changed the design from a530
sixty occupancy and increased it to seventy-two but hadn’t changed the doors and531
not put an extra door in. I said you are in breach of Building Regulations. No we532
are not. Yes you are. It says here look, in here. Yes, but it’s only a ... I don’t care533
if it it’s twelve people or two people, it’s a building regulation. I’ve not written it.534
A: But when it’s occupied, it’s not, is it? Because it’s down to the fire risk assessment535
as soon as it’s occupied. It may not have been built to ...536
LUFSO: Yes, but what I’m saying is, my argument was; the inspector hadn’t snagged537
it. He was just, and that’s wrong, he should not put his blinkers on, he should snag538
that. And I said. I’ve no objection against it as long as you show me evidence of539
how you have mitigated against it. And this is my big argument and they were540
saying, that’s for you to do the risk assessment. I said, it’s not for me to do the risk541
assessment, you’ve designed the building and involved the building inspector. You542
know, if you’re letting things go, how can I design a risk assessment on it? You’ve543
already made this, kind of, questionable, what else are you passing? If you’re passing544
that, what else are you passing I don’t know about, I haven’t seen? So I caused a545
bit of a fuss.546
A: No, your job isn’t easy.547
LUFSO: It is not, here! but, as I say, it is not just me. I am not on my own,548
it’s a University kind of issue. It’s an ethos that most universities up until 2006,549
never gave a stuff about fire safety. Then as soon as the RRO came in, they kind of550
panicked a bit. Some counties were very quick to jump on universities. Leicestershire551
was slow on the uptake, they never came in here till 2011. Other than a few little552
jobs that, kind of, drew their attention, which was the Towers. They challenged me553
over, you know, we’ve been here nineteen times this year and you aren’t managing.554
I just challenged back, well you need to look at your paperwork a bit better than555
that. I said because that Towers is one building on this complex and if you want me556
to calculate the number of detectors I’ve got, your CFOA Guidance, I don’t even557
register on your box where it says I need to be interviewed by you.558
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You pick on the building, I said, we can go down town and do that, can’t we? I can’t559
accept it but I appreciate what you are saying and I want to do something about560
it and I will use you as my lever to get something done. But you’re wrong in how561
you have come challenging and saying we have got to do this and I challenged them562
against the Hollywell Park because that is a double-knock system and they said,563
because we had had a few false calls to it, we called them out on first and second564
knock, sorry, we called them out on second knock and both second knocks had been565
faults, you know, nothing. And they said you need to prove your signal and I said,566
no, not while I have a system that’s first and second knock so you’re telling me now567
that I have to question a person who has hit a manual call-point who has discovered568
a fire, I’ve got to go and investigate it now? Is that what you are telling me? And569
they kind of sit back at that and I say, put that all in writing and I’ll do as you tell570
me but I said, no, I’m not prepared to do that. This is a double-knock system that,571
in my opinion, if two devices have come in and said there is something not right,572
we have to assume there is possibly a fire; rather than delay it even further and573
investigate it and put an extra five minutes on that already properly established fire574
before we even get you here. I can’t accept that from an asset protection point of575
view. And they said, well, you know, we are not happy about that. I said, well, let’s576
compromise then; I’ll challenge it during normal working hours on Monday to Friday577
when I’ve got staff within the building and I’ve got, you know, plenty of people, eyes578
and ears discovering fire but out of hours, no, I’ll call you. So they agreed on that.579
But had they have probably bullied us we would have been challenging that one in580
the middle of the night, you know, right down the other end of the campus.581
So. I don’t know. I find that, sometimes it’s; the book says. Yes, well, look at the582
bigger world! Or look at the bigger picture! But I’ve had other inspecting officers583
who have been really great. One guy, I think, (name removed) somebody, came and584
did Butler Court. You could see he was, like, yes this is fine. I’m happy with this.585
I’ve got no problems.586
I’ve always been a person, if you are doing a life safety issue, you have just to say to587
yourself; would you sleep here or would you not sleep here? Now, if you’re saying,588
yes, sleep here. Yes, alright. there are a few things that are not quite right but I’d589
sleep here, you know what I mean? It’s safe. Alright there are improvements that590
every fire seal should have no paint on it, but that’s Utopia, isn’t it?591
My argument was; well, I can appreciate your fire seals being a very important factor592
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if I’ve got no alarm system. But I’ve got an alarm system that’s sniffing every nook593
and cranny that it just cannot, and, I said there’s no dead-end conditions. I really594
can’t buy into your fire seals; this was this last fire officer; I can’t buy into it. I said,595
you are reading from the text-book which clearly says all compartments ...596
A: There are some good fire service officers. Don’t rate everybody by this one597
(laughs).598
LUFSO: Yes, but this other guy, (name removed), who came, we’ve got similar599
things, and he just went, yes, that’s fine because he could see there were other600
control measures in place. The only thing, the fire seal, the smoke seal would do for601
the University is to stop smoke damage or limit, sorry, not limit the smoke damage602
so well if it’s got paint on it because it can’t seal as well. But it would be minimal.603
you know, I’ll get a cleaner in and clean it off but it would just not put anyone at604
risk. That’s what I argued with him about but he wouldn’t buy it.605
A: (Name removed), thanks for your time.606
LUFSO: No, you are very welcome, (author’s name). I mean, (name removed) said607
that, if you could, she would like to see something of this later on, if you can, to608
demonstrate; because there is something we have to do where she has to say where,609
when we work with other people in the University. I said, well I’m working with610
(author’s name); he works out of (name removed) so I’ll just update her on this. 50 minutes611
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Author: (Name removed). How many years have you had in the fire brigade?612
Fire Service District Manager: Nineteen.613
A: Just a little bit of background. This particular research that I am doing is into614
fire safety management. I have access to the University’s statistics, fire incident615
records; I have access to your fire incident data, Leicestershire’s, from 2009 to this616
April, just gone. What I’m doing, I’m looking at that and what I’m trying to find is617
a way to forecast fire safety management. To profile a property or an organisation618
by which you could identify, because of certain parameters; things to do with fire619
safety management, that they are more at risk than another one. Thereby, you620
could, if you chose to do so, target fire safety management with these profiles of621
organisations or properties that exhibit these characteristics. In the knowledge that622
you will be driving down the amount of fire damage. Just as you have, in exactly623
the same way that you have done with fire deaths in accidental dwellings and driven624
down the number of: its a profile of a property rather than a profile of a person.625
That is my aim, that’s the aim of my research.626
So, I’m trying to use the data that I have access to and interviews such as this, with627
yourself and relevant people in the process, to try and find some new knowledge that628
we can; that I can offer to the fire brigade or the fire brigade can see and choose to629
take up or whatever. That’s the background.630
So I sent you these questions which we’ll go through, that’s going to be the basis for631
the interview but I’ve also put down; I’ve also sat and thought and I’ve tried to see632
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the world from your viewpoint as a District Fire Manager, fire and rescue service633
manager, and I’ve put down some points and at the end of the interview. What I634
would like to do is to go through those points and I’m going to ask you if you can635
put them in order of importance.636
FSDM: Okay.637
A: So, we’ll start off with the first one. This is Question 1: How does the manage-638
ment of fire safety assist a company or an organisation, you could perhaps think of639
the University, to meet the requirements of regulation and the scrutiny of regulatory640
inspection from the fire and rescue service. How does the management of fire safety641
assist the company in its requirements and liaising or preparing for an inspector to642
come on site to do an inspection?643
FSDM: I think the first thing; obviously my role requires me to manage on the three644
properties that I’m responsible for and the key element, obviously, is to reduce; A,645
the potential for fire and the injuries or any fatalities that may be a consequence646
of it but it also provides a safer workplace for those that work there from a general647
day to day perspective. Also, it reduces the amount of time that I have to put when648
an audit occurs from the regulatory agency, i.e. ourselves, if we turn up to do an649
audit, I know where everything is. If everything is in order when they roll up, it’s650
basically delivering the material to them. It’s very succinct, it doesn’t take a great651
deal of time if you have your house in order and that’s you.652
A: Do you look at it just from a life safety point of view, though? Because the653
requirements are all about life safety, aren’t they, and it’s only by default that it’s654
property protection?655
FSDM: But, of course, the other aspect is clearly business continuity. If my property656
was involved in fire here, the embarrassment factor, first and foremost for me, is the657
fire service having fires in their properties would be national news, I’m sure and,658
clearly, although we don’t make a process or deliver because we would obviously still659
deliver the fire and rescue service but from an alternative means but I have to invoke660
those alternative means and it does put a strain on the service, in that respect. If661
I was a University, a building is no longer available to teach then I’m looking at662
financial cost, disruption to the student’s experience, which are all negative factors663
which will affect the University.664
A: Do you think that fire safety management then achieves that?665
FSDM: If you do it correctly, it will.666
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A: But if you think about yourself in the role as fire safety manager here or the667
Fire Safety Officer at the University; in principle, exactly the same but two vastly668
different ...669
FSDM: Vastly different, I would suggest, on the value from the Uni’s perspective.670
They have a lot of young students that are frequenting their properties whereas the671
number of staff that work here are all fire safety trained from the moment they672
join; so it is embedded to their psyche which wouldn’t be the same from a student’s673
perspective.674
But the regulation aspect again, as the question states; how should the management675
of fire safety assist? It should make them slicker in terms of operation to enable676
them to be open more consistently throughout the year because they are not get-677
ting prohibition orders or; you can’t use that area of the building because you’ve678
done something with it to, you know, develop it not in accordance with fire safety679
legislation. And that is upheaval that businesses just wouldn’t want, ultimately. So,680
obviously, by managing it well you reduce that.681
A: Okay. While you were talking I’m reflecting on the conversation with (the Uni-682
versity Fire Safety Officer) last week. He has certain issues with; his view of life is683
that, perhaps, the fire brigade concentrate too much on life safety and not property684
protection or asset protection as (name removed) calls it. He is focused, I think; his685
focus is certainly on life safety but it is also on asset protection. I think he has two686
main focuses actually; one is asset protection because of business continuity because687
he gets his **** kicked if a building is unusable but, also; the points just gone.688
FSDM: We’ve had this conversation with (the University Fire Safety Officer).689
A: Oh, right. You know (name removed).690
FSDM: Yes, I’ve had a fair amount to do with (name removed) in the past and691
I know his viewpoint is; weight of attack, for example; if there is nobody in the692
property and it is on fire, there are a few bits and bobs in there that, you know, you693
may be aware of through information, would you go in and put the fire out? And,694
as you know yourself, depending on the risks that are present and the perception of695
the manager who is present from our service, they may decide that actually, no, I’m696
not going to go in just yet because, there is no life risk. So, you know, the principle697
of; we will risk our lives in a highly calculated fashion, we will risk our lives a little698
for saveable life and not so much for saveable property and not at all for things699
that are already lost. That ethos is pretty well embedded in the service. So for700
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us to worry about saving property is completely different to saving a life. The risk701
that you put or that you expose yourself to or are happy to accept are completely702
different. And I have a phrase that says; I don’t mind if anybody remembers me for703
losing a building but I’m never going to be remembered for losing a life. That’s a704
pretty robust and well-embedded phrase705
A: I totally understand that.706
(The University Fire Safety Officer’s) other focus is on cutting down the number707
of times he calls you to the University and, certainly the figures show that he does708
quite well. You know, it is something like five times; this was the year from, I709
don’t know, 2009 to 2010? Something like that but twelve months-worth of data.710
He called you; he called the fire and rescue service five times but the alarm went711
off, in one of the buildings in the University, something like, 450 times. And those712
445 times, the University staff dealt with the incident themselves. Which I think713
is tremendous. Because I want to come on to, a bit later on, about unwanted fire714
signals which is something that taxes me. From my point of view, he seems to be715
doing quite well, does (The University Fire Safety Officer).716
FSDM: I can’t dispute the figures and I think it ties in with the unwanted fire signal717
policy where, of course now, what we would do if we received a call from the alarm-718
handling company is ask them, well is there a fire at that property? The idea is that719
within a window, that they come back to us and declare; there either is or there isn’t720
and until such time that they advise us then we don’t send the resources. Obviously 10 minutes721
with the University having a security system that is set up where they respond to722
the property to then clarify if there is or there isn’t a fire. We, obviously, don’t roll723
out so much because, invariably, there aren’t so many calls which are genuine fires,724
they are through other means. So although the number of activations that they725
have detected are still; I don’t know whether they are consistent or not because I726
don’t know what their figures are. But the fact that we don’t mobilise anything like727
as much as we used to because of that extra barrier to ask to clarify and it’s only728
outside of normal working office hours and the actual building is a life risk; like a729
hotel where we would normally go as per normal. In fact, in the day if it was a hotel,730
i.e. Burleigh Court1, if there was a fire alarm that was operated there, we would731
roll as per normal because it is a life risk. But if it was a lab block or something732
like that, we wouldn’t necessarily respond.733
1Burleigh Court is a Hotel and Conference Centre on the Loughborough University Campus.
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Which is another good point because if we don’t go to calls so quickly, I think it734
puts the emphasis on the occupier then to make sure that their house is in order on735
the value that we know that the fire engines are not going to come straight away so736
we want to make sure that if there is an alert that we know quickly. There either is737
or isn’t a fire and then their own staff can take actions because that is again part738
of their risk assessment. And, if they require then mechanical devices to be fitted739
for fire protective measures to mitigate building losses and production losses, then740
that’s an appetite that the occupier needs to have. Which, again, goes back to your741
management of fire safety, isn’t it? How much do they want to invest in it so that742
they can deliver.743
A: It all boils; in my mind, it all boils down to the ignition. It is control of that744
ignition. If you have processes that use an ignition, it is controlled. If you have745
no processes that use an ignition and you have lots of flammable material, it is746
the control of any ignition, you know, through arson, through cigarettes, through747
whatever? That’s what fire safety management; that’s the essence of fire safety748
management is the control of that ignition.749
So, I think you have probably answered the second question; how does the manage-750
ment of fire safety assist in the protection of property or the continuity of business?751
I think we’ve probably answered that so I’ll skip to the third one.752
Do you think that a good standard of fire safety management reduces the likelihood753
of fire damage and, if so, do you think there is a parallel between the standard of754
fire safety management and the amount of fire damage?755
FSDM: I think the first part of that question is that, generally; if you have a good756
standard of fire safety management then it will reduce the likelihood of fire damage757
providing that the cause of the fire isn’t a deliberate act where the fire safety aspects758
have been mitigated by their actions. So, i.e. if I work in a loading-bay area where759
there is a high fire-loading but the fire protection aspects in there are really good,760
you know, no smoking, no naked lights, good compartmentation and so on; if I want761
to create damage, pin the doors open and set fire to something then, clearly, the762
losses are going to be greater. So I think it’s only controlled by the human factor763
of whether there is a correlation between good fire safety and the losses. If it’s a764
deliberate act then, clearly, it will be different and if you look at (company name765
removed), which I know that you were involved with many moons ago, you know,766
massive losses and you’d say that their fire protection was probably reasonable for767
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the time but, on face value, the size of building like that that you would think it768
would be good. But, of course, because of factors that occurred; total loss of a huge769
warehouse and, you know, multi-million pounds.770
A: Can I tell you my reflective considerations on (company name removed)?771
FSDM: Sure.772
A: Because, it never came out, because there is no evidence for it. You know, the773
fire investigation is to find evidence of what caused the ignition. The insurance774
companies who were working there, there were three or four insurance companies775
and, really, I was just looking over their shoulders to see what they were doing776
because they were investigating the fire. They were all concentrating on the site777
management and the deficiencies in the site management and the sprinkler ring778
main. And, I believe that’s what the settlement was all about; it was all the fault of779
the site management and, you know, they have to pay but what was paid, I don’t780
know? It never came to court, I think it was all settled out of court.781
It’s probably still going on for all I know. But, my own opinion is that the fire safety782
management was at fault because the duty manager at (company name removed)783
knew that the sprinkler system was inoperative, he perhaps didn’t understand why784
but he knew it was inoperative because he was told and; as did all the other duty785
managers on the site in the twenty-eight occupancies but they did nothing about it.786
Now that’s a fire safety management fault.787
FSDM: Absolutely.788
A: And, if they had have done something about it; I don’t know what they could789
have done but certainly they could have done a risk assessment, they could have790
assessed the risk, assessed it as high, as it was and, I don’t know; could have had791
people standing there with fire extinguishers or whatever, you know, till the fault792
was rectified.793
FSDM: And, I think that is based on this appetite of profit through your operation794
against the safety and security of your property which is clearly an aspect there795
that; we all know in this massive shed that there’s no water going to be deployed796
instantly there is a fire. That’s okay because we need to make money, we need to797
carry on working, we need to make the profits and that influence clearly outweighs798
any safety aspect at that site at that time because you would have liked them to799
have said; hang on a second, if there is a fire and there is no water we are going to800
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lose all of this. That’s going to be a massive problem for us and if we’re going to801
lose far more money than we are going to make by carrying on. So, should we just802
not shut for a week and get somebody back and make sure the sprinklers work and803
...804
A: That’s right.805
FSDM: ... that’s the management aspect of it, isn’t it, fundamentally?806
Going back to that question, if you have a good standard of fire safety management807
then, clearly, it will reduce the likelihood of fire damage, regardless of the cause, by808
the very nature that you have, you know, mechanisms in place and good management809
in relation to your training and your observance of your staff and it will reduce losses.810
A: So, do you think there’s a parallel between the particular standard of fire safety811
management; whether it’s good or bad, and the amount of damage that would ensue812
if a fire occurred or an ignition occurred?813
FSDM: Well, there has to be. They are linked, aren’t they? The; I think that it’s a814
difficult one to quantify based on the type of property involved.815
A: It’s something I would like to quantify with the data but, really, I’m just after816
your opinion.817
FSDM: (Long pause) Yes. The standard of fire safety management and the amount818
of fire damage; there has to be a parallel.819
A: There’s a, sort of, direct relationship between the two, don’t you think?820
FSDM: Yes, they’re inextricably linked. The better your fire safety management, the821
less damage that you’re ever going to lose and, if I go back to another example would822
be a high-bay warehouse with sprinklers that operate and staff that are trained and823
have extinguishers on site and anything else. Where a deliberately ignited fire in a824
palletised system within the rack which was, three o’clock in the morning, activated825
sprinklers which suppressed the fire. And, although the alarm system didn’t work, it826
was spotted by staff, it was extinguished as well by ten extinguishers and the losses827
were limited to £1000. Which was the value, roughly, of the; probably wasn’t £1000828
to the company but it would have been for me and you if we had gone and paid829
over the counter for it. So, a nominal £1000 fee in terms of product, clearly, time830
of people not being able to work due to the call and the post-investigation and so831
on, but it just shows you that their good fire safety measures reduced the damage.832
A: It doesn’t happen by luck, does it? It can’t happen by luck?833
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FSDM: No, it’s not a chance thing.834
A: That’s what (company name removed); really, the duty manager; he was just835
trusting to luck, wasn’t he?836
FSDM: Absolutely. So that, in that respect, no. And, if you had, you know, other837
systems in place where (pause), well, there’s another site that’s just opened up,838
that we’re aware of, in (place name removed). It’s (comapny name removed). It’s839
colossal, huge but the engineering solutions are such that, no matter what happens840
in there from a fire perspective, it would be alerted very quickly and there are841
sprinklers and, for the number of people that work there, which is low, this thing’s842
all automated, picking, fetching and carrying. It will probably look after itself before843
we get there some twenty minutes later.844
A: Providing everything’s maintained by fire safety management and works845
FSDM: Providing everything’s maintained. It works. Absolutely.846
So, today it will work great, brand new and it’s been commissioned and it’s fantastic.847
It’s three years down the line, is the question, is it still as good? Have the sprinklers 20 minutes848
been checked? Is the pipework still free of, you know, corrosion, blockages and so849
on? And that’s the interesting facet.850
A: It’s the engineering solutions, the fire safety engineering solutions that are doing851
away with the old compartmentation, the things that didn’t need maintaining, ex-852
cept the doors and that. You know, that have always existed and you didn’t need to853
bother about them, they contained the fire. Now, because of the restrictions of that,854
we have these fire-engineered solutions in place which rely on fire safety management855
and we don’t have, you know, we’re not upkeeping the management side of it.856
FSDM: And that goes back to the profits versus the time that you can’t use the857
site, doesn’t it? For the testing and maintenance.858
A: Let’s talk about unwanted fire signals. What are the benefits to the current859
fire and rescue service to reduce unwanted fire signals. As I see it, the benefits to860
the fire and rescue service are that it reduces the number of false calls they receive861
with a corresponding saving of time and money. Does it also lead to a reduction862
in the amount of fire damage? Or is there a correlation, a relationship between the863
unwanted fire signals campaign, you know, the CFOA campaign that’s been ongoing864
for quite a few years with all the, you know, the press exclamation and whatever,865
are the fire brigade going to do this or whatever? And all the commercial companies866
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and people like the, you know, these associations of companies who are suddenly867
having to say; the fire brigade won’t attend, you know, and what do we do instead?868
FSDM: I think there are a number of benefits. I think the first one for an organisation869
is for them, first and foremost, and again, through our engagement with them when870
we do attend and is to sort themselves out. Certainly through my career, you’ve871
been to the same place time and time again and its because an engineer hasn’t872
contacted whoever, to say that the alarm’s offline while we do this drilling work or873
it’s the kitchen steam again that has activated the one outside the corridor and it’s874
just been left and we’ve come away and you’d go again the week after and it would875
just be continual ..876
A: ... the same detector time after time after time.877
FSDM: Absolutely. But, of course, what we are saying now is, look there is a bit878
of pressure from you under the Regulatory Reform Order that you haven’t got the879
right assessment because it’s still happening, we’re still coming out. So that’s one880
attack and, of course, when we don’t go any more because of this issue of wanting881
to find out if there’s a fire or not? It puts the emphasis on the occupier to actually;882
(A) clarify, quickly, if there is a fire or not but also if there is, what are we going to883
do? The fire brigade have still not left yet till we tell them there’s definitely a fire.884
So, perhaps, we should do a bit more staff training, have the relevant extinguishers885
available because, again, part of the RRO2 suggests that you shouldn’t staff (??) by886
extinguishers to get out, you should actually get, you know, train your staff to go887
back and put it out to reduce the losses you’re going to entail if you left it.888
So, I think it’s a two-pronged approach.889
A: So that the likely result then would be a reduction in fire damage because of890
the characteristics you’ve just mentioned. But, was that ever the intention, do you891
think? You know, the motivation was; am I right in my saying that the motivation892
was to reduce the amount of time and effort that the fire brigade put into it?893
FSDM: Oh, I think, is that primarily, that is the reason for it. If you look at it894
again, I’m pulling figures out of the air; the number of AFAs3 that we attend far895
outweigh the number of confirmed fires. And, of course, the impact to the fire and896
rescue service in that respect is that we’ve not got the time then to do important897
training, risk information gathering as well as community safety work because we’re898
2RRO refers to the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
3AFA is an acronym for Automatic Fire Alarm.
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forever nipping up and down to wherever to say, sorry but you need to fill this form899
in because there’s no fire and it’s caused by steam, wrong detector, faulty system,900
you know, accidental breakage of a call-point which you don’t really need anyway901
and all these sorts of things.902
The driver was for us but, I think, the knock-on effect was that, you know, businesses903
can look at it from the viewpoint of improving their own management. And also904
enhancing their own systems in terms of staff and training.905
A: I’m not aware that that policy has been reviewed. Are you aware?906
FSDM: Do you meant the CFOA4 effect of it or locally within Leicestershire?907
A: Oh no, the CFOA driver, really, because the brigade’s have just picked up on;908
the fire and rescue service’s have just picked up on the CFOA driver, haven’t they?909
FSDM: I think, historically, a lot of things can be driven centrally and we pick them910
up and we never let go of anything. I think that was systematic of the fire service,911
wasn’t it? You know, we’ve been doing this for years and we never have; well why?912
Why now? Because we are going to get to a point where UFSs5 will, hopefully, get913
to a level that you think, well actually, that’s, we can tolerate that. You might get914
one or two occupants that have problems throughout the year but, on the whole,915
we tolerate it. Because the flip side is, we’re doing so much work in terms of filling916
forms, collating data, sending them letters to say that you’ve not complied. You’ve917
had three calls, for example, this month and we just need to remind you of your918
responsibilities and, if it continues we then send an FP Officer around to do an audit919
to make sure that things are all in place. But that’s generating our own work on the920
value of trying to reduce the number of calls that they have. So you have to hit a921
level where you say; I’m actually happy now. Because we need to save the resources922
in terms of letter-writing and sending officers out to do audits because we are at a923
point where we are happy and we can tolerate those levels. Because nothing is ever924
going to stop. You’re always going to get something occurring. It’s just knowing925
when that cut-off is? That might not be a decision that I am able to make.926
A: No. I find this toleration of things quite interesting. Because, when I joined927
the fire brigade, in the (name of location removed), we had forty-five deaths per928
year, on average. And people said that’s the natural thing, you know, you can’t do929
4CFOA is an acronym for Chief Fire Officer’s Association. The professional voice and supporting
organisation for the leaders of UK fire and rescue services.
5UFS is an acronym for Unwanted Fire Signals.
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anything about it, it’s just the natural figure. But then we started to do something930
about it and decided they weren’t all; some you could do something about because931
they were accidental, others you couldn’t because they were deliberate, you know,932
so that reduced the figures and it’s reduced to; I don’t know what the figure is now933
but it’s probably 50% of that, it’s probably twenty per year now in the (name of934
location removed). And I’m aware that the fire deaths is going down and it has for935
the past ten to fifteen years because of the efforts of community fire safety and so936
on; whereas the fire damage is going up and it’s still going up. No that’s, you know,937
we tolerate the number of deaths or, it was tolerated then but suddenly it wasn’t938
tolerated so we did something about it, but the fire damage, you know, we tolerated939
it then and it’s now here and we’re still tolerating it. I find that quite intriguing,940
the way, you know, the toleration. How and why we do that, I don’t quite know?941
FSDM: I think, for me, where I’m at at the minute, or where we are as a society942
at the moment, is that; there will be a number of different property types across943
the district in the county that you would still want to respond to. To an AFA in944
hospitals are clearly one example and hotels would be another one, for me. And the945
number of calls that we receive to such premises, you know, you would argue, yes,946
we can tolerate that because you expect to go. If the hospital across the road here947
had a call now you’d want to go because of the very nature of the profile of the staff948
and the patients that are in there. But, in terms of ‘Mr. Engineering’ around the949
corner that you’ve been to, probably, thirty or forty times over the last three years,950
you get to a point where; I don’t want to keep coming to you, because it’s the same951
reason every time. It’s what you do, it’s your process. You need to sort yourself out952
and change your, you know, your behaviour so that we don’t come because we’re953
going to ignore your system. And I know that some counties are doing that, aren’t954
they, some industrial properties that have AFAs completely, they’re not responding955
to or they’re going to charge if they do respond. But I wouldn’t want to go down956
that route, first and foremost.957
A: But that’s just the way of managing the situation, really, isn’t it?958
FSDM: Yes, but that figure to tolerate, I would suggest, is where we are at. I would959
be happy to tolerate a certain number of AFAs from certain properties but, you’re960
right, I wouldn’t want to tolerate a number of AFAs to other types of properties. It961
would be something I would want to reduce.962
A: I’m aware of your arguments with (the University Fire Safety Officer) are really963
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on detail.964
FSDM: Of course they are, yes.965
A: You’re actually traveling precisely in the same direction and there are only the966
little details that, because of the character that (name removed) is, you’re actually967
doing a fantastic thing and you’re both holding hands, walking into the sunset.968
FSDM: It starts with trying to influence, because you said that it’s about property969
influence in terms of losses but a lot of that is because of the people that are in the970
properties. They’ve got to be influenced.971
If you look at secondary fires, you know, the small deliberate stuff that you get; we’re972
at a point now where, unbelievably, it’s really, really low, and I’d love to tolerate973
those levels for the rest of my career because they are so low. To the point where I 30 minutes974
think I have two in a month in an area the size of Charnwood which is huge. You975
know, to only have two deliberate fires which are small, we’re only talking a bit of976
rubbish or a bit of litter or a waste bin in a park. That’s fundamentally fantastic and977
the reasons behind that, of why they are so low, I really don’t know. I’d like to guess,978
well, the weather clearly may be an issue, it’s been wet a lot lately maybe people979
are staying indoors and not going out but I also think that through the school’s980
programme that we’ve been doing for many a year, it’s embedded into young people981
now that there are dangers with fires and you need to, you know, be careful. I’d982
like to think that people that are now of working age have had this input and it’s983
stays with them. They’ve had reminders along the way with national campaigns984
and local ones and they are actually far more fire-savvy than they ever used to985
be; which, when you put them into the work environment, hopefully, reduces the986
impact that fires have on the businesses but the impact of fires within their working987
environment, full stop. I think, it’s not scientifically proven but I’m sure that that’s988
an influence.989
A: No, I’m just thinking of the times that my children pick me up on things (laughs).990
I guess you’re aware of the number of fire deaths, in the area that you administer,991
within the last twelve months.992
FSDM: Yes.993
A: You’ve just mentioned that you are aware of the number of deliberate fires within994
that area.995
FSDM: I am, yes.996
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A: Are you aware of the amount of fire damage or the economics of fire damage997
within the area you administer?998
FSDM: I’m totally unaware of that and, for the very nature that it doesn’t form999
part of our key service indicators where, clearly, we’re measurable on fire deaths and1000
the number of incidents we attend. Probably because they are reasonable targets for1001
you to measure performance. But I’m not entirely sure how the fire losses would be;1002
(A), collated and; (B), put into some sort of format that would target, you know, if1003
I was to sit here for next year’s figures to say, (author’s name), that I’m looking to1004
restrict fire losses to £1.4 million; I would have no idea where I would be plucking1005
that figure from?1006
A: Which brings me into my last question.1007
Do you think it would be beneficial to measure the operational performance of the1008
fire and rescue service with a performance metric that evaluates the efforts of com-1009
panies and organisations, such as Loughborough University, that can demonstrate1010
an improvement in business continuity or reduction of fire damage?1011
Now that pre-supposes that you can measure the amount of reduction; sorry, the1012
amount of improvement in business continuity or reduction of fire damage and that1013
you would be able, somehow, to relate that to the performance of a fire and rescue1014
service. (Pause) Do you think that the concept is good?1015
FSDM: But would that performance measure for the fire and rescue service? Sorry,1016
I can’t see where there is a link with our performance in relation to the management1017
of a site, for example. If you were to compare Charnwood District with North-West1018
Leicestershire, for example, which is similar in size, for argument’s sake. Certainly,1019
there are some similarities in terms of crime-rate and things like that. But for1020
me to state that we’ve had better savings in terms of fire losses than North-west1021
Leicestershire would be difficult to rationalise because their geographical make-up1022
and their risks that they have are really different to ours. They have a raft of1023
high-bay warehousing where there’s lots and lots of stock whereas we get quite a1024
lot; there’s still quite a few small engineering companies and there’s a few bits of1025
warehousing and so on. So to have a fire in North-west Leicestershire in a high-1026
bay warehouse could immediately result in far greater losses or lower ones, because1027
we spoke about (comany name removed) having little losses, you know, because1028
it was well-managed than it would be for a multi-occ place in Loughborough, for1029
example. And I’d really struggle to understand how our performance is monitored1030
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in that respect because, by the very nature of the fire-protective measures that are1031
fitted, if that contains the fire like we said about the pallet, so it’s local to a one-1032
palett of stock, that’s fantastic but we’ve done nothing to assist that. It’s been the1033
occupant, the actual owner of the property, through their own fire-engineering or1034
their perception of what is good management at their site; they’ve done it themselves1035
and we’ve had no influence whatsoever.1036
A: Well, we do have influence, don’t we? Because we look at the plans, we inspect1037
the plans of new premises, we inspect the fire safety solutions for...1038
FDSM: We do inspect but we’re less influential, I would suggest, than we used to be1039
and the (company name removed) property up the road; we’ve gone there and said1040
that, it’s fantastic, it’s huge but there are things that we would like fitting like a1041
protected stairwell which you haven’t supplied for us; and they said, well, no you’re1042
not having it becasue we spent all this money on all these other technologically-1043
advanced systems, we think this is suitable. So, we’re not involved. We are involved1044
with them, don’t get me wrong but we haven’t positively influenced them at all.1045
A: When the plan is passed with, you know, whatever fire safety solution is included,1046
you know, and that should be, sort of, in consultation with all the interested parties,1047
it dissolves down into the fire safety strategy to maintain that solution. And the1048
fire safety strategy; fire safety management is about maintaining that fire safety1049
strategy. So, in; if you think about it in a dwelling, you’ve identified the profile of1050
people most at risk and you’ve used all these different agencies to form partnerships1051
so that you can reach these people; give them advice, give them smoke alarms,1052
give them, you know, make them have fire risk assessments and so on, and reduced1053
the number of deaths because of that. Then couldn’t a similar view be taken on1054
properties that, like high-bay warehouses, that, you know, if they do catch fire, the1055
whole thing burns down. And I know there are other factors because I know they’re1056
designed, these days so that if they burn down they can just be; they don’t want1057
you to save them...1058
FSDM: No, they don’t. They’d just rather bulldoze it and start again.1059
A: They just want to bulldoze it and start again. Which isn’t good for; well, it isn’t1060
good for the environment but it might be good for their profits. It isn’t good for the1061
environment and it isn’t good for the people who work there. It would be far better1062
to prevent that fire in the first place, is my opinion. And the fire brigade, I think,1063
could have some; in the way that you’ve tackled yourself with accidental fires in1064
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dwellings, you could also tackle yourself with fire safety management in properties1065
that have got the potential of the biggest loss or the most frequent loss or whatever?1066
FSDM: I don’t dispute what you say but I think; my opinion, at the minute, would1067
be the fact that within that domestic property where we are trying to both influence1068
the person who lives there as well as make the property safer, the net result is, we’re1069
saving life. Within an organisation where people are awake, mainly, whilst they’re1070
at work, we’re not that bothered if you lose your property at the moment, are we?1071
Because we’re on about the life risk again. As long as my little green indicator1072
says that we’ve had no non-domestic casualties or fire fatalities then I’m, or this1073
organisation, at the moment is achieving well. The fact that we’ve lost fourteen1074
premises or put half of Loughborough out of work on the value of it, isn’t our fault1075
and it’s not something that we’re marked up on.1076
A: This is my argument about toleration, really. Why it intrigues me, because we1077
tolerate this; I think it’s something like £8.5 billion per year at the moment in fire1078
costs. You know, no indication of how many jobs that are lost or the devastation1079
to people’s lives or whatever? You know, we just tolerate all (laughs) that but we1080
only; we deal with something that we don’t think society will tolerate and that’s1081
the number of fire deaths.1082
FSDM: Does that figure; because, obviously, from an insurance perspective most1083
premises will have insurance that will cover that and, you know, there are some1084
organisations that don’t have insurance or fire cover because it’s just cheaper to1085
accept the fact that; well, we’ve lost the building, by the time we build another one1086
then it’s cheaper than having a premium so that, you know, there are a number of1087
factors that people work to. Whereas, and again, that’s for the business aspect to1088
look at, that’s their business, they’re making their profit and you crack on. But Mr1089
Soap and his property with his family, we don’t want you involved in fire so we are1090
going to just, you know, concentrate our efforts on you. And that’s where we are at1091
the moment. I don’t see any shift in that respect.1092
A: No (laughing). I can’t see any shift, either.1093
FSDM: The shift that we have, I think, with the non-commercial properties is just 40 minutes1094
knowing that we know a bit about that property and, if we perceive it to be a threat1095
to the firefighters attending, the staff that are in it; the environment comes, you1096
know, down that level as does the societal issue of people being unemployed, you1097
know, out of work and so on.1098
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A: The environmental legislation isn’t very effective, is it? Because there is, you1099
know, there are responsibilities on you for the environment but they’re not enforced1100
at all, are they?1101
FSDM: No. Not. We’ve done some work on the effects that we can make at a fire in1102
terms of; if we take direct action, obviously, it affects the environment in a greater1103
way than a fire on it’s own would have done. And, obviously, we could be culpable1104
for that.1105
Probably, about two or three years ago, we started looking at that in some intensity1106
but I’m not aware of anything that has ever come back yet and bit us in the backside.1107
And again, from an environmental perspective, without it being a fire involved, you1108
don’t hear that many issues where people are being prosecuted for it. Or, I certainly1109
don’t at my level.1110
A: The amount of pollution that (company name removed) caused, you know, you1111
would think, in the cold light of day, there’d be some sanction that environmental1112
legislation could do?1113
FSDM: Unfortunately, what happens there, again there’ll be, and there is a raft of1114
insurance policies that cover environmental damage for your property and it’s just1115
more of your profit going to another insurance policy. And you’ll, you know, influ-1116
ence that by changing the way that you work, You’ll alter your margins, might not1117
get your sprinklers serviced so often? (laughs ironically) So, it’s a local management1118
issue, isn’t it for each property?1119
A: It is, it is. Thank you for that, (name removed), that’s good.1120
Just to finish off then, I’ve got this list here of, one, two, three, four, five points and1121
I’ve termed them, the general viewpoint of a fire service officer. I’ll just go through1122
them and I’ll let you read them so that you can; because what I wanted to do is to1123
put them in their order of importance. So the general viewpoint of someone in your1124
position is to police the requirements of regulations, reduce the number of calls for1125
assistance, measure the operational performance of a local; of this station or it’ll be1126
your area. Respond to calls with the correct response and to reduce the number of1127
unwanted fire signals. Now you may disagree with some of those you may say that1128
that’s not conclusive or comprehensive? Which is great but, I think, what I’m really1129
looking for is an order of importance.1130
FSDM: Sure. I would suggest for me as a District Manager, the most important1131
one continues to be to reduce the number of calls, regardless of what its for, in the1132
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district. If you look at my chart on the wall, (author’s name), you’ll see a raft of1133
key performance indicators and the main ones are; the number of fires, secondarys,1134
RTCs6 we attend, how many other emergencies have we been to? False alarm calls,1135
which you’ll see is low, in green. So that raft there is all about the number of1136
incidents we go to. That’s the number of injuries and deaths from fire, RTC. This is1137
whether we’re assessed as a high-performing fire and rescue service i.e. the number1138
of properties attended more than once for false calls. You can see where the list is1139
coming?1140
A: I can, yes1141
FSDM: That’s the percentage of incidents attended in accordance with our times1142
and then I’ve got the level of staff availability and the availability of my appliances.1143
So, they’re the key elements for me which, if you go through your list; reducing the1144
number of calls would be my priority. Reducing the ...1145
A: If you think they’re equal ...1146
FSDM: They’re all fairly equal, as I said before. The number of calls is one aspect1147
which ties in with reducing the number of unwanted because they’re, obviously,1148
inextricably linked. Responding to calls with the correct response is something that1149
we are measured on but I think it falls below the operational performance of the1150
stations; i.e. the attendance times, the number of riders and the availability of that1151
lorry. So I would say those two; do you want me to mark on the paper?1152
A: Yes, please.1153
FSDM: I think that they’re clearly number 1, as that is as well. We need to make1154
sure that that happens. Responding to the calls with the correct response; is that1155
in terms of the PDA7 so that the right number of lorries have turned out?1156
A: The right number of lorries and the right types of lorries and the right types of1157
people.1158
FSDM: (Pause) Yes. That’s probably a bit of a ‘gimme’ from a Control perspective1159
as opposed to my, sort of, monitoring. That’s Control’s element that does that,1160
albeit we know, we do review risks on a timely basis to make sure that the PDA1161
is proportionate. So, certainly for Category 3 risks and Category 1 risks, not even1162
6RTC is an acronym for Road Traffic Collision.
7PDA refers to the Pre-Determined Attendance; the calculated number and type of fire appliances
that should be sent to the incident.
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Category 1? That we, just by attending, you’d know in the big work done by the1163
guys, we’ve gone in with this many pumps and we didn’t need it. Bearing in mind1164
we are generic. We have a two-pump PDA for every building.1165
A: It also includes, you know, if your first attendance goes in there and finds the, you1166
know, the whole thing was a fire safety management disaster, then it also includes1167
asking fire safety inspectors to come along.1168
FSDM: Yes. That’s not something that we record. It would be an expectation of1169
the crews attending, to be fair. Did we deal with the incident correctly, I think, is1170
an issue which would be listed. And to police the requirements of the regulations,1171
for me, is not necessarily high on my agenda because our FP Team8 will obviously1172
undertake those results, albeit, I’m clearly conscious of anything that isn’t in accor-1173
dance; , because of the impact that it may have on the safety of our guys turning1174
up as well as those that are, obviously, in the property. And also from the fact that1175
if we do mobilise to the site, the guys here have on their tip-out sheet the fact that1176
there is a prohibition on and it is for this reason. So that if they turn up and they1177
find that it’s been breached, they can obviously inform the FP Officer. So they can1178
take their action in that respect. So, I’m going to join; I’m going to cheat. I’m going1179
to say that they’re equally 2s. (laughter)1180
There’s no one to six or one to five, look, they’re all obviously important aspects but1181
in terms of the Regulations of both, it’s for the occupant to police their own proce-1182
dure; sorry, fire safety measures. In fairness, they’ve got to manage it themselves,1183
should I say, from a policing perspective, we would obviously go in from an audit1184
point of view. Again, I say, in a timely fashion we would go if we felt there was a1185
need. i.e. the number of UFSs attended, for example, and the number of calls we’ve1186
attended for other reasons. But, in terms of a time-line, it’s not that straight-cut be-1187
cause you may have national influences which just take, you know, waste recycling’s1188
suddenly a problem because we’ve had a number of incidents around the county or1189
around the country. We may then focus on that. Public houses may be an issue1190
at the minute due to lots of issues within the licensing trade that the training and1191
the fire protective measures is, you know, low order. Because it’s about trying to1192
get people through the doors and selling beer. That might be a priority that they1193
have at the minute because, it’s clearly, you know, it’s a difficult time for them so,1194
auditing licensing or licensed premises, should I say, may be more important than1195
8Fire Prevention Team.
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they were maybe four or five years ago. We used to go ourselves, didn’t we, many1196
years ago? Not for the beer but to go and make sure that, you know, lighting was1197
working, the old ‘during performance’ inspections.1198
A: DP Inspections.1199
FSDM: They fell off the cliff.1200
A: Do we not do those any more?1201
FSDM: No. Not for many a year.1202
A: (Name removed), you’ve been great and I appreciate, I really appreciate your1203
time because I know how busy you must be. 48 minutes
48 seconds
1204
Clarified by e-mail on 18 December 2012 (the day after the interview):
Author: If I described your service/career as more oriented towards operational fire
and rescue activities than fire safety engineering and regulatory activities, would
this be a fair statement?
FSDM: You are correct with your assumptions to a degree although my remit covers
all activity within Charnwood, I obviously cannot monitor all elements of work we
do. My performance is measured by the operational output of my crews and the
number of incidents we attend, so naturally that is my focus.
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Author: What is your full title?1205
GMFPP: Group Manager Fire Protection but I’m currently Group Manager Fire1206
Protection and CSSG. So it’s Prevention and Protection, side of things1207
Author: Okay. So, experience. How many years have you in the fire brigade?1208
GMFPP: 26 years.1209
Author: How many of those have you been working with fire safety, specifically?1210
GMFPP: Oh, er, probably fourteen, fifteen at most.1211
Author: Fourteen or fifteen?1212
GMFPP: Yes. A lot of it seems to have been in FP.1213
Author: So, I have already done two interviews so I’ve got; I’m informed about1214
how (name removed), the fire safety manager at Loughborough University views his1215
role. I’m aware of how (name removed), who is the local District Manager; I know1216
you know that but I’m trying to put it into context. That is the reason I have1217
interviewed (name removed), he is the local fire service officer who is responsible for1218
Loughborough University. Yourself, in context, you are giving the county-wide view1219
of an inspecting officer and then (name removed) will give the viewpoint from the1220
insurance industry. So, I’ve already been informed of how (name removed) sees his1221
role and how (name removed) sees his role; so I’m interested in how you see your1222
role.1223
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I don’t want to put you on the spot or anything, that’s not my intention and although1224
this will be transcribed, it will be anonymised. So your name won’t be referred to;1225
your position will but not your name. And, of course, this will then be an Appendix1226
in the thesis that goes forward for my Master’s degree. That’s put it into context.1227
So, it’s about fire safety management and I’m; I think I’ve stumbled on this because1228
I’m impressed by the way (name removed) manages fire safety on the University1229
Campus. He’s got, I don’t know, Two hundred buildings? A big site. I have the1230
fire incident records; fire incident data for five years; five-year’s worth. So I’ve been1231
looking through that and I’ve seen the number of incidents; the number of times that1232
the fire alarm goes off, the number of times that that’s an actual fire and the number1233
of times that he calls for assistance from the fire brigade to come and assist him to1234
deal with a fire. The figures; when I first looked at them, they looked ridiculous,1235
I didn’t believe them to be honest, because the number of times he calls the fire1236
brigade or the fire brigade get called to the site is so few, considering the number of1237
times that an alarm goes off.1238
So I’m quite impressed at the way he does his job so what I would like to do is1239
principalise the way he does his job to see if that could be extended into; you know,1240
principles that could be applied to other industries, perhaps the fire brigade could1241
take them up, you know, with a strategy of tackling fire safety management or1242
whatever? That’s the thrust of what I’m trying to do. But it’s come from the fact1243
that I’m impressed by the way (name removed) does his job.1244
Now I don’t know whether you know (name removed)? He can be quite abrasive1245
at times. He is very, you know, he knows what he wants and he will try and get1246
it and he is a very practical man and he thinks practically rather than, you know,1247
intellectually. Which is really, as far as the University is concerned, he is a really1248
good employee. So I don’t know what your opinion of him is but that’s the reason,1249
I’m quite impressed with what he does.1250
So, the questions that I’m going to put to you, I’ve put to both (name removed)1251
and (name removed) and I shall put them to (name removed) as well; to try and1252
get a consistency in the interviews. So the first question then is; How does the1253
management of fire safety assist a company or an organisation and, I would be1254
obliged if you would think, University Campus in the context of Leicestershire. How1255
does the management of fire safety assist a company or an organisation to meet the1256
requirements of regulation and the scrutiny of regulatory inspections? How does1257
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that process...1258
GMFPP: Well, for a start, it makes my job an awful lot easier doesn’t it? Because1259
you’ve got the practical hands-on approach in relation; like you’ve just said; (name1260
removed) tends to be quite practically based. And so, if there’s an issue or a problem,1261
he will contact us. He does liaise with our guys quite regularly and I think that;1262
the practical approach, that’s, going around and making sure that the fire doors1263
are, you know, as they should be; basically the fire safety provisions there and it’s1264
operating as it should be. It helps massively because what we can do, effectively,1265
as inspectors and regulators is, if we’re looking at one of the buildings, we can walk1266
in; we know we don’t need to go into significant detail because we can see instantly1267
that that maintenance is being; the building is being looked after and maintained1268
in the way it should be. So, from our perspective, from a fire service or regulators1269
perspective, it makes it a lot easier.1270
I think, generally, I mean, University aside, there’s a different focus to fire, the way1271
that fire service’s operate and carry out regulation now is different to what it was,1272
certainly, two to three years ago and that’s really being pushed by the Government,1273
at the moment. Is that working in partnership, is that working with business, trying1274
to make sure that we make things easier.1275
Author: But you’re concentrating on fire; life safety rather than property protec-1276
tion? Because that’s what the law demands. Is there any consideration of property1277
protection.1278
GMFPP: Yes, there is. There is, particularly, like I say, because of the push the1279
the Government have at the moment in relation to working with business, working1280
in partnership and trying to achieve a sufficient and satisfactory level of fire safety,1281
without going to gold standard, if you like? But part of that, really, is the push on;1282
is trying to push that. If you do this right, if you spend ten minutes of your time1283
looking at the fire safety issues then you could save yourself an awful lot of time in1284
the long run. Because if you do, you know, there’s the whole business continuity1285
side of it and, obviously, things like the fire doors, the fire safety provisions and1286
whatever, if; yes, primarily, we’re concerned with life safety, but if they’re in there1287
working, obviously they’re going to have quite an impact. Certainly when we draw1288
up our inspection programme, that’s one of the things that features; is how many1289
fires have we had in certain types of premises where it’s spread beyond the room of1290
origin. So, yes, it does, you know, automatically defaults to property protection as1291
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well as the life safety side of things. And it’s certainly become much more of a focus1292
more recently.1293
Author: When you do an audit? The audit, sort of; property protection isn’t a focus1294
of the audit, it’s life safety that’s the focus of the audit ...1295
GMFPP: Yes, life safety is the focus of the audit.1296
Author: ... property protection is just by default.1297
GMFPP: Yes, almost, yes.1298
Author: So there’s no actual positive consideration of it?1299
GMFPP: I think any good inspector would be considering that side of it as well. I1300
think we’re slightly; (pause) I think the officers that we have now have got a wider 10 minutes1301
perspective and a wider view of the whole fire safety side of it, and it will come1302
into things like arson prevention; advice on that side of things; advice on security1303
but without compromising life safety; and, like I said, the real crux and the real1304
push at the moment, is that business; it’s getting business operating, getting it up1305
and operating as safe as we can do without it spending thousands and thousands1306
on unnecessary fire precautions. So, it seems; I suppose it could be seen as slightly1307
contradictory, we’re not going for the gold standard, we’re going for the; which is1308
what we always did, (author’s name), isn’t it? If you actually look back to the1309
old Fire Precautions Act, when we were doing that. You specified the minimum1310
required standard, not the gold standard and that’s where the focus was. Well1311
that’s effectively what we’re trying to go back to now but we’re trying to be more1312
proactive in the way that we undertake the inspection work because we went through1313
a series; you’re probably fully aware of this but when the Workplace Regs replaced1314
the Fire Precautions Act, and then subsequently, the Fire safety Order replaced the1315
Workplace Regs, there was this period where it was a case of, just tell them they1316
don’t comply and that seemed to be the general view nationally. Don’t give them1317
any information, don’t give them any guidance, just say, that doesn’t, you know,1318
your risk assessment isn’t suitable and sufficient because of A, B and C. And the1319
approach has completely changed, completely changed.1320
There is now a push, for example, and I know; stop me if I’m wandering off with1321
this but CFOA, you know, CFOA currently, rather than the department; now what1322
was the directorate? The Enforcement Working Group is now the Business Safety1323
Group. So they’ve acknowledged, there’s been this acknowledgement that they’ve1324
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got to embrace the changes that Government are pushing and so that’s reflected in1325
the change of title. And there’s a real push at the moment to support business to1326
grow; and that’s, obviously, being pushed through CFOA via local Government but1327
we’re getting influence from the Better Regulation Delivery Office via the Depart-1328
ment for Business Innovation and Skills. So there’s two angles that we’re getting1329
approaches from, at the moment, that are trying to push this; and we’re actually1330
quite lucky; as Leicestershire, we are, probably, the front runner in relation to work-1331
ing in partnership with the regulators. We’ve got the Better Business for All; well,1332
it was set up, blimey, about two years ago now to bring regulators together and look1333
at how we can work in partnership; how we work together; how we can reduce the1334
burdens to business and, on the back of that, we have a steering group that’s been1335
set up and we’ve set up a regulatory services partnership group as well. So there’s1336
lots going on in relation to trying to bring things together, make things simpler.1337
But, going back to your original point (laughs), yes, the focus is the life safety but1338
the property side of it does fall into part, we are giving more advice on that side of1339
it and trying to ensure that we don’t end up with, you know, a small fire developing1340
and taking a whole business out of operation.1341
Author: So you are taking account of the two thrusts, then? You are taking account1342
of the thrust from the Better Regulation and Business Innovation. You know they’re;1343
I mean, they’re presumably concerned about the number of businesses that go out1344
of business because of things such as fire, emergencies, such as fire that they go on1345
that they could deal with if they tried?1346
GMFPP: Yes. The primary focus is to reduce regulatory burdens; that is what1347
their primary focus is; that’s the push from Government so; but, I think, almost by1348
default, it, sort of, it still slots into that because it is, it’s assisting business to grow,1349
it’s making life simpler and giving you advice and assistance to help that should,1350
sort of, hopefully make sure that, you know, we don’t end up in a fire situation1351
and losing a business; because, as you know, the majority of businesses just won’t1352
recover from a major fire.1353
Author: Well (laughs). I mean I know that statistic that 80% of businesses, if they1354
suffer a fire, they won’t be in business next year but I don’t know where that’s1355
come from and I can’t find out where that’s come from; and I know that one of the1356
businesses that had the biggest fire that Leicestershire’s ever had, (company name1357
removed), where it wiped out half of it’s business stock, its clothing stock, is still in1358
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business. So I’m not sure about that statistic at all!1359
GMFPP: I don’t know; we’ve had the one recently just down the road, haven’t we?1360
(name of location removed)?1361
Author: Oh, (company name removed)?1362
GMFPP: I don’t know; it would be interesting to see how, you know, how that1363
pans out and where they stand at the end of; whether, you know, whether it can1364
continue to operate in the same vein or whether the business ends up folding? Be1365
an interesting one to keep an eye on, really?1366
Author: Yes, because it wiped out, more or less, the whole of the business. I read1367
something about, they were hoping to save the servers so some of the information1368
would have been saved. But; okay. Good answer (laughter).1369
My second question, then, which I think you have already covered to a certain1370
extent; how does the management of fire safety assist in the protection of property1371
or the continuity of business. I think, probably, you’ve already referred to that. It’s1372
...1373
GMFPP: I mean, I think fire safety management is crucial to anything, isn’t it?1374
It’s the management of fire safety that is the crucial factor. Because, if you’re1375
not managing it, your fire safety provision is never going to be; it will deteriorate1376
overtime. You know you’re leaving yourself wide open. So that is a crucial factor, the1377
management; and I think you can probably walk into most buildings, in reality, talk1378
to whoever is responsible for fire safety; you can normally, pretty quickly establish1379
that they’ve got a good fire safety management system, in which case, you really1380
shouldn’t be spending too much time focusing on, you know, wandering round and1381
inspecting every cubby-hole and every; you really should be taking a step back and1382
really, accepting that they the management side of things is well covered. And, as1383
such, the rest should slot into place.1384
Author: What you are saying is that you walk into a place, you take in the at-1385
mosphere and you make an assessment as to how you are going to deal with that1386
company.1387
GMFPP: Yes, you do and it’s that liaison, that initial liaison with the Responsible1388
Person that will give you a good indication as to whether, you know, whether it’s1389
something we really need to go to town with or whether it’s something that you’re1390
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satisfied with the management system is in being and is a solid, sound system and1391
there’s very little to worry about.1392
Author: There is guidance on that, I’ve read guidance on that; CFOA; as to how1393
you’re dealt with by the company is, to a certain extent, prescribes how you should1394
deal with the company. I need to look that up again.1395
GMFPP: Yes, but I think, to be honest, (author’s name), that’s fairly standard1396
stuff. We did that anyway when we were inspectors. We did that; it was something1397
that you just automatically did. If you’d got somebody who was positive and could,1398
pretty much, show you the detail, no, not so much the detail but the overall plan1399
and some of the detail, you normally got a pretty good idea that you needn’t spend1400
a great deal of time on it. I think that one of the issues, it’s funny this, because I’ve1401
been out with all the inspectors over the past twelve months on various inspections1402
and it’s nice to see that they adapt to suit the scenario or situation that they are in.1403
And they very much do that; their approach would be very much different from going1404
to a very plush sort of office building which we don’t look at a great deal, in fairness,1405
anyway, to, maybe, a little factory unit which has been selected randomly from the1406
database. But, it’s interesting to see the approach of the different inspectors because,1407
I mean, I’ve been in with one; and there is some education on the inspectors side,1408
as well in relation to this, if we’re walking in we can see straight away that, pretty1409
much, things are as they should be. The liaison with the Responsible Person is;1410
you’re getting good feedback from that; they’re able to demonstrate some very good1411
examples of what they’re doing; should we really be wandering around spending1412
time when we could, effectively, be using our time elsewhere? And, it’s one of those1413
things; it’s trying to get people; because I think maybe, me sitting on their shoulder1414
is; they’re approaching what they are doing slightly differently because they want1415
to make it; you know, they want to make sure that they’re demonstrating that they1416
can conduct a thorough inspection.1417
Author: What are the criteria that bring you there in the first place?1418
GMFPP: It’s simply about me keeping up to speed with what the inspectors are1419
doing.1420
Author: Well, what I was thinking about is how do you prioritise. Do you, pre-1421
sumably, prioritise on the life safety basis because you follow the matrix in the1422
guidance?1423
GMFPP: Yes we do. That forms part of how we do it because we don’t stick solidly1424
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to that. Because, otherwise, we’re going back to the same buildings over and over1425
and over again and I’ve got a limited resource. What I need to do is make sure that1426
we look at the bigger picture in relation to this. I’ve got; there’s a; I’ve got a draft1427
of some guidance around putting together an inspection programme. Which, I’m1428
more than happy to e-mail through to you, if you want. You know, to have a look 20 minutes1429
at it, But it’s not just life safety it is; because if you look at the stats where we have1430
the problems, so we look at the stats for, maybe, the last three years; where have1431
we had the problems, where are the issues, where have we had, as I said before,1432
where have we had a fire that’s spread beyond the room of origin? What type of1433
premises? So we identify, you know, where we need to focus out attention and it is1434
about focusing our attention, these days, we haven’t got; we’ve got; I’ve got eleven,1435
twelve inspectors currently, which will soon be reduced to eleven inspectors. So I1436
need to make sure that best use is being made of those inspectors and that they are1437
going to the right place.1438
But we get an awful lot more referrals than we’ve ever had before; or concerns coming1439
in from partners and from the operational personnel. There is a much better link1440
now with Ops than there ever has been before. So they come across a problem, they1441
fire it through to us and we pick it up and deal with it. So...1442
Author: They’re better informed then?1443
GMFPP: Yes, very much so.1444
Author: And more motivated, I suppose?1445
GMFPP: Yes. The whole way, and I know I’m drifting off again so just pull me back;1446
the whole way the department works now is, we’re more mobile based. So, officers;1447
once we’ve decided what the type of premises that we want to focus our attention1448
on, are; we’ll randomly generate inspections based on when they were last inspected1449
and whatever, and we’ll divide them up between officers. The officers tend to be1450
geographically located, you know, we try and locate the inspections geographically1451
around where they live, their home address. So that we’re making best use of1452
transport arrangements and we’re making best use of time. Now we can’t always1453
achieve that as you appreciate. We’ve got some people in the city, we’ve got some1454
people who live right out on the edges of the county. But wherever possible, we try1455
and, you know, do that to make best use.1456
So yes, I suppose going back to the point why I’m going and sitting on the shoulders1457
of the inspectors. It’s really because we’ve got this mobile set up. We’re not all in1458
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the office. It’s not, certainly not like (name of fire station removed) was when you1459
used to work there and we seemed to have stacks and stacks of people up on the1460
top floor there. We’re just not, you know; it’s very rare to see one of the inspectors1461
actually in the office now.1462
Author: Just a point about the twelve inspectors you’ve got. Are they all serving1463
firefighters ...1464
GMFPP: They’re all, well ...1465
Author: ... or have you got graduates who have come in?1466
GMFPP: No. We’ve not (name removed), who’s done the fire engineering degree1467
and the Masters. We’ve got (name removed) at the moment who is in his last year1468
of his degree course.1469
Author: Up at Preston?1470
GMFPP: Yes. There’s a request come in via (name removed) to slot somebody else1471
on which, at the moment, there’s a little bit of resistance about. So (name removed)1472
currently doing a little bit of work around the justifications and what have you that1473
surround that? But we’re predominantly Watch Managers who are, either promoted1474
in or maybe, they’ve transferred across. And we’ve got two fire control operators or1475
ex-fire control operators who’ve, basically, been moved into the department when1476
we had the re-structure around Fire Control and, obviously, knew what was going1477
to happen with the Regional Fire Control. So we’ve ended up with two Green-book1478
inspectors out of that as well. So, and they are, probably, two years into being there1479
so that they’re at the point now where they’re actually going to start delivering,1480
you know, some good results, hopefully.1481
So yes. There’s a mixture and the only graduates, as such, are those that go through1482
the degree, you know, go through the process up at Lancashire, there and end up1483
with a degree course out of it. So, there are no others. Certainly I haven’t; I’m not1484
a ...1485
Author: That was the thinking, I mean it’s no guarantee that a firefighter coming1486
up from the watches into fire safety is going to be any better than a graduate off a1487
degree course.1488
GMFPP: Well. I’ve got a viewpoint on this which I’m quite happy to share with1489
you and it’s based around my experience of work we’ve done around the other1490
regulators. Now, I’m talking regulators right across the board; Health and Safety1491
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Executive, Environment Agency. local Environmental Health, Housing; there’s a1492
huge number of regulators that we’ve got working together. We carried out a; we,1493
basically, carried out a; it was like a training session but it was really based around;1494
I say there must have be around twelve, thirteen, fourteen regulators all represented1495
at (name of venue removed). We used the boxes there, up on the top floor, and you1496
actually went from box to box to box to box and you got some input from everybody.1497
So, it could have been, you know, it could have been Environment Agency; it could1498
have been Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Health and Safety. So you got an1499
appreciation of how each one operates but the approach; well, there’s been some1500
work done locally about the approach of regulators and how regulators, sort of,1501
carry out their work, and certainly, some of our guys have been out with the other1502
regulators to see how they operate and the one thing that comes back is, they can1503
be quite, sort of, almost officious, at times, in the way they go about it. And I; the1504
way that the fire safety guys go about it; now I can speak from experience because1505
I’ve been out with them and I’ve seen the approach that’s used and all the rest of1506
it, and I think that we’re ahead of the game as far as taking firefighters and actually1507
getting them to do the inspection work; and the reason that I say that is because1508
the way they approach people.; and as firefighters and as Crew Managers and Watch1509
Managers, they’ve been confronted with pretty horrible situations, you know, along1510
the way; and the way that they deal with those panic situations, the way they try1511
and calm the situation down, they adapt to suit the situation they’re faced with; I1512
think carries over into that other side of regulation. So I think that the way; if you1513
take a firefighter that’s been in those scenarios then you put them in; really there’s1514
nothing going to faze them to be confronted with; and they’re more relaxed about1515
the way that they carry out their inspection work and their regulatory work; and I1516
think, I’ve made this point more recently at an event that I attended and there was1517
general agreement that there were two things that worked in our favour. One was1518
that, the approach by the individuals and the second was that we’re in a uniform.1519
A uniform makes a huge difference.1520
So yes, whilst we could; we’ve already, sort of, laid the ground. The Green book1521
inspectors coming in and there’s nothing to say that in the future we won’t be pulling1522
graduates or people from other areas in to conduct inspection work. But I do think,1523
at the moment, we have a slight advantage in the way we operate, the perception1524
of us, I suppose?1525
Author: From my experience looking at other brigades it seems as if the fire safety1526
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departments are made up of exactly the same attitude as you seem to have, is that1527
there’s nothing substantially wrong with graduates coming in but you have to retain1528
this core of experienced officers who can deal with the, you know, the prohibitions,1529
prosecutions and so on. Because they have to be dealt with, you know, quite; it’s1530
not easy to deal with prosecutions and you need a certain amount of experience and1531
aplomb and, you know, gravitas to deal with those things.1532
GMFPP: I think it’s also really advantageous to have that basic knowledge of fire-1533
fighting techniques and the way that we go about carrying out firefighting operations1534
because if you’ve got that background, you know; a really simple example, (author’s1535
name removed), you know, that we can always, sort of, say is about the half-hour1536
fire-door on the basement and the half-hour fire-door on the ground floor. And that,1537
when you’re sitting in a meeting with Building Control and fire engineers and all the1538
rest of it, and they’re saying, no, no, no, we’re just going to put one one-hour fire1539
door on the, you know, at the basement level there or whatever? You just think. Let1540
me explain. You have to go back and explain why we want the two half-hour doors1541
rather than the one, you know, the single one-hour door. And arguing the toss with,1542
not so much architects but certainly fire engineers; there’s another good example, if1543
I take a fire engineer that I; we had a debate around what was satisfactory and what1544
was not? This fire engineer was ex-fire service so had a really good understanding,1545
an appreciation but his argument was based around ventilation requirements on a1546
protected; on a firefighting shaft. And, the point that he made and quite right, I had1547
to concede in the end. I could not argue against what he’d put forward was the fact1548
that he says, I can meet your ventilation requirements in this existing building but1549
to do that, I’m going to have to cut the lobby down in size. Now there’s no specified1550
size around that lobby so I’m going to cut it down to whatever it ended up being? I1551
can’t remember the dimensions. He says, alternatively, I can give you the full lobby1552
so that you can lay out hose and you can base operations around there but your1553
ventilation won’t be quite so good. Which one am I going to opt for? I’m always1554
going to go for give me something I can use to carry out firefighting operations. So, 30 minutes1555
a really good example of someone who’s come in that was a fire engineer that had1556
got a basic knowledge of firefighting techniques and the way we go about things.1557
Author: What’s missing from that, and you’ll probably agree with this, is how the1558
occupant is going to use it anyway? That’s what is missing from that debate. I’ve1559
always felt that is an inadequacy of these arguments that I have had with architects1560
and Building Control. What’s missing is the; the person who is going to occupy it1561
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is going to prop the doors open because he can’t use the space anyway.1562
GMFPP: Yes, absolutely. No, you’re too right but a lot of fire safety legislation1563
is great, you know, for the built environment when we’re putting certain things on1564
doors or certain ventilation requirements. Buy you know that within twelve months,1565
if the fire safety management isn’t good, there’s going to be windows, you know,1566
secured closed that are there for ventilation or something else is going to be done1567
that compromises fire safety. And that is one of my biggest concerns, really, about1568
the whole fire-engineered solutions and whatever else. Fantastic on paper and they1569
look great, you know, but ultimately, you have to think ten years down the line.1570
Are those that are sitting in that building there, you know, realistically, are they1571
going to have the knowledge? You’d like to think so but I tend to think that they1572
will have completely forgotten by; (name of company removed) is a great example;1573
we’re lucky, we have a great management team down there...1574
Author: Sorry, where was that?1575
GMFPP: (Name of company removed). A great example of where we compromise,1576
we bend, we try and, you know, come up with alternative solutions and they’re1577
fantastic; they’re based on limiting the mall space or something to that effect. And1578
you know that there’s creep over time. Try and see if we can get a bit more here or1579
there. What was that smoke curtain put in for in the first place? Nobody knows1580
and nobodies willing to go right back and look at the initial application to justify1581
it. So the next thing we get, you know, we’ll take it down and you’ve compromised1582
the whole fire-engineered solution.1583
Author: Yes, I know exactly what you are on about.1584
Do you think that a good standard of fire safety management reduces the likelihood1585
of fire damage and, if so, do you think there’s a parallel between the standard of fire1586
safety management and the amount of fire damage?1587
GMFPP: A very difficult one to answer? I certainly think that the fire safety1588
management ...1589
Author: It’s purely your opinion. I’ve not given you any data to go on.1590
GMFPP: No, I do. I think that’s a fair point because, as we pointed out right at1591
the start, if a fire door closes and does what it is supposed to do then, obviously,1592
you’re going to contain any fire in a given area. So, I think there’s direct correlation1593
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there. Yes, between the fire safety management and the containment of any fire in1594
the building. (Pause). I just wouldn’t argue with that, (author’s name removed).1595
Author: That’s a yes.1596
GMFPP: Yes, absolutely.1597
Author: What are the benefits of the current fire and rescue campaign to reduce1598
unwanted fire signals? What are the benefits of that? The benefit, as I see it, the1599
benefits for the fire and rescue service are that it reduces the number of false calls1600
they receive with a corresponding saving of time and money, but does it also lead to1601
a reduction in the amount of fire damage? Is there an unintended purpose to it or1602
is there a further intended purpose to the campaign to reduce unwanted fire calls?1603
GMFPP: I think, really, the main driver for the unwanted fire signals is brigades’1604
reducing the number of fire calls they have or false alarm calls they have. That’s1605
purely and simply; it’s cutting down on the number of attendances made. I think1606
the onus has been, it’s certainly been pushed back onto those responsible on the1607
various premises. I think; I’m not aware that there’s been a rise in fire damage as1608
a result of it. But to be honest, (author’s name removed), I don’t know where; I’ve1609
never looked into it and I don’t know, you know, if anybody has? As far as business;1610
well, the call centres, those that are operating the facility to call out fire services or1611
police or whatever in the event of an alarm going off, I think they’ve ...1612
Author: You mean the agencies, the call agencies?1613
GMFPP: Yes. They’ve, sort of, struggled with the concept more and I can un-1614
derstand, to some extent, why? Because we’re in a situation where Leicestershire1615
would operate and we would say, well we’re not coming out unless we’ve got this1616
criteria where you get Oxfordshire or one of the other brigades saying, well we’re1617
not coming out at all. There’s a huge variation right across the country and you can1618
understand why some of the bigger operators would be thinking; hold on a minute,1619
we can’t change; we can’t just, you know, write something specific to Leicestershire1620
and something specific to Nottinghamshire, then something specific to Derbyshire.1621
We’ve tried to work more regionally; when we first started we tried to make it a1622
regional approach and we end up setting up a sub-group on the back of CFOA fire1623
safety to look into that. But I think, you know, it has still resulted in different parts1624
of the country operating in different ways. It’s increased the burden on business1625
and it’s increased the business on the agencies that are handling those calls and1626
delivering that service as well. But ...1627
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Author: So the intention of the unwanted fire signals campaign, then, is just to save1628
time and effort?1629
GMFPP: Yes, but, I think, as a consequence of that, it puts the onus back onto the;1630
the University is a good example and the bigger hospitals and whatever; because1631
we’ve got dedicated fire officers there. They will put in procedures to deal with the1632
various situations and scenarios and that’s the whole thing about the going out;1633
we’ve got an alarm going off somewhere, you know somebody can just carry out,1634
have a quick look, make sure that it’s not a false alarm that can be easily identified1635
or whether, actually we do; it’s that confirmation; that, sort of, visual from a human1636
being rather than a detector head and I think it’s good in relation to them meeting1637
their obligation to fire safety. So the onus is pushed back on them.1638
As far as detail on unwanted fire signals, you know, if you do want some more1639
detail on that; (name removed) is leading on the CFOA side for unwanted fire1640
signals. So if you did want any more information on unwanted fire signals, probably1641
(name removed) would be a good source of information. Because he can give you the1642
industry viewpoint as well. Because I think he has had a bit of an uphill battle trying1643
to satisfy the fire industries requirements and needs and then taking the brigade’s1644
needs and trying to come up with something we can all work with; which he is1645
currently trying to do. So. it may be worth having a word with (name removed).1646
Author: So, is there an advantage to; does it give an advantage to commercial1647
organisations or any organisation the fact that ...1648
GMFPP: It certainly doesn’t give a commercial advantage to the fire industry that’s1649
looking after the fire calls or directing them through to emergency services because1650
they’re having to do more work, effectively. Because controls are asking for confirma-1651
tion of things before they are going to mobilise. So a service that’s being provided1652
by somebody say, like (company name removed) or (company name removed) or1653
one of the bigger operators, all of a sudden, rather than their operator getting a1654
signal come up and then calling us to go out; they’ve got to then go back and get1655
confirmation of the situation before they come through to us otherwise we’ll just be1656
asking them the questions. There are ways around that, of course, you just say it’s1657
a confirmed fire every time and, you know. But yes, so as far as an advantage to1658
the fire industry know that there isn’t an advantage to them as such, as I’ve said,1659
it’s more of a burden than anything. But I think that’s why (name removed) been1660
doing the work that he has been doing to try and get some middle ground so that1661
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we’re all satisfied that what we’ve come up with is reasonable and achievable.1662
Author: If an organisation such as the University takes that on board, though,1663
which (name removed) has; he doesn’t look at it as a defeat if he has to call the fire1664
brigade or if the fire brigade gets called; he doesn’t look at it as a defeat but he tries1665
to avoid that, if possible, or; he doesn’t try to avoid that. He tries to only call the1666
fire brigade when they need to be called. That’s his intention, that’s his aim; and1667
that’s; one of the reasons for that is because, you know, that the fire brigade used1668
to get called to Loughborough University so many times that it was embarrassing to1669
him. So, I suppose it’s the embarrassment factor that is part of his motivation; so,1670
in that respect there is an advantage. Not sure; well, there must be an advantage1671
to the University because; well, I don’t know. I don’t know whether there is less1672
damage, less fire damage.1673
GMFPP: Yes, potentially there is, isn’t there? Potentially you could make that ar-1674
gument, couldn’t you? Your initial action; let’s be honest, initial actions are crucial,1675
aren’t they? We’ve all, sort of, acknowledged, the fire services across the country 40 minutes1676
that we need to move the focus back again so that we are taking in those initial1677
actions that prevent something from being a one- or two-pump fire to something1678
that ends up as a ten- or twelve- or fifteen-pump fire; and obviously initial actions1679
are crucial in that respect. So, yes, it’s a very good point, if the onus is put back1680
onto those responsible for fire safety to actually conduct some kind of investigation,1681
you could argue and make that point, and I think that’s a valid point as well. That1682
their actions, if you’ve got an initial firefighting team or whatever you’ve got and1683
they do something about it, they could pretty much stop something from getting1684
completely out of control.1685
And I think there’s the disruption side of it as well, isn’t there? Somewhere like the1686
University; our trucks turning up all the while; really it doesn’t help or look good,1687
for a start, for a University but then there’s the disruption that’s caused through1688
that, through appliances turning up, you know, an hour, two hours, three hours,1689
whatever they’re there for with the difficulties that that has for traffic management1690
around the site, you know, whatever lessons, whatever were programmed into those1691
...1692
Author: According to (name removed), he now invites the Loughborough Station1693
in because he’s concerned that they don’t know the University well enough. That’s1694
because they never attend now. That’s quite poignant, I think.1695
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GMFPP: Absolutely, and, to be honest with you, they should be going there because1696
there’s a; that crucial link, isn’t there for the risk side of it? The crews need to have1697
an awareness of what the risks are. Now, I think with Loughborough University,1698
certainly when I was at Loughborough Station; I met with (name removed) a few1699
times. I know, (name removed), you know, had quite a lot of liaison with (name1700
removed) and I used to think it was a really positive and proactive approach to the1701
way, you know, we operate and the way that; and trying to reduce the potential for1702
things to go wrong. Should we turn up and not have the information and awareness1703
and, I think, we’ve moved on massively in that respect. And, hopefully, it should1704
continue and we should be focusing on the risks within their areas and should be1705
getting out there and ...1706
Author: That’s good firefighting.1707
GMFPP: Yes, absolutely.1708
Author: Okay, the last question then is; do you think it would be beneficial the1709
operational performance of the fire and rescue service with a performance metric1710
that evaluates the efforts of companies and organisations such as Loughborough1711
University, that demonstrate an improvement in business continuity or reduction of1712
fire damage? So, that would be a performance metric that looks at; that somehow1713
measures the standard of the performance of, for instance, Loughborough University,1714
and if that performance reduced the number of calls or the number of fires, reduction1715
of fire damage or whatever? That would reflect on the performance metric of the1716
fire and rescue service, you know, to be maintained or to be measured against or1717
whatever? There’s no detail to that, it’s just a concept?1718
GMFPP: No, and I think it’s something that, you know ...1719
Author: The value or the standard of the fire brigade is somewhat dependent on1720
the performance of the; Loughborough University.1721
GMFPP: Yes, It’s certainly something worth exploring. The difficulty we’ve got1722
with that, I suppose, is that; and it would be a great lever, I have to say, it would1723
be a great lever to get senior management to make them think, you know what,1724
it’s the work that some of these guys do that does reduce, overall, you know, our1725
attendance; they know this anyway but at times, you do feel that there’s not enough1726
attention given ...1727
Author: ... to inspecting officers?1728
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GMFPP: Yes, the inspection process and the value of the work that’s undertaken.1729
So it certainly would be good in that respect and, if brigades were given that,1730
the difficulty is; is that the resources we’ve got available to us to do it, effectively.1731
Because the inspection programme is a fraction; it’s a fraction of the premises or the1732
properties that we have right across the county. So, it would probably; it’s easier for1733
places like the University or the hospitals or De Montfort or Leicester or wherever1734
to; it’s easier to meet that because you’ve got a dedicated resource that can work1735
around that area. Not so easy, I think, when it’s a smaller business.1736
But there are things going on, at the moment, the primary authority scheme is1737
something that they’re looking to extend. Do you know about the primary authority1738
scheme?1739
Author: The primary authority; isn’t that where one authority deals with one type1740
of business or (company name removed) or something?1741
GMFPP: Yes, it’s very much like West Midlands used to do with (company name1742
removed) or we now currently do with (company name removed). But what it1743
does, it formalises the arrangement and also enables payment for the time taken to1744
administer and look after the arrangement. So it formalises things around there.1745
And that’s where, I don’t know, we could end up with, for example, maybe it may be1746
an extreme version, but universities could all come under one brigade. One brigade1747
would look after their, you know, fire safety advice dealing with issues and all the1748
rest of it. The issue that we get is that the post would need to be funded and so all1749
the time that was taken looking after whatever the issues were around those types1750
of buildings, there would be payment for that. You’d end up in a situation; you’d1751
have to end up in a situation where the post was funded through that arrangement1752
and; maybe taking universities is a bad example, (author’s name removed), but1753
let’s say something like (company name removed) or (company name removed) or1754
whatever, where, yes, we can extend what we’ve got at the moment which is the1755
Lead Authority Partnership Scheme; we can extend that; we can change it to a1756
Primary Authority Scheme; there’s no particular issue with that and, hopefully, it1757
won’t take too much work. We can do that, but having that one scheme is not1758
going to be sufficient. What you need is, probably, a hundred schemes, two hundred1759
schemes that you’re doing the same thing with to make it work. Because then, at1760
least, the posts are going to be funded. You’re going to get sufficient payment in to1761
fund those posts as separate, almost separate posts to the main inspecting officers.1762
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Author: What I’m thinking of is (company name removed), I’m aware of one or1763
two fires at (company name removed) but (company name removed) isn’t usually1764
at the top of the list for burning down; I was just thinking of (company name1765
removed) then because there’s another (company name removed) burned down in1766
Hampshire the other day and I know that (company name removed) has had one or1767
two spectacular fires but, considering the amount of (company name removed) there1768
are around the country, its a very small percentage. But concentrating so much on1769
these businesses; is it those businesses that burn down? Or is it the (company name1770
removed) ...1771
GMFPP: I think that’s part of the basis of why they’re looking to push it. Its as1772
simple as that because, what do they call it? The term is ‘assured advice’. So, if1773
you’re giving advice on a means of escape dilemma or a fire alarm system; what’s1774
sufficient and what’s not? Then that would be taken as assured advice and could1775
be applied right across the country to all those similar stores.1776
So, you’re absolutely right; I think what they’re trying to do; my argument has1777
been, I can see there’s a benefit to it but it is very specific and what they’re trying1778
to do is take something like primary authority; which is going to work in some1779
areas; undoubtedly, it will work but it’s not quite so easy to do it with fire safety1780
legislation.1781
Author: The focus of it, though, is because; is to make the; you know, (name1782
removed) manage their business more easily. Because then they don’t have problems1783
with each local authorities fire safety inspectors.1784
GMFPP: Yes and ultimately ...1785
Author: But does that reduce the amount of fire damage? Does it make the places1786
safer? Does it make; you know, that’s not the focus, is it? The focus is actually on1787
that business itself, isn’t it?1788
GMFPP: It is, yes, it is. But that’s what being pushed at the moment via the Better1789
Regulation Delivery Office at; from Central Government. That’s being pushed as1790
something that brigades are, whether it’s statutory or non-statutory is yet to be1791
decided, but, at the moment we’ve got six brigades doing a non-statutory trial for1792
six months under CFOA and we’ve got ourselves and another five brigades doing1793
a statutory trial through the Better Regulation Delivery Office. So, and we’ll see1794
how that pans out at the end of the day. I think that makes it easier for business,1795
whether; what effect it has on the fire safety overall; the potential for fire starting1796
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in the first place and the potential for it to spread beyond that room of origin? I’ve1797
absolutely no idea. Absolutely no idea.1798
Author: And I’m conscious that the (company name removed) place in London, their1799
Head Offices in London some years ago; the plush place, you know, where; multi-1800
storey building but they were prosecuted and fined £400,000; it was the biggest1801
prosecution at the time because of; yes, they had everything in place but they were 50 minutes1802
doing some modifications and they just hadn’t thought about fire safety manage-1803
ment. They were prosecuted on their fire safety management.1804
So even though, you know, (company name removed) might get; they wanted to1805
make certain adaptations to their building to accommodate the newest thing coming1806
in, you know, in retailing; it makes their job more easier because they don’t have to1807
negotiate with each authority. It’s only the fire safety management that’s going to1808
save it, isn’t it?1809
GMFPP: Yes, it is. That’s what it’s got to focus around, is the fire safety manage-1810
ment. If the fire safety management is right then, hopefully, everything else should1811
slot into place.1812
Author: Okay. I’m conscious of the time.1813
I have a list here and I’ve titled it, the general viewpoint of a senior fire safety officer.1814
I have a list here and what I want you to do is look at these and confirm that it is1815
your viewpoint as, you know, in your current role and I wonder if you could perhaps1816
prioritise that list? You know, which is the number one, the number; you know, if1817
you agree with the list, you know, which would be your number one priority, number1818
two and so on? Or whether they’re equal priority?1819
(Pause)1820
GMFPP: It’s quite a difficult one, (author’s name removed). I would say; (pause)1821
perhaps not, really; (pause).1822
Author: Make them equals if you ...1823
GMFPP: (Pause) and that one really ... That’s a two, that’s a two; that’s got to1824
be a two as well; that could be a three; two ones, three twos and; that’s not really1825
very helpful, is it?1826
Author: It is.1827
GMFPP: Are you sure?1828
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Author: Yes.1829
GMFPP: I’ve probably; do you know what? If I sat down and went through them1830
I’d probably change the priority around again but I’d say, initially, just as a ...1831
Author: No, that’s fine.1832
GMFPP: Like I say; that there is the whole emphasis of business and that; working1833
in partnership, they’re real biggies at the moment.1834
Author: I’m quite encouraged by your, you know, what you’ve said about supporting1835
the business community because, now sitting where I am, five, six years out of the1836
fire brigade, it seems to me that, you know, there’s a focus on life safety with the1837
fire safety order; in fact, as part of this thesis, I’ve been doing a literature review1838
and I’ve come up to the; I’ve started way back in the sixteenth century where the1839
Great Fire of London, whatever? When certain things were put in place and then1840
the London Acts from that the Victorian building acts up until the First World War;1841
sorry, the Second World War, the focus was on building protection and life safety1842
was secondary, it was by default. But since the Second World War the focus has1843
gone onto life safety with building protection as default. I have a comment from1844
an MP in Parliament actually saying that. Yo know, we’re going to concentrate1845
on life safety; as far as regards building protection we’re going to leave that to the1846
insurance companies. So, you know, why was that shift in emphasis and why has it1847
been reinforced and is still being reinforced? You know, apart from the comments1848
that you’ve made this morning. That’s quite intriguing to me and I don’t quite1849
understand why that is?1850
GMFPP: There’s definitely a national approach nationally with what’s going on and1851
what they want is for enterprise partnerships; local enterprise partnerships to run1852
the whole better business side of things and to try and bring the regulators together1853
and work under the LEP umbrella. So, Yes. Like I say, ourselves and West Mids,1854
actually, are the two that are involved. But, I think, we started up slightly before1855
West Mids did; so we got the ball rolling before West Mids did. So, yes there’s a lot1856
going on.1857
Author: Great, Thank you (name removed).1858
GMFPP: You’re welcome.1859
Author: I appreciate your time.1860
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Author: The whole thing is about fire safety management. That’s the core of my1861
Masters. So, I’ve got fire incident data for the University. I’ve got fire incident data1862
for Leicestershire and I’m comparing the two, but I’m interested in the University1863
because, from my point of view, the fire safety management is extremely good in1864
Loughborough University.1865
DFEC: You’ve spoken to (name removed), is it?1866
Author: I’ve interviewed (name removed), he was my first interview and I’ve in-1867
terviewed (name removed) who is the local District Manager of Leicestershire Fire1868
and Rescue Service; his office is in Loughborough Fire Station and yesterday, I in-1869
terviewed (name removed) who, at the moment, is the senior fire safety officer in1870
Leicestershire. So, I’ve got the viewpoint of (name removed), the fire safety man-1871
ager, the practitioner; I’ve got the viewpoint from the local District Manager whose1872
responsibility includes the Campus.1873
DFEC: So he’s the enforcer?1874
Author: ... the enforcer, regulator. He is, yes, but he’s more the operational side.1875
DFEC: Oh, okay.1876
Author: The enforcer really is the fire safety, the senior fire safety inspecting officer,1877
(name removed). Because he, you know you have the two sides to the fire brigade,1878
you have the operational side, you have the fire safety side. So I have the practitioner,1879
the operational guy, the regulator and then I was looking for someone from the1880
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insurance side. Because, to be honest, that’s the side I haven’t delved in. It’s a side1881
I don’t know too much about?1882
DFEC: Well do you know the University is insured by (name of company removed),1883
something like that?1884
Author: I didn’t, no.1885
DFEC: As part of my work, I’ve tried to speak to one of their surveyors; he was1886
very evasive but I know the name of the guy who surveys Loughborough University1887
on behalf of the insurer. So I can get you his contact details.1888
Author: Don’t worry about that at the moment; that’s a bit more, probably, in-1889
volved than I want to be at the moment. Because what I want to pick out is the1890
principles of what (name removed) does to manage fire safety so well. Because I1891
think those principles could be, perhaps enhanced or, if I could find out or measure1892
those principles then that could be some sort of measurement system of fire safety1893
management. But I’m aware that the insurance side, particularly the FPA, is al-1894
ready; measures fire safety management to a certain extent. It certainly does a lot1895
of training and ...1896
DFEC: Well, it measures losses, it measures when it goes wrong in terms of financial1897
consequence.1898
Author: Yes. And I think the starting point is the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety)1899
Order because that is whet the fire and rescue service regulate but that only focuses1900
on life safety, it doesn’t focus on property protection. So that sent me down another1901
course; why doe we only focus on life safety, why don’t we focus on property pro-1902
tection? And if you look back in history; up until the Second World War, probably,1903
we did focus on property protection. All the legislation, all the regulation was to do1904
with property protection then, suddenly, it flips about and we focus on life safety.1905
Nobody focuses on property protection, as far as I can see? And that’s; I think it’s1906
that ...1907
DFEC: It’s not only the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order but also the building1908
regulations; when you’re designing a building, the building regulations are very much1909
focused on life safety issues; its; means of escape and there’s a bit about limiting1910
spread of fire to other buildings but it is the safety of people, is the main focus of it.1911
Author: Property protection is by default, really.1912
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DFEC: Property protection, yes, I mean property protection is only really enforced1913
by insurers or people who are a bit more enlightened when they’re putting a design1914
together. Because architects tend to focus on, what they see as the bare minimum1915
they’ve got to do and that’s compliance with the building regs. As soon as I’ve done1916
that, I can get on with making the building look nice.1917
Author: That’s right, that’s right and, in fact, some of the conversations; the con-1918
versation I had with (name removed), yesterday, he mentioned one or two examples1919
of that; which I know full well because I’ve been in the same situation myself. You1920
know, dealing with an architect or a building designer or a fire engineer who has1921
to meet certain ventilation requirements has got the space to do it. Where do you1922
make the compromises? That’s an argument goes on every day with fire officers.1923
And of course, fire officers struggle because now we’ve got people like yourself; fire1924
engineers who are highly qualified, knowledgeable and you’re dealing with fire safety1925
officers who aren’t so highly qualified and who aren’t so knowledgeable. But you1926
have to get their say so for your designs and it’s quite difficult; I know that and I1927
know it’s getting worse because we now have fire-engineered solutions.1928
But that also brings me to; fire-engineered solutions are also exacerbating the prob-1929
lems with fire safety management.1930
DFEC: So you’re defining fire safety management; sorry, I should ask you; how are1931
you defining fire safety management?1932
Author: As the sum total of what the fire safety manager has to take into consider-1933
ation to correctly manage the building that he’s, you know, responsible for to make1934
sure it’s safe for the occupants and to make sure that the business that’s, you know,1935
in the building continues. So I think it’s the sum total of everything he has to do.1936
DFEC: Right. So, I mean, obviously within the scope of an MSc, you’ve got to focus1937
in on certain elements of it so you’re looking at buildings in use. That’s the main1938
element, isn’t it?1939
Author: Yes, such as the University.1940
DFEC: ... which is an enormous organisation with lots of property and quite; I1941
looked at; when I was; for the last couple of years I’ve sat on the Civil and Building1942
Engineering Department’s Safety Committee as a post-grad rep. That was quite1943
interesting because I could see how (name removed) fire safety management policy1944
was being devolved down to Schools and then buildings within the Schools. So1945
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it’s actually the safety officer within the department who is responsible for imple-1946
menting the management plan, so; I suppose one of my criticisms of the fire safety1947
management policy within Loughborough University is there’s a slight disconnection1948
between the policy and keeping tabs on how it’s implemented at the local level. The1949
building; the building that we work in is provided with a protected staircase; it’s1950
got signs that say ‘refuge’ at each level with an intercom and when I asked at the1951
Safety Committee, what happens when you push that button? What are your pro-1952
cedures, if you have a wheelchair user on the first floor? What are the department’s1953
procedures for ...1954
Author: ... who deals with it? What’s the management system?1955
That is part of the sum total of fire safety management.1956
DFEC: That is the nitty-gritty of fire safety management, isn’t it?1957
Author: Yes.1958
DFEC: It was interesting; they then asked me to come up with a departmental; to1959
enhance the departmental procedures to include that kind of thing; but they’ve got1960
fire wardens that walk round but nobody specifically mentions that there could be1961
some mobility-impaired people who have entered the building, come up in the lift but1962
they can’t use the lift to get out. Who has actually discussed with them; well, we’ve1963
got these refuges in that staircase over there and, if you press that button, you’ll1964
be put through to Security and; who has done that joined-up thinking? Within the1965
department, it wasn’t there?1966
Author: It wasn’t there. I was a fire safety warden in that department and that1967
was never discussed with me. so, you know, that’s one of glitches. But, I mean, the1968
probability of a wheelchair being there and, you know, it’s lowered anyway, isn’t it?1969
The probability of that happening when there is a fire is lowered anyway. You know1970
we get away with these things on probabilities, really.1971
DFEC: That’s right. But it’s interesting when you provide (unintelligible) of health1972
and safety legislation as well because the building is provided with equipment but 10 minutes1973
we’ve not provided any training in how to use that equipment.1974
Author: That’s right. and one of the things about the building regs is you’ve got1975
this Section 38, where you have to provide all this information to the occupiers. I1976
went into a brand new police station in (name of city removed) and they’d got; it’s1977
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just reminded me because they’d got these intercoms on the stairs and that was my1978
first question, you know, how does this work?1979
Well, you press the button.1980
Yes, but who does what?1981
Well, I don’t know?1982
Well, first of all let’s see what the information; you should have some information1983
under Section 38 of the building regs?1984
Right?1985
Have you got any information on any of the systems in here?1986
Oh yes. We have these folders.1987
We opened this cupboard and along the bottom there were about twelve folders. So1988
we took them out and all the information was in there which was provided as per1989
Section 38 of the building regs but had never been opened. So they were of no use1990
whatsoever!1991
DFEC: I’ve worked with (name of organisation removed) in their premises; you’ve1992
got an evac chair. Has anybody been trained in how to use it? No. Have you got1993
any personal evacuation plans for wheelchair users who might want to use those,1994
or choose to use them? No. So, sometimes, there’s some good intent in the design1995
of buildings and systems provided but its fire safety management is crucial to the1996
operation of the building and to actually allow these things to be used properly and1997
effectively and to be maintained.1998
Author: That’s right and that brings me back to the fire-engineered solutions be-1999
cause now we have more and more and more of these engineered solutions; and not2000
only completely fire-engineered solutions but partial fire-engineered solutions; the2001
fire safety management of looking after a building with a fire safety solution is or2002
could be, potentially, totally different from a traditional building itself. So, unless2003
the fire safety manager understands how the fire engineering works; understands2004
what should be maintained and in what priority and, you know, how it should be2005
tested and that; it’s never going to work, is it?2006
DFEC: Really it; that strategy is left in the capable hands of the fire safety manager2007
and then; throughout the life-cycle of the building and so if, in five years time, they2008
want to change that meeting room into a storeroom because they need more storage,2009
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it’s the fire safety manager who has to understand the implications of that change2010
and whether the fire resistance of the doors and the walls are adequate; all of that2011
stuff and ...2012
Author: ... and if you do the change through the proper channels; you go through2013
building control; who then liaises with the fire officer, both the building control2014
officer has to understand the whole of the system to see what effect it has and the2015
fire officer has to understand the whole of the system to see what effect it has.2016
DFEC: But someone’s got to know that to make that change, you’ve got to go2017
through those processes because the local building users could say; we don’t use2018
that material anymore, do we? Let’s just use it in storage and it goes unnoticed2019
until there’s a problem.2020
Author: That’s right. That’s right. I means this is all focused on life safety. I’m2021
looking at property protection and business continuity because I’m looking at the2022
fire damage, you know; how much fire damage; how much increased fire damage, is2023
there, if the fire safety management doesn’t work? If the system is faulty, does it2024
then result in extra fire damage? Fire damage is, you know, loss of jobs, damage to2025
the environment, etc. etc. etc. Which is where the insurance comes in because the2026
insurers.2027
I mean, that was one of; one of the responses from (name removed), the local District2028
Manager; when I started to talk about, you know, what happens if the; what happens2029
if the; I can’t remember the thing but it’s what happens if the building burns down,2030
his response was; well, they have insurance?2031
Well, yes but, you know, I didn’t expect that response from him? Because, yes2032
they’ve got insurance and, yes, they can have a sum of money the next day but how2033
about the jobs that are lost? How about the building that’s lost? How about the ...2034
DFEC: Let me give you an example. In 2005, there was a building in a university in2035
the south of England that caught fire. And it was a Sunday morning, it cause £502036
million of damage; it was Sunday morning, the fire service attended, the facade of2037
the building was behaving strangely. There was; the fire service suspected there were2038
cylinders within the building because of the research that went on so, consequently,2039
the fire service started defensive firefighting and didn’t go into the building and were2040
trying to protect surrounding buildings from the strange way that this building’s2041
facade just fell away like a bonfire. So, no-one was hurt. Was that a successful2042
design?2043
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Well, from a life safety perspective; a building regs perspective; a legislative per-2044
spective, it was fine. Like you say, they’re insured, the fire service did a dynamic2045
risk assessment at the fire scene and did what they had to do, and did all they could2046
do to save the surrounding buildings. However, this building housed an electronic2047
research facility. They were the world leaders in this field. They had contracts2048
with multi-national companies to do this ground-breaking research and the research2049
that went on in that building counted for 60% of the universities income. And that2050
income ceased overnight.2051
So, from a building that was designed in the 90s that passed building regs; was2052
managed by the university with risk assessments that took place annually; everyone2053
thought everything was fine but the fire resulted in that university; not only the2054
insurable loss of the building; that’s fine. £50 million? Yes, I’m sure the insurers2055
would pay up for that. It was this 60% of the university’s income stream that stopped2056
overnight; but you can’t insure for that; and that was the big embarrassment to the2057
university. Such an embarrassment that, despite me trying to use it as a case study2058
in my research; I met with the Chief Fire Officer of the brigade concerned. I met2059
with the Facilities guys on site at the university campus. I met with the insurers;2060
all three of these organisations were happy to talk about it but, like the fire service2061
said; we’ve got this big folder of information but I can’t let you see it unless we have2062
the university’s permission and the university wouldn’t give me permission to use it2063
as a case study because it was so embarrassing.2064
So that’s a good case of not thinking about the actual activities that go on in a2065
building and how that relates to the business or the operations of the organisation2066
and ...2067
Author: Business continuity, isn’t it?2068
DFEC: Business continuity being paramount in that building. And if that was2069
recognised before the fire then they would have done something differently. They2070
wouldn’t have had a building that was designed with good means of escape and a2071
fire detection system alone. They would have had this research broken down into2072
fire-resisting cells; they would have had (unintelligible) and fire suppression in there.2073
They would have had better passive fire protection so any incident that happened2074
would have been contained and because their fire safety management procedures2075
were lacking because; the biggest fire safety management failing in that incident2076
was that they had cylinders and they couldn’t account for cylinders within the2077
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building. If they had had a proper management regime for that and they knew the2078
locations of them, then the fire service might have been able to go in and do a bit2079
better job of salvaging the; rescuing the building.2080
Author: They hadn’t recognised the risk ...2081
DFEC: They hadn’t recognised that risk.2082
Author: ... appropriately. they’d recognised some risk but not the risk.2083
DFEC: And that was a university building.2084
Author: And. you know, it’s a good example. A good example of what I am on 20 minutes2085
about, I think? It’s; it’s also when things change. Because if you’ve got, say, the2086
(name of shopping centre removed) in town, which is dependent on its sprinkler sys-2087
tem; what happens when the sprinkler system goes down? Which, they occasionally2088
do. Do they shut the shopping centre?2089
DFEC: Well, I’ve got personal knowledge of (name of shopping centre removed)2090
in (name of city removed) and; have you ever been to (name of shopping centre2091
removed) in (name of city removed)?2092
Author: I have, yes.2093
DFEC: (Name of city removed) is the biggest concentration of people for miles2094
around and, consequently, (name of shopping centre removed) is the biggest risk on2095
the patch of (name removed) Fire and Rescue Service within that district. So they2096
pay close attention to what goes on at (name of shopping centre removed).2097
Author: (Name of city removed) Fire Station is the only full-time volunteer station2098
in England.2099
DFEC: And it’s right next to the shopping centre, isn’t it?2100
Author: but it’s the only volunteer fire station in England (laughs).2101
DFEC: Anyway, I know they’ve had instances where a vehicle in the loading-bay has2102
reversed into a valve set, cutting out a section of the sprinkler system and the fire2103
service have said; the fire service have come and said, I’ll put a prohibition notice2104
on you unless you get that sorted within half an hour.2105
So, yes. To answer your question, shopping centres can get closed down if the2106
protection measures aren’t in place and that costs; the consequential damages from2107
that are millions in terms of losing trading hours.2108
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Author: Yes, but it’s the fire safety manager who has to be aware of how important2109
the sprinkler system is; how vital it is to the shopping centre, to be able to then, do2110
something about it. So he also has to have the authority to do something about it.2111
And, such as (name removed), you know, with all his valiant efforts, he hasn’t got2112
the total authority that he needs and he’s always batting his head up against a brick2113
wall. He hasn’t got that lifeline to the; not the Chief Executive; the Chancellor,2114
the Vice-Chancellor. He hasn’t got that line; direct line to the Vice-Chancellor,2115
there are people between. But he needs that because he has to make decisions or,2116
potentially, make decisions like that.2117
So, you know, there are lots of problems for a fire safety manager.2118
DFEC: I suppose for you to put this into some kind of structure so you analyse what2119
we’re talking about, have you got to ask me these questions in order? Have you got2120
to ask me these questions so that you can some analysis or are you alright with a2121
chat?2122
Author: I’ve used the questions; I’ve done that with the other three interviews. I2123
wasn’t going to be so strict and rigid today because you’re an academic anyway, you2124
know what it’s all about. I wanted to, really, explore how you see things with your2125
particular background. As I say, it’s one that’s alien to me anyway.2126
Question 3 there, it says, do you think there’s a parallel between the standard of2127
fire safety management and the amount of fire damage?2128
DFEC: Yes. I think an example of that was the management of cylinders within a2129
building ...2130
Author: I know (name removed) has palpitations about cylinders at Loughborough2131
because, if you go in, I think it’s the (name of building removed) for one; that’s2132
one I’ve walked around with (name removed) and I know there’s the odd Acetylene2133
cylinder, you know, here and there and (name removed) explained to the building2134
manager about what happens if there’s a fire involving an Acetylene cylinder. You2135
know, there’ll be an exclusion zone; you won’t be able to get back in the building for2136
at least twenty-four hours, you know, are there alternatives you could use instead of2137
Acetylene, It’s just batting his head against a brick wall because they are still there2138
because; oh no, we can’t use anything else, it’s impossible, we have to use Acetylene.2139
So that’s one example of ...2140
DFEC: It’s one example but, yes. I think that a good standard of fire safety manage-2141
ment does reduce the likelihood of fire and, probably, fire damage as well. Because,2142
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the likelihood of fire is to do with good management of keeping ignition sources2143
away from fuel, isn’t it? It’s about reducing ignition sources so it’s about portable2144
appliance testing, it’s; you do test your fixed wiring ...2145
Author: I think; going back to my definition of fire safety management; I think I2146
would reduce it to the control of the ignition. Fire safety management is the control2147
of the ignition. If it’s a process of using an ignition, it’s controlled, however?2148
DFEC: It could also be control of the fuel itself, though because good housekeeping2149
and making sure that you don’t store combustible waste inappropriately and stuff2150
like that, is part of it, isn’t it? Making sure that your wheelie bins aren’t right up2151
against; I mean, a lot of this good fire safety management can be about prevention of2152
arson as well, can’t it? Or making sure you are not giving a source of fuel to potential2153
arsonists by having wheelie bins unlocked underneath the eaves of a building.2154
Author: If you live in an area where arson is, you know, (unintelligible speech), you2155
have to have precautions.2156
DFEC: Having a secure site and monitoring it. So. yes. I can’t say anymore except,2157
yes. I do think ...2158
Author: If you concur then, that there’s a parallel between them, let’s go onto the2159
next one. The next one is about the fire service campaign for; to reduce unwanted2160
fire signals.2161
DFEC: What are the benefits of it?2162
Author: That was brought in, in my opinion, that was brought in purely to reduce2163
the amount of time and effort that the fire brigade does. I don’t think there was2164
any consideration given for businesses, organisations, occupiers as to what effect it2165
would have on them? And I know that I’ve seen, no end of times, comments and2166
complaints, you know, from the fire industry saying this is unacceptable, this should2167
have never been and why are they doing this? And so on and there’s no; there2168
doesn’t seem to be an explanation to it? So, I wondered what the benefits to the2169
industry are; what the benefit to commerce is?2170
DFEC: Well, I don’t know if there are any benefits to commerce except that, hope-2171
fully, their council rates would be coming down if they’re not paying so much to the2172
fire service for unwanted interventions but for the end-user, it means that they’ve2173
got to be aware of the situation and if they’ve got, for example an auto-dialer on2174
their fire alarm system which sends a message out to an alarm receiving centre,2175
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they’ve got to back that up with a physical ‘phone call as well. If they want the2176
fire service to come out can’t rely on just that signaling, they’ve got to confirm it,2177
haven’t they? They need to know that.2178
Author: Well it depends where you are because it’s a post-code lottery again.2179
DFEC: So for large organisations who have got premises; like hotel chains, for ex-2180
ample, who’ve got places all around the country; they need to know their local2181
(unintelligible speech), don’t they? It doesn’t really apply to Loughborough Uni-2182
versity so much.2183
Author: Well, it does and that has been a big motivator for (name removed). Be-2184
cause when he first came to the University, the fire brigade were turning up every2185
five minutes for false alarms, so he put in a system that’s still running today where2186
the Security check first before; well, I think it depends on time of day, it’s different2187
during the night hours from the day hours but the; it results in one years-worth2188
of alarm signals within the University was 450 that a fire alarm was activated in,2189
you know, one of the buildings on the University site. Out of those 450, only five2190
times were the fire brigade called to site. Whereas it would have been 450 times in2191
previous years. Which is what really impresses me about what (name removed) has2192
done, to be honest.2193
DFEC: What was the most obvious cause for unwanted alarms? Was it students2194
doing daft things?2195
Author: It’s cooking, more than anything. It’s cooking setting off smoke detectors2196
in the residential units; the student halls.2197
DFEC: So, is that a a human thing or is it something; would it be able to make 30 minutes2198
him (unintelligible speech) in the way the building was designed to prevent some2199
of those? For example, making sure there were closers on doors; cooking only took2200
place in designated kitchens; kitchens had detectors; there were self-closing doors so2201
that smoke doesn’t get into the corridor where there were smoke detectors?2202
Author: He’s certainly tackled that but what he’s got is an education programme in2203
place that starts in August/September and he teaches that year’s intake and gets,2204
you know; gets the number of calls down; reduces them to a certain extent then they2205
go away and the next intake comes and he has to start all over again. But, yes, he2206
does tackle that and it is seasonal, so yes. But that’s; if you ask (name removed),2207
what are the benefits of this unwanted fire signals that it’s forced him to do that.2208
238
Appendix 5: Transcript of interview with the The Director of a Fire Engineering
Consultancy
It’s forced him to look at the management system and to fine-tune it so the fire2209
brigade don’t get called.2210
DFEC: I know it’s probably focusing on life safety but another advantage of reducing2211
unwanted signals is, it gives confidence in the building so that when they hear the2212
fire alarm, it’s a fire. It’s not, duh, it’s another false alarm. I’ll not bother leaving2213
just yet. So it does give confidence.2214
Author: Other than those benefits to the fire brigade and the benefit that (name2215
removed) mentioned which has made him; forced him to do things, I can’t see; I’m2216
not aware of any evidence that it reduces the amount of damage or the number of2217
fires ...2218
DFEC: No, and it might be the opposite? Because it might be that there’s a delay2219
before the fire service actually respond to genuine fires.2220
Author: Well the insurance companies would be complaining then, wouldn’t they?2221
Because they’d be paying more out on the insurance and I’m not aware that that2222
message is coming out from say, the FPA?2223
DFEC: Well they are complaining. I can get you a report; send you a report that2224
RISCAuthority produce. RISCAuthority is the insurer funded scheme that the FPA2225
administer, which was looking into just this issue and the implications to insurers.2226
And it was a lobbying kind of document to say that it was actually being detrimental2227
to industry.2228
Author: That would be interesting.2229
DFEC: Right, I’ll get that for you. And it was based on certain statistics as well. I2230
think that’s quite a useful document for you.2231
Author: My next question was a, sort of, concept one. The fire brigade have always;2232
well not always but since the 1990s have had performance indicators which this2233
present Government has rescinded. But the fire brigade are so into performance2234
indicators that most fire brigades have kept them and, in fact, introduced, what2235
they call, local performance indicators, which they’ve dreamed up themselves.2236
I was wondering if it would be possible, and I’d welcome your opinion on this;2237
if it would be possible to bring in some performance indicator that measured the2238
performance of the fire brigade related to the amount of fire damage that was in2239
their administrative area. So, how you would measure it, I don’t know. But what it2240
would mean; the fire brigade would have to make some effort to reduce the amount2241
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of fire damage and if there’s a parallel between fire safety management and the2242
amount of fire damage then it would mean by addressing fire safety management2243
they would automatically reduce ...2244
DFEC: Well that would be much more of a motivational factor for fire prevention2245
work.2246
How are they measured at the moment, then?2247
Author: They’re measured on the amount of deaths but it’s specific because it’s2248
fire deaths in accidental dwelling fires. But as I said, they’re not measured now2249
because this Government has rescinded them, so they’re not. But most of the fire2250
brigades are still carrying on with measurement in their risk management plans.2251
It’s the number of fire deaths in accidental dwelling fires. So that excludes all the2252
deliberate fires; deliberately setting fire to yourself and so on. They’re measured on2253
the attendance times. Most of them measure the, you know, the number of female2254
firefighters, the number of ethnic ...2255
DFEC: Diversity?2256
Author: Diversity. They’re those type of measurements. But the one for fire deaths2257
has caused the fire brigade to reorganise, partially. They’ve brought in this, what2258
they call, community fire safety; which really is focused on accidental deaths; fire2259
deaths in accidental dwelling fires. So now, if you ring up the fire brigade they’ll2260
come round and do an inspection of your house. They’ll give you a free smoke alarm.2261
If you’re in; what they done is they’ve looked at the statistics and found out the risk2262
profiles. So if you go on a fire station now and say; what’s the most likely profile of2263
the next person to die on your patch, they will say, well, it’ll be an elderly man who2264
lives on his own and smokes because that is the most likely to die in a fire.2265
But, if you went on a fire station; and this is the point I’m making; if you went on2266
a fire station and said; what’s the most likely profile of the type of premises that’s2267
going to burn down in your area, they won’t have a clue because the work hasn’t2268
been done on it. And, I think, where I’m coming from, is the work could be done2269
on it, we could have risk profiles for places such as this or (name of a business park2270
removed) down the road there; and we could have the probability of that being2271
the, you know the next likely type of fire, in which case it would be up here on a2272
priority list, you know, more at risk than this one. So if you tackled the fire safety2273
management in that one, you know, you could reduce the risk just like they are with2274
fire deaths in accidental dwelling fires.2275
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DFEC: That’s an interesting concept and it would focus resources in a different way,2276
wouldn’t it?2277
Author: If it worked and it reduced the amount of fire damage then it would reduce2278
the need for the number of resources that they have at the moment. The resources2279
that they have at the moment for tackling fires are the most expensive. If you have2280
an operational firefighter and a fire safety officer standing next to each other, the2281
one is far cheaper than the other; because you have to have a fire engine and all2282
the equipment to service this one but you only need a notebook and pen to service2283
this one. So, if this one could have the knowledge of all the fire safety management2284
priority; what it should; what it should tackle and it reduces the amount of fire2285
damage, you will reduce the need for the expensive one. So, potentially, it’s a far2286
cheaper fire service.2287
DFEC: I don’t know if this is; I don’t know the truth behind this statement but it’s2288
been told to me a couple of times; the difference between fire service, not mentalities2289
but motivations. If you picture rufty-tufty Americans, they want to be on the busiest2290
fire station. They want to be going out to the most fires whereas this contrasts with2291
a place like Hong Kong where they see it as a personal failure that they actually2292
have to go out and attend a fire because they’re so focused on the fire prevention2293
and fire safety. That is their mandate and they see it; the station officer feels a2294
personal failure if there’s a fire on their patch or on their watch.2295
It’s funny, isn’t it? That that’s the kind of change that we’re talking about?2296
Author: Yes, we’re talking about the change from reactivity to proactivity. If you2297
can get in first and prevent the problem, it’s a lot better than waiting for it to2298
happen ...2299
DFEC: ... it’s cheaper.2300
Author: Yes, it’s cheaper and less damaging to the environment.2301
DFEC: So you could measure it; you could measure that in terms of pounds; mone-2302
tary loss or you could measure in terms of area, I suppose for; it would be a difficult2303
one to measure but the concept seems to have legs, doesn’t it?2304
When you think about the history of the fire service, they were, way back; weren’t2305
they started by the insurance companies anyway? It was all about, if you had your2306
insurance policy and you had the plaque on the wall, the fire service would come2307
and put your fire out.2308
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Author: That’s right.2309
DFEC: It was all about property protection and then there was; a lot went into 40 minutes2310
salvage operations as well? So after you’d put your fire out, the fire service were2311
interested in making sure the water they’d used wasn’t running off and damaging2312
other areas; I don’t know if that’s much of a focus these days?2313
Author: It is a focus but I don’t think it’s so much of a focus. I can remember2314
sheeting up machines and sheeting up roofs and so on but it doesn’t seem to go on2315
so much today and they don’t carry so many salvage sheets as we used to carry in2316
those days.2317
DFEC: It’s odd how the focus has changed and perhaps it’s about time (unintelligible2318
speech).2319
Author: Well it’s, I mean the motivation for tackling fire deaths is because society2320
won’t tolerate it. It won’t tolerate too many fire deaths. You know, if there’s five2321
people die in a fire, as there has in Leicestershire, you know, there’s a big outcry;2322
because what are the fire brigade doing about it? Well, this is what the fire brigade2323
are doing about it. They’re doing smoke alarms, they’re doing risk inspections,2324
etc.etc.2325
You know, (company name removed) down the road here, burns down; there’s no2326
outcry, is there? That was the biggest fire that Leicestershire’s ever had!2327
DFEC: But it’s been talked about a lot in insurance circles ...2328
Author: I’m sure it is, yes.2329
DFEC: ... and it’s still going through the courts. As to who’s going to pay for it2330
because there’s some doubt over; I don’t know the details but there’s conflict be-2331
tween the sprinkler maintenance company or something like that. Was the sprinkler2332
system fully operational and then when there’s large sums of money at stake, it’s2333
amazing how motivated the insurance companies are to investigate thoroughly what2334
happened.2335
Author: I investigated that fire and I was looking over the shoulder of three, four2336
insurers because I was just fascinated by their methods, to be honest about it. We2337
had formed this little working group, you know, to investigate the fire and really, I2338
was sitting back just listening to what they were talking about.2339
DFEC: What were the big issues there then?2340
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Author: Well, the big issue was the fact that; do you know the story of the fire?2341
DFEC: I don’t.2342
Author: The big issue was that they tested the sprinkler pumps at half past nine2343
one morning and there was a burst in the; underneath the car park. The burst2344
pipe was six foot under the ground. So they immediately tried to dig it up and2345
repair it and they went through a gas main, which meant they had to stop. And it2346
was, that was half past nine in the morning, well it was seven o’clock at night when2347
(company name removed) ignited. Of course the sprinkler operated for two minutes2348
and then stopped. The fire brigade had no chance because they expected the fire2349
to be controlled by the sprinklers. I have to say the firemen from (name of town2350
removed) here, they, you know, I would credit them with doing the right things but2351
being defeated by what had happened.2352
But what never came out and what hasn’t come out, as far as I am aware. It2353
didn’t come out in the fire report because the fire investigation report; because2354
that’s just to investigate the cause of the fire. What didn’t come out was the fire2355
safety management failure. Which was that the site management ‘phoned around2356
the twenty-eight units and told them that the sprinkler system was inoperative; it2357
was only a verbal message ..2358
DFEC: This is (name of business park removed) management?2359
Author: The site management for (name of business park removed). They ‘phoned2360
through to each of the the units and told them that the sprinkler system was inop-2361
erative; they didn’t give them any advice on what to do or what effect that might2362
have; it was just a bald statement; your sprinkler system isn’t working but, certainly2363
in (company name removed), that message just got lost. So the fire safety manager2364
obviously didn’t realise the implications of that message.2365
DFEC: Oh, I see. It was the main to the site itself that was burst?2366
Author: The sprinkler system was a ring main and, I understand from the insurers,2367
that there was a; and I looked at the diagrams myself but there was a way of diverting2368
the; around the burst. I never fully understood how that could have been done but2369
the insurers were positive that it could have been done and I guess that’s what2370
the insurers negotiations and argument have been about? But, it was a sprinklers2371
system; the ring main which; with a burst so none of the twenty-eight sprinklers off2372
that main would; I think there were four pumps and I think you could have two2373
major fires in the twenty-eight units before it was overdrawing the system.2374
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So it was down to that burst sprinkler main but my contention is that it was also a2375
fire safety management failure because the information was there but nothing was;2376
it wasn’t challenged; it just got lost.2377
DFEC: What did actually cause the fire?2378
Author: It was never found out. I had got an argument with the insurers that it2379
was twenty yards away from where they thought it was. I had got all the footage,2380
the CCTV footage and so on but I just eliminated all the ignition sources that I2381
could and I was left with nothing (laughter).2382
But I think that is part of my motivation for this thesis, is that that was a fire safety2383
management failure; because the company could have done something. I don’t know2384
what? I mean, first of all they could have found out what a risk it was; what risk2385
they were taking if they did nothing?2386
DFEC: At the bare minimum they could have had a more stringent fire watch whilst2387
the sprinkler system not going to function properly?2388
Author: They could have, yes. It would have cost less in the long run.2389
So there was no consideration of that information, there was no understanding of2390
what it meant?2391
DFEC: They didn’t quantify that additional risk in terms of what it could do to2392
them? And, yes. A very high profile fire, really, within the industry, within the2393
insurance industry, anyway.2394
Author: I’m sure and certainly the biggest fire that Leicestershire has ever had!2395
DFEC: So, wow! I mean is this, sort of, one of the recommendations that is going2396
to come out of your work?2397
Author: I don’t know? Because I don’t know whether it’s feasible. I think the2398
concept is good; it’s the feasibility. I don’t know how you’re going to measure it?2399
DFEC: How did your fire service interviewees respond to that?2400
Author: Oh, it won’t work. No way of measuring it. But that’s not good enough,2401
I’m afraid.2402
But I think a performance indicator would be some measure of the amount of fire2403
damage, you know, the fire damage would reduce somehow which would measure;2404
would measure the performance of the fire brigade. How that would happen I don’t2405
...2406
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DFEC: Ultimately there has to be motivation from the Government to measure2407
something again.2408
Author: I think, at the end of the day, it’s down to us as a society. Because it’s us2409
complaining about the number of fire deaths that makes the Government act to do2410
something and it would be us complaining about the amount of fire damage that2411
would compel the Government to do something; and we’re not complaining. Fire2412
damage is still increasing; eight and a half billion pounds or something per year;2413
well, that depends on how you measure it because it’s the consequences of it and,2414
you know; if you include the costs of keeping the fire engines in the fire station into2415
that cost; there’s different ways of costing it, as you know; the amount of damage.2416
But as far as I can work out, it’s still increasing and we still accept it in our insurance2417
premiums and whatever?2418
DFEC: I think it’s a good concept; it’s very, yes; you’re right. It’s always a tough2419
sell.2420
Author: The last bit; I don’t know whether I put it in the e-mail; did I put? Ah.2421
I’ve got some points down here which I’ve called the general viewpoint of an insurer2422
and I wondered if you would just look at those and see whether they’re valid and 50 minutes2423
perhaps; these are the points here. They’re valid and, if so, what sort of; would2424
there be a priority order for them and are there any missing, I suppose would be2425
the other question?2426
DFEC: Did you know that insurers do not make a great deal of money from insuring?2427
They make their money by investing it on the stock market.2428
Author: I’d guessed; I don’t know exactly how insurers make money but I can2429
imagine that there are all sorts of mechanisms to do something with the money, to2430
make money.2431
DFEC: Insurers, quite often, pay out in claims, more money than they take in2432
premiums. But it’s because of their investments; how they invest that money that2433
they take from people before they have to pay it out, that makes the organisation’s2434
money.2435
So, obviously, if they’re taking on a risk, as they call it; if they have a financial2436
incentive in a risk, then they are very keen to know that that is being managed as2437
best as it can be.2438
Author: What efforts do they go to?2439
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DFEC: Well, before they take on a policy they, quite often, send out a surveyor to2440
have a look at it. So they look at; depending on what the policy is? It’s very rare to2441
find pure fire insurance policies now, it tends to be a property insurance, so that’s2442
security, flood as well as fire; all the perils, as they call them, they don’t tend to2443
have so many hurricane risks in this country but that’s all included in there. So2444
the surveyor goes out to make sure the building is constructed of materials that fits2445
within the risk appetite of the particular insurer; some insurers, they won’t take on2446
timber-framed, for example. So they’ll only; they’re looking for a building that’s2447
constructed from robust materials, bricks and mortar or sandwich panels, stuff like2448
that.2449
Author: Is it true that it’s difficult to insure thatched buildings?2450
DFEC: Yes, it is difficult, yes.2451
Author: Some insurers won’t even insure thatched buildings.2452
DFEC: So they’re looking at construction; they’re looking at how well maintained2453
that building is. Whether it’s in a good state of repair, housekeeping, management2454
does play a large part. They’re looking at how the fire precautions within the2455
building are maintained. They’re very interested, if the building is sprinklered,2456
they want to know that it is maintained properly and they may want to do some2457
testing of the pumps, themselves; and then they tend to have annual insurance2458
programmes of surveying whilst they’re responsible for those buildings. So, for2459
example, Loughborough University; I’ve thought of his name now, (name removed),2460
does Loughborough University; (name removed) goes out annually to Loughborough2461
University on behalf of (name of company removed) to do his checks,2462
Author: So he would interview (name removed), presumably?2463
DFEC: He probably talks to (name removed), yes. I’ll get you his contact details,2464
it might be worth a ‘phone call at least.2465
So, fire safety management is important but, from an insurance point of view, prop-2466
erty protection really is about; good property protection is about physical things2467
that don’t require human intervention. Because wherever there’s human intervention2468
there’s a chance that things could go wrong. And the insurers calculate insurance2469
policies based on a concept called estimated maximum loss (EML). Now, estimated2470
maximum loss is, basically, a calculation of a typical ignition source and a typical2471
fire; what’s the most we can lose here? And they tend to base that calculation on2472
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things not working. So, they wouldn’t reduce their EML if the building is sprin-2473
klered, for example, or if it’s got fire detection because they might not work. So an2474
EML is calculated based on physical; as a two-hour compartment walls or physical2475
boundaries of buildings. So, for example, if you are looking at the EML of the2476
Department of Civil and Building Engineering, it would be 100% because one fire2477
could travel throughout the whole of the building; a total loss. So that building2478
would be 100% irrespective of how well that building is managed. The pricing of2479
that policy would be based on the insurer could see 100% loss of that building.2480
And, they’re quite stubborn about that sort of thing and insurers attitudes are based2481
on historical loss statistics and they’ve got statistics for different types of occupancy2482
and they know that for different types of industry or different types of warehousing,2483
statistically speaking, they can expect to have any fires in any given year and that’s2484
what they base their pricing on. So it’s historical fire statistics; loss statistics and2485
this concept of EML.2486
So, fire safety management probably comes quite low down their list of priorities.2487
Important, and they might make it more attractive for them to take on a policy but2488
it probably wouldn’t affect the pricing much.2489
Insurers want hard facts and, not just metaphorically speaking, but practically they2490
want hard walls and they want to know that a fire is going to be limited by bound-2491
aries within the construction.2492
Author: Which is what, you know, how it used to be. That’s the principle of2493
compartmentation? Which is all going now with fire engineering.2494
DFEC: Yes. Fire engineering does present a problem to insurers if they’re going to2495
insure a property. For example ...2496
Author: And it also makes fire safety management more important.2497
DFEC: It does, exactly. It’s interesting. It’s a perverse world, really. The investment2498
part of the insurance life, where they make their money, they’re probably invest-2499
ing in fire-engineered buildings. If you think about the Gherkin in London. That2500
was commissioned and the majority of it is owned by a Swiss reinsurance company,2501
(company name removed). Now that’s a building with, not a great deal of compart-2502
mentation. It’s a high profile building which is based on; completely fire-engineered2503
and other insurance companies have offices within that building, it’s so high-prestige2504
but it makes you think; are they practicing what they preach?2505
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So, the general viewpoint of an insurer; reduce the amount of fire damage, well, yes2506
definitely; and that’s probably one in order of importance. One and two; I know2507
you only have four here but these are probably nine and ten.2508
Author: (Laughs) No, that’s useful.2509
DFEC: Fire safety management is a nice to have but it’s not what motivates the2510
insurer to a great extent ...2511
Author: ... and it doesn’t motivate the fire service at all, I don’t think?2512
DFEC: Which is odd because from the legislative point of view I’d have thought2513
the; the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order was predominantly talking about2514
the Responsible Person managing fire safety, in the appropriate way?2515
Author: Yes, I’m sorry. In relation to property protection, I was thinking. You’re 60 minutes2516
quite right, yes. It is about fire safety management. It’s all about fire safety man-2517
agement but it’s about fire safety management with a focus on life. Providing the2518
life is saved, you know, hang the building.2519
DFEC: Does that help, in terms of motivation of the insurer?2520
Author: It does.2521
DFEC: That’s why the insurance surveyor goes out every year and (name removed)2522
goes out every year. (name removed) is doing his life safety fire risk assessment.2523
(name removed) is going out and doing his insurance survey. They’re looking at the2524
same buildings but from different perspectives.2525
(Name removed) is coming out with his fire risk assessment which is life safety2526
focused; (name removed) is coming out with his insurance report which is very2527
much property protection focused; he’s looking at how the building is built? He2528
is looking at how it’s managed, to a certain extent; he would be horrified if he2529
saw cylinders randomly strewn across a building but he’s looking at hard facts and2530
physical structure.2531
Author: Now I must correct you there because (name removed) looks at; he focuses2532
on life safety because he knows that is the focus of the fire risk assessment but2533
his equal focus is on something that he calls, asset protection; which is business2534
continuity and property protection. He has an equal focus, in my opinion, an equal2535
focus both of those.2536
DFEC: Right. Excellent. Yes. Which is brilliant because, sometimes, business2537
continuity is a strange term because it applies whether you’re in business or not.2538
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Mission continuity, is another way of looking at it. The School’s should be designed2539
with business continuity in mind; not because we’re in business generating money2540
but because they need to be providing a learning environment, you know, for the2541
children that they’re responsible for; and, if their school burns down then there’s a2542
failure there, isn’t there? There’s a big failure and they’re not able to continue their2543
mission, their objectives.2544
Author: (name removed), thank you. I’m grateful for your time2545
DFEC: You’re welcome.2546
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